Iterated Reckless Ignorance as a Substitute for Knowledge
Previous chapters have been concerned mainly with willful ignorance—which, paradigmatically, is to violate the duty to reasonably inform oneself about a suspected inculpatory proposition with the intention of preserving one’s ignorance. But one also might fail to inform oneself about one’s suspicions with other mens rea: one might do so while reckless or negligent with respect to the fact that one will remain in ignorance. Such lesser breaches of one’s investigatory duties can be culpable too. However, the existing willful ignorance doctrine does not reach these lesser forms of culpable ignorance. That is a problem. This chapter argues not only that it would be good for courts to go beyond the existing willful ignorance doctrine, but that they are committed to doing so. The law allows willful ignorance to substitute for knowledge on the theory that acting with the former can be culpable to the same degree and in the same way as acting with the latter. Accordingly, the law is committed also to allowing certain forms of egregious nonwillful ignorance—most importantly, reckless ignorance—to substitute for knowledge, provided the conditions of equal culpability are met.