Value and risk effects of financial derivatives: Evidence of corporate governance on hedging, speculation and selective hedging strategies

<p>This study investigates whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, whether corporate governance influence in firms impacts the association between derivatives and firm value, and whether corporate governance influence affects the association between derivatives and cash flow volatility, stock return volatility and market risk. This study uses two different data samples of publicly traded firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The first sample comprises a panel of 6900 firm year observations and the other consists of a panel of 6234 firm year observations both over the eight-year period from 2004-2011. With regard to whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, the findings from the empirical results show that corporate governance does influence derivatives and therefore is an important determinant in the firm’s decisions to use derivatives. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined, board size, institutional shareholders, CEO age, CEO bonus, CEO salary, insider shareholders and total CEO compensation show significant association with derivatives. This study finds that derivative users exhibit higher firm value on account of the corporate governance influence, which is correspondingly largely insignificant for derivative non-users. Further the research indicates that the impact of corporate governance varies according to the different types of risks examined. Generally, the board of directors and CEO governance mechanisms reduce stock return volatility to achieve hedging effectiveness. This supports the view that directors and management take actions to reduce stock return volatility to protect their personal portfolios without having to bear the costs of hedging themselves. With respect to cash flow volatility, the board of directors and CEO related corporate governance mechanisms largely exhibit increased risk to show evidence of speculative behavior. It supports the perceptions that managers and directors have a strong motivation to show higher earnings to protect jobs and reputation and to enhance compensation. All the shareholder governance mechanisms encourage risk taking with respect to stock return volatility, without any increase in firm value. This is in line with research findings of market granularity by institutional and other larger block holders to indicate that these investors increase stock price volatilities and play the markets for their own financial gain. Besides they have little interest in diversifying firm risk as they already have well protected portfolios and would not want to incur additional costs of hedging. The study finds evidence of association between corporate governance and hedging, speculation and selective hedging. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined in the study board diversity consistently shows hedging effectiveness, with accompanying increase in firm value. While board meetings, institutional shareholders, block shareholders, CEO age, CEO base salary and CEO compensation exhibit exclusive speculative behavior. The remaining corporate governance mechanisms: board size, insider shareholding, CEO tenure, CEO bonus and audit committee size, show evidence of selective hedging behavior. The concurrent hedging and speculative behavior evidenced in this study supports literature in respect of selective hedging by non-financial firms. It also validates the idea that corporate governance delves in risk allocation strategies that have been evidenced by past research. The results remain unchanged, after using alternative measures for firm value and firm risk, and alternative methods of analyses.</p>

Value and risk effects of financial derivatives: Evidence of corporate governance on hedging, speculation and selective hedging strategies

<p>This study investigates whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, whether corporate governance influence in firms impacts the association between derivatives and firm value, and whether corporate governance influence affects the association between derivatives and cash flow volatility, stock return volatility and market risk. This study uses two different data samples of publicly traded firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The first sample comprises a panel of 6900 firm year observations and the other consists of a panel of 6234 firm year observations both over the eight-year period from 2004-2011. With regard to whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, the findings from the empirical results show that corporate governance does influence derivatives and therefore is an important determinant in the firm’s decisions to use derivatives. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined, board size, institutional shareholders, CEO age, CEO bonus, CEO salary, insider shareholders and total CEO compensation show significant association with derivatives. This study finds that derivative users exhibit higher firm value on account of the corporate governance influence, which is correspondingly largely insignificant for derivative non-users. Further the research indicates that the impact of corporate governance varies according to the different types of risks examined. Generally, the board of directors and CEO governance mechanisms reduce stock return volatility to achieve hedging effectiveness. This supports the view that directors and management take actions to reduce stock return volatility to protect their personal portfolios without having to bear the costs of hedging themselves. With respect to cash flow volatility, the board of directors and CEO related corporate governance mechanisms largely exhibit increased risk to show evidence of speculative behavior. It supports the perceptions that managers and directors have a strong motivation to show higher earnings to protect jobs and reputation and to enhance compensation. All the shareholder governance mechanisms encourage risk taking with respect to stock return volatility, without any increase in firm value. This is in line with research findings of market granularity by institutional and other larger block holders to indicate that these investors increase stock price volatilities and play the markets for their own financial gain. Besides they have little interest in diversifying firm risk as they already have well protected portfolios and would not want to incur additional costs of hedging. The study finds evidence of association between corporate governance and hedging, speculation and selective hedging. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined in the study board diversity consistently shows hedging effectiveness, with accompanying increase in firm value. While board meetings, institutional shareholders, block shareholders, CEO age, CEO base salary and CEO compensation exhibit exclusive speculative behavior. The remaining corporate governance mechanisms: board size, insider shareholding, CEO tenure, CEO bonus and audit committee size, show evidence of selective hedging behavior. The concurrent hedging and speculative behavior evidenced in this study supports literature in respect of selective hedging by non-financial firms. It also validates the idea that corporate governance delves in risk allocation strategies that have been evidenced by past research. The results remain unchanged, after using alternative measures for firm value and firm risk, and alternative methods of analyses.</p>

The impact of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic on financial markets: a seismologic approach

This work investigates financial volatility cascades generated by SARS-CoV-2 related news using concepts developed in the field of seismology. We analyze the impact of socio-economic and political announcements, as well as of financial stimulus disclosures, on the reference stock markets of the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, France, Germany and Italy. We quantify market efficiency in processing SARS-CoV-2 related news by means of the observed Omori power-law exponents and we relate these empirical regularities to investors’ behavior through the lens of a stylized Agent-Based financial market model. The analysis reveals that financial markets may underreact to the announcements by taking a finite time to re-adjust prices, thus moving against the efficient market hypothesis. We observe that this empirical regularity can be related to the speculative behavior of market participants, whose willingness to switch toward better performing investment strategies, as well as their degree of reactivity to price trend or mispricing, can induce long-lasting volatility cascades.

