scholarly journals Kinematics and observer-animator kinematic similarity predict mental state attribution from Heider–Simmel style animations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bianca A. Schuster ◽  
Dagmar S. Fraser ◽  
Jasper J. F. van den Bosch ◽  
Sophie Sowden ◽  
Andrew S. Gordon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Random Forest ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Correct Identification ◽  
Random Forest Analysis ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Clinical Populations

AbstractThe ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. Animations tasks, in which observers watch videos of interacting triangles, have been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations. Compared to control participants, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism typically offer less appropriate mental state descriptions of such videos. Recent research suggests that stimulus kinematics and movement similarity (between the video and the observer) may contribute to mental state attribution difficulties. Here we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we confirmed the hypotheses that an animation’s jerk and jerk similarity between observer and animator significantly contribute to the correct identification of an animation. By employing random forest analysis to explore other stimulus characteristics, we reveal that other indices of movement similarity, including acceleration- and rotation-based similarity, also predict performance. Our results highlight the importance of movement similarity between observer and animator and raise new questions about reasons why some clinical populations exhibit difficulties with this task.

scholarly journals Attributing Minds to Triangles: Kinematics and Observer-Animator Kinematic Similarity predict Mental State Attribution in the Animations Task

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bianca A. Schuster ◽  
Dagmar S. Fraser ◽  
Jasper J. F. van den Bosch ◽  
Sophie Sowden ◽  
Andrew S. Gordon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Correct Identification ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Clinical Populations

Abstract The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. One task that has been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations is the animations task, where participants are asked to infer mental states from short videos of interacting triangles. In this task, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorders typically offer fewer and less appropriate mental state descriptions than controls, however little is currently known about why they show these difficulties. Previous studies have hinted at the similarity between an observer’s and the triangles’ movements as a key factor for the successful interpretation of these animations. In this study we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we demonstrate that an animation’s kinematics and kinematic similarity between observer and generator are integral for the correct identification of that animation. Our results shed light on why some clinical populations show difficulties in this task and highlight the role of participants’ own movement and specific perceptual properties of the stimuli.

scholarly journals Attributing Minds to Triangles: Kinematics and Observer-Animator Kinematic Similarity predict Mental State Attribution in the Animations Task

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bianca A. Schuster ◽  
Dagmar S. Fraser ◽  
Jasper J. F. van den Bosch ◽  
Sophie Sowden ◽  
Andrew S. Gordon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Correct Identification ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Clinical Populations

Abstract The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. One task that has been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations is the animations task, where participants are asked to infer mental states from short videos of interacting triangles. In this task, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorders typically offer fewer and less appropriate mental state descriptions than controls, however little is currently known about why they show these difficulties. Previous studies have hinted at the similarity between an observer’s and the triangles’ movements as a key factor for the successful interpretation of these animations. In this study we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we demonstrate that an animation’s kinematics and kinematic similarity between observer and generator are integral for the correct identification of that animation. Our results shed light on why some clinical populations show difficulties in this task and highlight the role of participants’ own movement and specific perceptual properties of the stimuli.

Dehumanization and Mentalizing Animals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Phenomenal States

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.

6.  Mental State Decoding in Dysphoric Individuals: The Role of Motivation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brooke Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Social Activity ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Underlying Mechanism ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Depression Symptoms ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Decoding Ability

