scholarly journals Experimental Philosophy on Free Will and Determinism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Robin Aldridge-Sutton
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Central Point ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Recent Movement ◽  
History Of ◽  
Original Interpretation ◽  
Folk Intuitions

<p>In the debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism most philosophers on both sides think that folk intuitions are a constraint on philosophical theorising. Most also think that the same criteria are required for free will in all cases. But recent attempts to empirically study folk intuitions about free will appear to show that these two positions cannot be jointly maintained. That is because folk intuitions about free will appear to represent compatibilist and incompatibilist criteria for free will in different cases. In response to this some philosophers have run new studies to demonstrate problems with older ones and undermine their results. One such study has been claimed to show that some participants mistakenly inferred that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions given determinism. In this thesis I argue that the questions about causation that were used in this study were too ambiguous to show this. My central point is that when considering the causal history of an action we tend to privilege the earlier causes over later ones. When participants responded that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions they may have meant that there were earlier conditions that caused the agent‘s mental states which then caused their actions. This would show that the participants had made the correct inference that given determinism the causal histories of an agent‘s actions extend back in time to events outside of the agent‘s mind. Thus the problem of the apparent mismatch between folk intuitions and philosophical theories of free will remains. I also suggest that the results of these studies also appear to demonstrate a greater level of disagreement among folk intuitions about the same cases than philosophers seem to expect. This raises questions about whether the same theory of free will has to apply to everyone, and if so, whether folk intuitions support any such theory. In chapter one I begin by briefly describing the free will debate and the role that folk intuitions usually play within it. I describe some debate over the usefulness of folk intuitions in philosophy, and make some small contributions on behalf of their usefulness. I describe and defend the recent movement towards attempting to empirically study folk intuitions on philosophical issues. In chapter two I describe the empirical studies that seem to show that folk intuitions about free will represent compatibilist criteria in some cases and incompatibilist criteria in others. I suggest that they also seem to show that when considering the same case some folk have compatibilist intuitions and some have incompatibilist intuitions. I raise some questions about the implications of rejecting the assumption, which most philosophers seem to make, that people generally have the same intuitions about the same cases. In chapter three I present the study that is claimed to show that participants in the earlier studies were confused, and thus that they did not really have incompatibilist intuitions. I present my arguments against it and conclude that for now the original interpretation of those studies stands, along with the problems it raises.</p>

scholarly journals Experimental Philosophy on Free Will and Determinism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Robin Aldridge-Sutton
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Central Point ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Recent Movement ◽  
History Of ◽  
Original Interpretation ◽  
Folk Intuitions

<p>In the debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism most philosophers on both sides think that folk intuitions are a constraint on philosophical theorising. Most also think that the same criteria are required for free will in all cases. But recent attempts to empirically study folk intuitions about free will appear to show that these two positions cannot be jointly maintained. That is because folk intuitions about free will appear to represent compatibilist and incompatibilist criteria for free will in different cases. In response to this some philosophers have run new studies to demonstrate problems with older ones and undermine their results. One such study has been claimed to show that some participants mistakenly inferred that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions given determinism. In this thesis I argue that the questions about causation that were used in this study were too ambiguous to show this. My central point is that when considering the causal history of an action we tend to privilege the earlier causes over later ones. When participants responded that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions they may have meant that there were earlier conditions that caused the agent‘s mental states which then caused their actions. This would show that the participants had made the correct inference that given determinism the causal histories of an agent‘s actions extend back in time to events outside of the agent‘s mind. Thus the problem of the apparent mismatch between folk intuitions and philosophical theories of free will remains. I also suggest that the results of these studies also appear to demonstrate a greater level of disagreement among folk intuitions about the same cases than philosophers seem to expect. This raises questions about whether the same theory of free will has to apply to everyone, and if so, whether folk intuitions support any such theory. In chapter one I begin by briefly describing the free will debate and the role that folk intuitions usually play within it. I describe some debate over the usefulness of folk intuitions in philosophy, and make some small contributions on behalf of their usefulness. I describe and defend the recent movement towards attempting to empirically study folk intuitions on philosophical issues. In chapter two I describe the empirical studies that seem to show that folk intuitions about free will represent compatibilist criteria in some cases and incompatibilist criteria in others. I suggest that they also seem to show that when considering the same case some folk have compatibilist intuitions and some have incompatibilist intuitions. I raise some questions about the implications of rejecting the assumption, which most philosophers seem to make, that people generally have the same intuitions about the same cases. In chapter three I present the study that is claimed to show that participants in the earlier studies were confused, and thus that they did not really have incompatibilist intuitions. I present my arguments against it and conclude that for now the original interpretation of those studies stands, along with the problems it raises.</p>

