scholarly journals Research on Public Rental Housing PPP Project Launching Dilemmas with Dynamic Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Xuan Zhou ◽  
Dan Liu ◽  
Chuanbin Yin
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rental Housing ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Urban Housing ◽  
Government Performance ◽  
Performance Incentives ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

The public housing PPP projects have encountered a cold reception from the government, which constrained solving the urban housing problem. This paper builds a dynamic game model under incomplete contract conditions, analyzes the key factors affecting the signing of PPP contracts by dynamic evolutionary game analysis, and verifies these factors by simulation. The results show that fiscal spending smoothing, risk transfer, and government performance can promote government to adopt cooperation strategy. Expected project benefits and government performance incentives can promote private capital to adopt cooperation strategy. Changes in transaction cost have a significant impact on the decision of cooperation strategy.

The role of information and communications technology in the transformation of government and citizen trust

2019 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 708-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Mahmood ◽  
Vishanth Weerakkody ◽  
Weifeng Chen
Keyword(s):  
Information And Communications Technology ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Government Performance ◽  
Communications Technology ◽  
Trust In Government ◽  
Digital Government ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Survey Responses

We present an empirically tested conceptual model based on exit–voice theory to study the influence of information and communications technology-enabled transformation of government on citizen trust in government. We conceptualize and address the key factors affecting the influence of transformation of government on citizen trust, including government performance and transparency. Based on 313 survey responses from citizens in Bahrain, the top-ranked country in information and communications technology adoption in the Gulf Cooperation Council region, we test government performance and transparency as mediators between transformation of government and citizen trust. The resulting preliminary insights on the measurement and manifestation of citizen trust in the context of information and communications technology-enabled transformation of government have multiple policy implications and extend our understanding of how information and communications technology-enabled transformation of government can improve the government–citizen relationship and digital services adoption. Points for practitioners To fundamentally change the core functions of government, information and communications technology-enabled transformation of government must move beyond the simple digitization and web enabling of processes. Information and communications technology-enabled transformation of government has the potential to address declining citizen trust in government by improving transparency and performance. The success of information and communications technology-enabled transformation of government in Bahrain is attributable to its small size and demographic composition, the relative maturity of digital government initiatives, and the complete commitment of the government to information and communications technology-enabled transformation of government.

Impact Research on a Nonlinear Cold Chain Evolutionary Game Under Three Various Contracts

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Tiantong Xu ◽  
Yalan Hong ◽  
Xueli Zhan
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Models ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Cold Chain ◽  
Chain Dynamic ◽  
Management Advice ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

In this paper, we establish a cold chain dynamic game model including a milk manufacturer and two downstream oligopoly supermarkets under the wholesale price contract in the real world. The manufacturer is responsible for the production and cold transportation, and the two retailers sell the product. The Nash equilibrium points and the complexity of the system are discussed. The influence of the decision parameters and the stability of the system are studied by using complexity theory. We reveal the stable regions for the dynamic system. In addition, revenue sharing contract and profit sharing contract are two valuable contracts. In order to see how the two contracts would impact on the system’s equilibrium solution and the profits, we establish and analyze two new dynamic models for the cold chain. By the comparison of the analyses under three contracts, we find that the manufacturer’s effort of cold transportation will change under different contracts, and the profit distribution of the whole cold chain will be affected. Chaos control is also studied by the method of delay feedback control, in order to provide some management advice.

scholarly journals Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Liwen Chen ◽  
Mengjia Zhang ◽  
Shiwen Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Existing Building ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Service Companies ◽  
The Government

Existing building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green retrofitting in China. This paper establishes the perceived payoff matrix and evolutionary game model of the government, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), banks, and owners. Through simulation analysis, the primary factors affecting the choice of game strategy and the stable strategy under different conditions are discussed. The results show that the strategic choices of the government, ESCOs, banks, and owners influence each other in the two game models. Government regulations will have an impact on the strategic choices of ESCOs, banks, and owners. The owners’ strategy choice is closely related to the perceived benefits and costs of retrofitting. Based on the results, corresponding suggestions are proposed to provide theoretical support for the development of the existing building green retrofitting market.

scholarly journals The Dynamic Game of Knowledge Hiding Behavior from Organizational Members: To Hide or Not to Hide?

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Fan Yang ◽  
Long Yang ◽  
Ping Li
Keyword(s):  
Negative Correlation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Stable Equilibrium Point ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Knowledge Leakage ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Innovation Ability ◽  
Hiding Behavior ◽  
Knowledge Hiding

In the era of the knowledge economy, it is urgent for organizations to solve the problem of knowledge hiding of internal members to accelerate the speed and efficiency of knowledge dissemination and innovation and adapt to rapid changes in the market. At present, research on knowledge hiding has received extensive attention from Western countries, but there are few relevant studies in China. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of second-level knowledge hiding of organizational members and analyzes the main factors affecting the stable equilibrium point using MATLAB numerical simulation. The results show that knowledge leakage risk is positively correlated with knowledge hiding. The ability of knowledge absorption and transformation is positively correlated with the behavior of knowledge hiding. There is a negative correlation between collaborative innovation ability and knowledge hiding. There is a negative correlation between knowledge stock and knowledge hiding. Only when the incentive reaches a certain level can organizational members be encouraged to give up knowledge hiding. This paper provides a more comprehensive and dynamic picture of the evolutionary game of knowledge hiding among members in the organization and provides a new idea of knowledge management for organizational managers.