Depression is associated with pervasive impairments in social and interpersonal functioning. Research demonstrates that individuals with depression have difficulty interacting with peers and show lower levels of social activity than do nondepressed individuals (Levendosky, Okun, & Parker, 1995). In addition, depressed individuals report that their social interactions are less supportive and less rewarding than those of non‐depressed individuals (Nezlek, Hamptom, & Shean, 2000). This reduced social competence may cause depressed individuals to disengage from social interaction, which may in turn exacerbate their state of depression (Rippere, 1980). It is thus important to understand and identify the mechanisms beneath these deficits.  Researchers commonly use the theory of mind framework to understand impaired social functioning in clinical conditions. Theory of mind refers to the ability to make judgments about others’ mental states to understand and predict their social behaviour. Research has found a relationship between theory of mind and dysphoria (i.e., elevated scores on a measure of depression symptoms, but not necessarily a diagnosis of clinical depression). Specifically, dysphoric individuals demonstrate enhanced mental state judgments (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005).  My research investigates social motivation as an underlying mechanism for dysphoric individuals’ enhanced decoding ability. A sample of undergraduates will participate in a theory of mind decoding task following social, monetary or no motivation. I hypothesize that dysphoric individuals will make significantly more accurate judgments than non‐dysphoric individuals. Further, I predict that social motivation will enhance non‐dysphoric individuals’ sensitivity to others’ mental states.

scholarly journals The Effects Of Adult Ageing And Culture On Theory Of Mind

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
louise phillips ◽  
Louisa Lawrie ◽  
Alexandre Schaefer ◽  
Min Hooi Yong
Keyword(s):  
Socioeconomic Status ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Generational Changes ◽  
False Belief Reasoning

Older adults tend to have poorer mental state understanding (Theory of Mind, ToM) than their younger counterparts, including in both Western and Asian cultures. The current study aimed to directly investigate whether there are any cultural differences in the pattern of age effects on ToM tasks. Given evidence of cultural differences in the development of ToM across childhood, we predicted that older Asian adults would find the mental state tasks particularly resource-demanding. We used two ToM tests which made differing demands on updating multiple mental states (the false belief task) and applying social rules to mental state processing (the faux pas task). We also looked at the role of education, socioeconomic status, individualism versus collectivism and working memory (WM). A total of 298 participants from UK and Malaysia completed faux pas, false belief, and WM tasks. Results showed that interacting effects of age and culture were evident in faux pas detection, some aspects of false belief reasoning, and WM tasks, with older Malaysian participants performing poorly compared to the other groups. We also found that WM fully mediated age differences in ToM in the Malaysian sample. High levels of individualism were associated with poorer faux pas detection, but education and socioeconomic status did not explain additional variance in the ToM tasks. This pattern of results may reflect generational changes in the familiarity and cognitive load of explicit mental state attribution, along with cultural differences in the pace and nature of cognitive ageing.

scholarly journals The 3d Mind Model characterizes how people understand mental states across modern and historical cultures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Sarah Wolf ◽  
Brian J. Reilly ◽  
Edward Slingerland ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
State Representation ◽  
Historical Societies ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
Different Cultures

Humans rely on social interaction to achieve many important goals. These interactions rely on people’s capacity to understand others’ mental states: their thoughts and feelings. Do different cultures realize this ability in different ways, or do universal principles describe how all peoples understand mental states? Here we investigated mental state representation in 57 countries, 17 languages, and 4 historical societies. We quantified mental state meaning by analyzing large bodies of text produced by each culture. We then tested whether a theory of mental state representation – the 3d Mind Model – could explain which mental states were similar within each culture. The model explained mental state representation in all studied cultures, indicating that universal principles describe how people understand other minds.

scholarly journals Theory of minds: managing mental state inferences in working memory is associated with the dorsomedial subsystem of the default network and social integration

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73
Author(s):  
Meghan L Meyer ◽  
Eleanor Collier
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Social Interaction ◽  
Social Integration ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social World ◽  
Default Network ◽  
State Information ◽  
Points Of View

Abstract We often interact with multiple people at a time and consider their various points of view to facilitate smooth social interaction. Yet, how our brains track multiple mental states at once, and whether skill in this domain links to social integration, remains underspecified. To fill this gap, we developed a novel social working memory paradigm in which participants manage two- or four-people’s mental states in working memory, as well as control trials in which they alphabetize two- or four-people’s names in working memory. In Study 1, we found that the dorsomedial subsystem of the default network shows relative increases in activity with more mental states managed in working memory. In contrast, this subsystem shows relative decreases in activity with more non-mental state information (the number of names alphabetized) managed in working memory. In Study 2, only individual differences in managing mental states in working memory, specifically on trials that posed the greatest mental state load to working memory, correlated with social integration. Collectively, these findings add further support to the hypothesis that social working memory relies on partially distinct brain systems and may be a key ingredient to success in a social world.