Desire, Foresight, Intentions, and Intentional Actions: Probing Folk Intuitions

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 133-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Folk Intuitions

AbstractA number of philosophers working under the rubric of "experimental philosophy" have recently begun focusing on analyzing the concepts of ordinary language and investigating the intuitions of laypersons in an empirically informed way. In a series of papers these philosophers – who often work in collaboration with psychologists – have presented the results of empirical studies aimed at proving folk intuitions in areas as diverse as ethics, epistemology, free will, and the philosophy of action. In this paper, I contribute to this research program by discussing the results of some new experiments that further probe folk intuitions about the relationship between desire, foresight, intent, intentional action, and moral considerations.

Free Will and Open Alternatives

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 167-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos J. Moya
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
History Of ◽  
Actual Sequence

Abstract In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom.

scholarly journals Laypersons’ Beliefs and Intuitions About Free Will and Determinism

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 539-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilad Feldman ◽  
Subramanya Prasad Chandrashekar
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Future Orientation ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Social ◽  
Human Uniqueness ◽  
Folk Intuitions ◽  
The Universe

We linked between the social psychology and experimental philosophy paradigms for the study of folk intuitions and beliefs regarding the concept of free will to answer three questions: (1) What intuitions do people have about free will and determinism? (2) Do free will beliefs predict differences in free will and determinism intuitions? and (3) Is there more to free will and determinism than experiencing certainty or uncertainty about the nature of the universe? Overall, laypersons viewed the universe as allowing for human indeterminism, and they did so with certainty. Examining intuitions of prosociality, future orientation, learning, meaningfulness, human uniqueness, and well-being, ratings were highest in the indeterministic universe condition and lowest in the deterministic universe condition, both significantly different from the uncertain universe condition. Participants’ free will beliefs had only weak impact on realism, happiness, and learning intuitions but did not reverse the general intuition favoring indeterminism and showed no impact on other intuitions.

Media Psychology and Complex Modes of Entertainment Experiences

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Klimmt
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Terror Management Theory ◽  
Death And Dying ◽  
Terror Management ◽  
Media Psychology ◽  
Mixed Emotions ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Complex Modes ◽  
History Of ◽  
Media Enjoyment

This comment briefly examines the history of entertainment research in media psychology and welcomes the conceptual innovations in the contribution by Oliver and Bartsch (this issue). Theoretical perspectives for improving and expanding the “appreciation” concept in entertainment psychology are outlined. These refer to more systematic links of appreciation to the psychology of mixed emotions, to positive psychology, and to the psychology of death and dying – in particular, to terror management theory. In addition, methodological challenges are discussed that entertainment research faces when appreciation and the experience of “meaning for life” need to be addressed in empirical studies of media enjoyment.

When Mother Earth Rises Up

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Sacchi ◽  
Paolo Riva ◽  
Marco Brambilla
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Natural Disaster ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Disaster Victims ◽  
Willingness To Help ◽  
Mother Earth

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.

Mind and soul? Two notions in the light of contemporary philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 0957154X2110100
Author(s):  
Enrico Berti
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
History Of

From the perspective of the Aristotelian notion of ‘Form’, the author explores the history of the concepts of mind and soul focusing on their ontologized version, as entertained by conventional science. He concludes that current neuroscience lacks the conceptual wherewithal required to deal with the meaning of mind and soul and with agential consequences such as free will and moral decision making. [GEB]

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF ACUTE FEBRILE ENCEPHALOPATHY CASES IN PEDIATRIC AGE GROUP PATIENTS: A STUDY FROM WESTERN RAJASTHAN

2021 ◽  
pp. 72-73
Author(s):  
Laxmi Rathore ◽  
P. K. Khatri ◽  
Saroj K. Meena ◽  
Archana Bora ◽  
Suneel Bhooshan
Keyword(s):  
Lower Class ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Clinical Feature ◽  
Female Ratio ◽  
Pediatric Age Group ◽  
History Of ◽  
Laboratory Investigations ◽  
Demographic Distribution ◽  
Viral Etiologies ◽  
Male To Female