Analyzing the consistency of the dynamics of the Russian financial capital components

Subject. The article discusses financial capital issues. Objectives. The study determines the consistency of the dynamics of the Russian financial capital components. Methods. The study is based on the systems approach and methods of statistical, neural network and cluster analysis. Results. I analyze the dynamics of rates, such as USD/RUB, RGBI, RTSI, SBER, IMOEX, and discovered the speculative behavior of financial capital holders (IMOEX, USD/RUB, SBER) in the domestic (RGBI) and external (RTSI) market. Analyzing the importance of growth rates of GDP and its constituents, I found the State prioritized the regulation of the GDP deflator (The Central Bank – inflation targeting), considering a growth in governmental expenditures and the decreased importance of growth rates of GDP and households’ consumption expenditures, as the import of goods and services gets more important. The high importance of rates of growth in the export of goods and services is identical to Australia, Estonia and Columbia. Corporate relationships of the Central Bank and financial corporations focus on the regulation of money supply and currency outside financial corporations and internal claims. The relationships strengthen as the monetary policy get more concentrated on net claims to the central government and inflation targeting. Conclusions and Relevance. The scope of consistency of trends in the Russian financial capital components allows public authorities to regulate a growth in the corporate relations of the Central Bank and financial corporations in order to curb the speculative behavior of financial capital holders. The findings hereof contribute to the knowledge and competence of officials of the Russian Government and the Federal Antimonopoly Services with respect to systemic decisions on control over financial transactions.

Movement of the components of Russian financial capital

In the article there is revealed movement of financial capital components as a substance – the unity of diversity and the diversity of unity. Analysis of USD / RUB, RGBI, RTSI, SBER, IMOEX dynamics revealed speculative behavior of financial capital owners (IMOEX, USD / RUB, SBER) in relation to internal (RGBI) and external (RTSI) market. Analysis of importance of growth rates of GDP and its components revealed the state priority of GDP deflator regulation (Central Bank – inflation targeting) in the context of state revenues growth and, as a structural consequence, reduction of importance of growth rates of GDP and expenditures of households consumption against the background of increase of importance of commodities and services import. At the same time the quite high values of importance of growth rates of export of Russian commodities and services are identical to ones of such countries as Australia, Estonia and Columbia. Analysis of capital growth rates revealed fixation of interrelations between the Central Bank and financial corporations in the context of regulation of money supply and currency outside financial corporations and internal claims. These relations strengthen due to focusing of monetary and credit policy at “clear requirements to central government” and at inflation targeting. Research of the Russian financial capital components movement demonstrated corporate strengthening of interrelations between the Central Bank and the financial corporations and also defined the options for regulation of speculative behavior of financial capital owners.

Alternative Policy on Progressive Tax Rate on Idle Land in the Special Capital Territory of Jakarta

The objective of this study is to analyze the alternative progressive tax rates on idle land in DKI Jakarta. Researchers used qualitative method. Based on the results of the analysis through data collection carried out using literature studies and in-depth interviews with informants, it can be concluded that with this progressive tax rate policy alternative it is believed that it can suppress effectively and precisely the concentration pattern of land ownership and control as well as speculative behavior towards land and legal entities that hoard the land. These laws and government regulations were inadequate to be applicable to non-agricultural lands or lands with ownership, or use rights. It is due to both of them have not regulated the extent of non-agricultural land, as well as the area of land ownership rights, building use rights, and use rights either for individual or legal entities. The imposition of a progressive tax rate by looking at the length of ownership adopted by South Korean country was also considered capable of being a pretty good way dealing with this idle land problem. The results of study related to the imposition of a progressive tax rate on idle land using the excess scheme or additional collection on the building land tax has been previously imposed.

Government Supervision Mode Selection in the Promotion Period of Prefabricated Construction Using Evolutionary Game

Aiming at the speculative behavior of some developers who seek private interests in the promotion period of prefabricated construction, this research combines the actual situation, objectively and reasonably determines the parameters in the model, and builds an evolutionary game model to study the choice of government supervision mode in different situations, from the perspective of government supervision. The results showed that the choice of government supervision mode has great connection with the probability of identifying developers’ speculative behavior when the government adopts node supervision. When the probability is greater than the developers’ speculative value, the government will choose node supervision, while the developers will not adopt speculative behavior. Conversely, there will be a periodic behavior pattern in the evolutionary system, and the choice of government supervision mode is related to the value of each parameter. At the same time, the minimum probability of identifying speculative behavior that keeps the optimal situation stable is obtained. On this basis, the paper takes a practical case to discuss the influence of different parameter variations on the choice of government supervision mode and makes numerical simulations; then it puts forward some specific suggestions for government to restrain the speculative behavior of developer.

Testing for Bubbles in the Chinese Art Market

This article detects the existence of bubbles in the Chinese art market and investigates when the bubbles originate and crash. We utilize the generalized supremum augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test to detect explosive behavior in the Chinese art market. The empirical results indicate that there are two bubbles in the Chinese art market that happened in the periods from 2004 to 2005 and 2010 to 2011. The main reasons are the financialization of artworks, the speculation of investment institution, and the fluctuation of macroeconomics in China. Our findings are in agreement with the bubble model improved by Gürkaynak considering that asset price can be decomposed to bubbles and fundamental parts. Therefore, to favor the Chinese art market price stabilization, the regulators from this market should identify bubbles to notice their evolutions. The authorities should also manage the expectations of the public and reduce speculative behavior.