HARMFUL SIGNALS: CARTEL PROHIBITION AND OLIGOPOLY THEORY IN THE AGE OF MACHINE LEARNING

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
European Union ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Oligopoly Theory ◽  
Communicative Acts ◽  
Sherman Act ◽  
Learning Capabilities ◽  
The U.S

Abstract The traditional legal approach for distinguishing between illicit collusion and legitimate oligopoly conduct is to rely on criteria that relate to the means and form of how rivals interact, such as elements of “practical cooperation”, or on the finding of an anticompetitive intent. These criteria ultimately refer to the inner sphere of natural persons and its emanations in communicative acts. Some authors therefore conclude that the cartel prohibition of Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or Section 1 of the U.S. Sherman Act is unable to capture collusion if it is achieved by autonomously acting computers relying on machine learning capabilities. It is instead suggested here to define collusion as parallel informational signals, which achieve a supracompetitive equilibrium, and to use the consumer welfare standard as a proxy for distinguishing between illicit collusion and legitimate oligopoly conduct. This approach is not tantamount to the idea of prohibiting tacit collusion as such. Rather, it is to check singular elements of communication, that is, “informational signals”, within an existing oligopolistic setting for their propensity to create consumer harm. This approach can help to close potential regulatory gaps currently associated with the surge of algorithmic pricing.

Statutory Provisions and Higher Court Interpretations

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Primary Source ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Sherman Act ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines competition law's doctrine on horizontal agreements. It begins by addressing the U.S. statute, Sherman Act Section 1. The chapter then turns to the leading Supreme Court precedents on Section 1. These are the primary source of U.S. antitrust law in general and specifically in delineating what constitutes a horizontal agreement. Here, there is more conflict than meets the eye. Finally, the corresponding provision in the European Union, Article 101, is examined. Because the underlying questions and the relevant economic theory of oligopolistic coordination are the same, it is natural to expect similar challenges to arise, and they do.

Sensory Quality and Histamine Formation during Controlled Decomposition of Tuna (Thunnus thynnus)

1996 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
EMILIO I. LÓPEZ-SABATER ◽  
JOSÉ J. RODRÍGUEZ-JEREZ ◽  
MANUELA HERNÁDEZ-HERRERO ◽  
ARTUR X. ROIG-SAGUÉS ◽  
MARIA T. MORA-VENTURA
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Shelf Life ◽  
Sensory Quality ◽  
Health Hazard ◽  
Human Consumption ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Histamine Production ◽  
Histamine Formation ◽  
Hazard Levels ◽  
The U.S

Histamine production was studied during controlled tunafish decomposition at 0, 8, and 20°C. The influence of the location of the anatomic section on the amount of histamine formed and the incidence of histidine decarboxylating bacteria were also considered. By the time of sensory rejection, histamine levels in tunafish sections stored at 0 and 20°C were still below the hazard levels and the allowable levels established by both the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European Union. Toxic amounts were only formed after the tunafish was considered organoleptically unsuitable for human consumption. However, at 8°C, levels of histamine between 100 and 200 mg/l00 g of fish were found before tuna reached the rejection point. Hence, physical appearance was not a good criterion for estimating the shelf life and especially the histamine-related health hazard when tuna was stored at 8°C, a common temperature in many home refrigerators.

Trump Administration Recertifies Iranian Compliance with JCPOA Notwithstanding Increasing Concern with Iranian Behavior

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 1056-1062
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The Other ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Ongoing Concern ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Trump Administration

In July 2015, Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Pursuant to that agreement, Iran committed to limiting the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. By law, the U.S. State Department is required to certify Iran's compliance with the agreement every ninety days. The Trump administration first certified Iran's compliance with the agreement in April 2017, albeit reluctantly. In its first certification, the Trump administration expressed ongoing concern about Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, and repeated previous criticism of the JCPOA as “fail[ing] to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran.”

scholarly journals Agency Insight from Portugal’s Autoridade da Concorrência

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-238
Author(s):  
Margarida Matos Rosa
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Eu

Abstract 2020 will be a landmark year for reasons that had not been anticipated. But it is also a critical year for the implementation, by national legislators in the European Union, of the ECN+ Directive. This will grant competition agencies stronger means of enforcement and will consecrate independence of enforcement decisions based on the pursuit of consumer welfare protection. Another developing topic in 2020 is industrial policy in the EU and its coexistence with competition policy. While the EU needs to remain pragmatic, it need not — must not, I would argue - lose its distinctive economic features.

scholarly journals Understanding the Environmental Background of an Invasive Plant Species (Asclepias syriaca) for the Future: An Application of LUCAS Field Photographs and Machine Learning Algorithm Methods

Plants ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Péter Szilassi ◽  
Gábor Szatmári ◽  
László Pásztor ◽  
Mátyás Árvai ◽  
József Szatmári ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
Invasive Species ◽  
European Union ◽  
Land Cover ◽  
Invasive Plant ◽  
Learning Algorithm ◽  
Machine Learning Algorithm ◽  
Invasive Plant Species ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Asclepias Syriaca

For developing global strategies against the dramatic spread of invasive species, we need to identify the geographical, environmental, and socioeconomic factors determining the spatial distribution of invasive species. In our study, we investigated these factors influencing the occurrences of common milkweed (Asclepias syriaca L.), an invasive plant species that is of great concern to the European Union (EU). In a Hungarian study area, we used country-scale soil and climate databases, as well as an EU-scale land cover databases (CORINE) for the analyses. For the abundance data of A. syriaca, we applied the field survey photos from the Land Use and Coverage Area Frame Survey (LUCAS) Land Cover database for the European Union. With machine learning algorithm methods, we quantified the relative weight of the environmental variables on the abundance of common milkweed. According to our findings, soil texture and soil type (sandy soils) were the most important variables determining the occurrence of this species. We could exactly identify the actual land cover types and the recent land cover changes that have a significant role in the occurrence the common milkweed in Europe. We could also show the role of climatic conditions of the study area in the occurrence of this species, and we could prepare the potential distribution map of common milkweed for the study area.

Tiptoeing the Line Between National Security and Protectionism: A Comparative Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Screening in the United States and European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Jason Jacobs
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
National Security ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
The United States ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
The U.S

AbstractWeaponization of state-backed, foreign investments by China is an emerging national security threat in the United States and the European Union. The U.S. and E.U. have espoused similar policy goals—to address the threat without closing their markets to foreign direct investment—while fostering increased cooperation between allied partners in screening transactions.On the surface, the recent, China-specific measures taken by the U.S. and the investment screening framework adopted by the E.U. appear reflective of an alignment of those policy goals. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that is exactly what is happening. However, closer examination reveals a stark divergence. The U.S. has a robust screening mechanism that has evolved into a weapon of economic warfare. The E.U. meanwhile, remains a patchwork of conflicting—or nonexistent—national regulations overlaid by a comparatively toothless investment screening framework.There is a tendency to attribute this divergence to structural differences between the United States and European Union. This in-depth comparison of U.S. and E.U. investment screening mechanisms exposes a split that goes beyond application and into actual policy. This revelation should temper expectations that the E.U. is equipping itself to block transactions that are of concern to the U.S.

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