Critical Note

2018 ◽  
pp. 512-525
Author(s):  
Mitchell Herschbach
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Interaction ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Situated Cognition ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Critical Note ◽  
Internal Capacity

I argue that the chapters in this section only modestly challenge the “traditional mindreading account,” which sees the capacity for mental state attribution as central to human social cognition. This internalist, cognitivist account has already been refined in recent years to give greater attention to unreflective, dynamic social interaction and non-mindreading processes. The chapters here support a kind of embodied social cognition that does not involve mindreading. They also support the idea that an embedded/situated cognition perspective can inform the nature of the mindreading and non-mindreading forms of social cognition, particularly their use during dynamic social interaction. Further, important empirical questions arise about the importance of social interaction in the development of mindreading. But the more radical extended cognition thesis only appears sporadically and is weakly defended. Thus, the 4E perspective represented here does not challenge the importance of the “representation-hungry,” internal capacity for mindreading.

Mental state attribution in schizophrenia: What distinguishes patients with “poor” from patients with “fair” mentalising skills?

2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 358-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Brüne ◽  
D. Schaub
Keyword(s):  
Executive Functioning ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Skills Training ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Normal Ranges ◽  
Median Split

AbstractPurposeAlthough many patients with schizophrenia are impaired in mental states attribution abilities, a significant number perform within normal or near-normal ranges in mental state attribution tasks. No studies have analysed cognitive or behavioural differences between patients with – to some extent – preserved mental state attribution skills and those with poor mentalising abilities.Material and methodsTo examine characteristics of “poor” and “fair” mentalisers, 58 patients with schizophrenia performed a mental state attribution task, a test of general intelligence, and two executive functioning tests. “Poor” and “fair” mentalising skills were defined according to a median-split procedure; the median score in the patient group was also within two standard deviations of the control group. In addition, patients’ social behavioural skills and psychopathological profiles were rated.ResultsPatients performing within normal or near normal ranges on the mental state attribution task had fewer social behavioural abnormalities than patients with poor mentalising abilities (even when controlled for intelligence), but did not differ in executive functioning. Fair mental state performers showed less disorganisation and excitement symptoms than poor performers. The degree of disorganisation mediated the influence of mental state attribution on social behavioural skills.ConclusionsSchizophrenia patients with (partially) preserved mentalising skills have fewer behavioural problems in the social domain than patients with poor mentalising abilities. Conceptual disorganisation mediates the prediction of social behavioural skills through mentalising skills, suggesting that disorganised patients may require special attention regarding social-cognitive skills training.

Mentalizing during social interaction: the development and validation of the interactive mentalizing questionnaire

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyan Wu ◽  
Bowen John Fung ◽  
dean mobbs
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Discriminant Validity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Convergent And Discriminant Validity ◽  
Development And Validation

Studies have shown that during social interaction a shared system underlies inferring one’s own mental state, and the mental states of others – processes often referred to as mentalization. However, no validated assessment has been developed to measure second order mentalization (one’s beliefs about how transparent one’s thoughts are to others), or whether this capacity plays a significant role in social interaction. The current work presents a interactive mentalization theory, which divides these directional and second order aspects of mentalization, and investigates whether these constructs are measurable, stable, and meaningful in social interactions. We developed a 20-item, self-report interactive mentalization questionnaire (IMQ) in order to assess the different sub-components of mentalization: self-self, self-other, and other-self mentalization (Study 1). We then tested this scale on a large, online sample, and report convergent and discriminant validity in the form of correlations with other measures (Study 2), as well as correlations with social deception behaviors in real interaction with Mturk studies (Study 3 and Study 4). These results validate the IMQ, and support the idea that these three factors can predict mentalization in social interaction.

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