Acute Febrile Encephalopathy is a clinical term used to describe patients presenting with short febrile illnesses with altered mental states. Demographic distribution plays an essential role in the diagnosis of viral etiologies. One hundred ve suspected AFE cases were enrolled in the study. A detailed history by predesigned performa and laboratory investigations was obtained for data collection. Viral etiology was diagnosed in 32 (30.48%) cases. The male to female ratio was 1.39:1. Total 56.25% of positive cases were from the lower class, 28.13% from the middle class, and 15.63% from the upper class. 24 (75%) cases from rural, while only 8 (25%) of the urban population showed viral etiologies. In 19 (59.4%) cases were either history of incomplete vaccination or not vaccinated, 13 (40.6%) cases had a history of complete immunization among positive cases. The predominant clinical feature was fever (100%) followed by seizures 66(62.86%), vomiting 37(35.24%), headache 14(13.33%), paresis in 16(15.24%) and altered sensorium in 29(27.62%), respectively. To conclude, the etiologic panorama of AFE varies with several factors such as time and demographical location, age, and immunization status. There is an urgent need to conduct more studies to prole the viral etiologies according to their prevalence in geographical areas so the treatment can be tailored accordingly and prophylaxis treatment or immunization can be boosted in the population at risk of getting the disease.

Ezekiel’s Map of Future Past

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Sulzbach
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Urban History ◽  
Sacred Space ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Urban Settings ◽  
Viable Solution ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Temple

Attention to the spatial elements in the book of Ezekiel reveal a coherent plan that maps sin onto the spaces of city and temple which become the focus of correction in the visionary chapters that end the book (chs. 40–48). The book displays great disdain for all urban settings, including foreign cities, for their corrupt politics, trade and crime. These charges especially apply to Jerusalem. The temple also exhibits similar corruption in terms of personnel, iconography and impurity. The final vision reaches back first into the pre-urban history of Judah, the wilderness period, in order to find a setting free from such corruptions, but ultimately it returns to an Eden-like state as the only viable solution to the problems of innate sin and desecration. This is an Eden with no free-will and no human agency, the only way to safeguard sacred space.

Northern Hemisphere Glaciation, African Climate and Evolution

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin H. Trauth ◽  
Asfawossen Asrat ◽  
Nadine Berner ◽  
Faysal Bibi ◽  
Verena Foerster ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Northern Hemisphere ◽  
Species Turnover ◽  
Abrupt Onset ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Scientific Idea ◽  
Gradual Process ◽  
Before And After ◽  
History Of ◽  
Change Point Models ◽  
Original Interpretation

&lt;p&gt;The hypothesis of a connection between the onset (or intensification) of Northern Hemisphere Glaciation (NHG), the stepwise increase in African aridity (and climate variability) and an important mammalian (including hominin) species turnover is a textbook example of the initiation of a scientific idea and its propagation in science. It is, however, also an example of the persistent popularity of a hypothesis despite mounting evidence against it. The first part of our work analyzes of the history of the scientific idea by seeking its roots, including coincidental meetings and exchanges between of scientists, at project meetings, conferences and workshops. The consequences of this idea are examined and its influence on subsequent scientific investigations both before and after it has been falsified. In the second part of our investigation, we examine why the idea that the high latitudes have a major control on the climate of the low latitudes and thus early human evolution persists. For this purpose, an attempt is made to understand the original interpretation of the data, with special consideration of the composition of the scientific team and their scientific backgrounds and persuasions. Some of the key records in support of the hypothesis of a step-wise transition will be statistically re-analyzed by fitting change-point models to the time series to determine the midpoint and duration of the transition &amp;#8211; in case such a transition is found in the data. A critical review of key publications in support of such a connection and a statistical re-analysis of key data sets leads to three conclusions: (1) Northern Hemisphere Glaciation is a gradual process between ~3.5&amp;#8211;2.5 Ma, not an abrupt onset, either at ~2.5 Ma, nor at ~2.8 Ma, or any other time in the Late Cenozoic Era, (2) the trend towards greater aridity in Africa during this period was also gradual, not stepwise in the sense of a consistent transition of a duration of &amp;#8804;0.2 Ma, and (3) accordingly, a step-wise change in environmental conditions cannot be used to explain an important mammalian (including hominin) species turnover.&lt;/p&gt;

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