The Energy-Saving Management System Design of Major Projects in Implementation

2014 ◽  
Vol 919-921 ◽  
pp. 1739-1743
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Ming Yuan Ma ◽  
Hong Tu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Energy Saving ◽  
Management System ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Management Mechanism ◽  
Rational Management ◽  
The Government ◽  
Information Dynamic ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

The energy-saving management system of major projects in implementation has always been in a state of imperfect. On the basis of combining energy-saving management status of major projects in implementation, referring to the research results of the management mechanism design theory at home and abroad, this paper aims at the primary interest-related subjects of the major projects energy-saving, uses economic mechanism designing theory and incentive theory, designs the energy-saving management mechanism; It does the theoretical analysis of the government and major projects owner with the complete information dynamic game model, then, provides decision evidence for the government to formulate the rational management intensity and maximize the interests of all parties. At last, the paper provides the suggestions to solve the existing problems of major projects energy-saving management.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Model of Iranian Labor Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Younes Brumand ◽  
Masoomeh Salary
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Status ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we analyze the interactions among workers, employers, and the government in the Iranian labor market using game theory. For this purpose, different games among the factors affecting the labor market are analyzed in both static and dynamic situations. In each case, intervention and non-intervention of the government are also examined. Thus, four different types of games are studied, including a static game between worker and employer, without government intervention; a static game among workers, employers, and the government; a dynamic game between worker and employer, without government intervention; and a dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government. In the first three games, Nash equilibrium implies low productivity of worker, low employer’s profits, and high unemployment rate in which players want to maintain the status quo. However, in the dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game can provide some conditions in which the labor market gets away from the low productivity situation

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game on Government Regulation and Green Supply Chain Decision-Making

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiayang Xu ◽  
Jian Cao ◽  
Yunfei Wang ◽  
Xiangrong Shi ◽  
Jiayun Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Green Behavior ◽  
The Government ◽  
Green Suppliers

Sustainability issues have gained growing awareness in recent years. Governments play an important role in environment and resources problems since they can affect enterprises’ production activities by enacting policies and regulations. To promote green production in the long term associated with the consideration of financial intervention of governments, we establish a three-population model of suppliers, manufacturers and governments based on evolutionary game theory, and analyze the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of their unilateral and joint behaviors. Further, system dynamics (SD) is applied to empirical analysis for exploring the dynamic interaction of the populations’ strategy, and the key factors affecting ESS are also discussed in detail. The results show that: (1) the proportion of green suppliers and manufacturers in their groups determines whether the government implements regulation; (2) any party of the supplier and manufacturer that adopts green strategy could promote green behavior of the other; (3) the government is advised to supervise and implement reward and punishment mechanism under the low proportion of green supply chain; (4) government regulation could promote the corporations to adopt green behavior and should preferentially implements the mechanism on manufacturers. The results provide insights into the policy-making of governments and enterprises management on sustainable development.

The Study of Company's Carbon Abatement Investment under Carbon Tax

2013 ◽  
Vol 869-870 ◽  
pp. 860-865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jia Yun Xia ◽  
Xiang Lou Gao
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Total Carbon ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Carbon Abatement ◽  
The Government ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
Duopoly Market

Emission tax is one of the most efficient economic mechanisms to reduce carbon emissions. Under the situation that government imposes tax , we develop a two-stage dynamic game model. First, Government achieves total carbon emissions targets by imposing carbon tax. Second, two companies constitute a Cournot duopoly market. Companies adjust their output and the proportion of carbon emissions to maximize profits. And through numerical analysis, we find that: When the Government set up the target emission, it will encourage companies to invest carbon emissions abatement, and enable companies to reduce carbon emissions. And then the Government may reduce the rate of carbon tax. Finally, Government and companies can get win-win situation. In the Cournot duopoly market , Abatement Company has more advantage in the competition of the market and more sustainable under the constraint of carbon tax. Otherwise, Non-abatement company is more sensetive to the changes of carbon tax.

scholarly journals The Game Analysis of Manufacturers’ Political Connections on Product Safety in Supply Chain: Evidence from China

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhao Na ◽  
Wang Fusheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Product Safety ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
The Political ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Product Protection ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

This paper studied the political connections on product safety in supply chain. In market economy, information asymmetry exists throughout the entirety of supply chains that ought to ensure product safety. Due to the existence of game relations between the government and manufacturers in the aspects of product safety and regulation, the formation of market equilibrium depends on political connections between the government and manufacturers. Based on study and analyses of a static game model and a dynamic game model, this paper reveals that governments and manufacturers must use positive political connections to achieve product protection and supervision of safety throughout the supply chain. On the other hand, negative political connections lead to losses of both governmental credibility and social profits. This study indicates that inherent mechanism of political connections exists in the supply chain; it will help to enrich the theory of supply chain.

scholarly journals Behavior Analysis on the Security Object of the Public Rental Housing

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 233-237
Author(s):  
Yanhai Zhang ◽  
Yaoiwu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Process Analysis ◽  
Rental Housing ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Evolutionary Strategy ◽  
Housing System ◽  
Object A ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Rental Housing ◽  
Basic Hypothesis ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

With the establishment of the system of public rental housing supply, the vulnerable group would get great benefit in the promotion of social welfare, however, due to the existence of price gap and the imperfection of the public rental housing system, the game relationship formed between the management authority and the security object. Based on the definition to the security object in the public rental housing, the specific classification to the security object was analyzed at first, and then the motivation of the security object to obtain the unjust enrichment was discussed from the perspective of policy and the behavior. To stimulate the relationship and interaction between the management authority and the security object, a dynamic game model was presented in the context of basic hypothesis, the evolutionary strategy was summarized after the game process analysis. The possible paths to prevent from the behavior of free-riding of the security object was finally concluded.

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