Naming and Indexicality

How do words stand for things? Taking ideas from philosophical semantics and pragmatics, this book offers a unique, detailed, and critical survey of central debates concerning linguistic reference in the twentieth century. It then uses the survey to identify and argue for a novel version of current 'two-dimensional' theories of meaning, which generalise the context-dependency of indexical expressions. The survey highlights the history of tensions between semantic and epistemic constraints on plausible theories of word meaning, from analytic philosophy and modern truth-conditional semantics, to the Referentialist and Externalist revolutions in theories of meaning, to the more recent reconciliatory ambition of two-dimensionalists. It clearly introduces technical semantical notions, theses, and arguments, with easy-to-follow, step-by-step guides. Wide-ranging in its scope, yet offering an accessible route into literature that can seem complex and technical, this will be essential reading for advanced students, and academic researchers in semantics, pragmatics, and philosophy of language.

The case against economic values in the orbitofrontal cortex (or anywhere else in the brain)

Much of traditional neuroeconomics proceeds from the hypothesis that value is reified in the brain, that is, that there are neurons or brain regions whose responses serve the discrete purpose of encoding value. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that the activity of many neurons covaries with subjective value as estimated in specific tasks and has led to the idea that the primary function of the orbitofrontal cortex is to compute and signal economic value. Here we consider an alternative: that economic value, in the cardinal, common-currency sense, is not represented in the brain and used for choice by default. This idea is motivated by consideration of the economic concept of value, which places important epistemic constraints on our ability to identify its neural basis. It is also motivated by the behavioral economics literature, especially work on heuristics, which proposes value-free process models for much if not all of choice. Finally, it is buoyed by recent neural and behavioral findings regarding how animals and humans learn to choose between options. In light of our hypothesis, we critically reevaluate putative neural evidence for the representation of value and explore an alternative: direct learning of action policies. We delineate how this alternative can provide a robust account of behavior that concords with existing empirical data.

Splitting Epistemic Logic Programs

Epistemic logic programs constitute an extension of the stable model semantics to deal with new constructs called subjective literals. Informally speaking, a subjective literal allows checking whether some objective literal is true in all or some stable models. As it can be imagined, the associated semantics has proved to be non-trivial, since the truth of subjective literals may interfere with the set of stable models it is supposed to query. As a consequence, no clear agreement has been reached and different semantic proposals have been made in the literature. Unfortunately, comparison among these proposals has been limited to a study of their effect on individual examples, rather than identifying general properties to be checked. In this paper, we propose an extension of the well-known splitting property for logic programs to the epistemic case. We formally define when an arbitrary semantics satisfies the epistemic splitting property and examine some of the consequences that can be derived from that, including its relation to conformant planning and to epistemic constraints. Interestingly, we prove (through counterexamples) that most of the existing approaches fail to fulfill the epistemic splitting property, except the original semantics proposed by Gelfond 1991 and a recent proposal by the authors, called Founded Autoepistemic Equilibrium Logic.

Crossroads and In-Between Spaces

The essay focuses on Gloria Anzaldúa’s narrative of overcoming shame in Borderlands/La Frontera. It addresses the question of coming to terms with multiple conditions of oppression obstructing the creative agency of radical Latina subjects. The discussion occurs along two intersecting planes: (1) the existential question of self-knowledge as the self undergoes the difficult process of identifying and releasing the weight of past oppressions and (2) the situated character of Anzaldúa’s Chicana/Latina condition in light of the heteronormative and epistemic constraints she faces as a Latina writer whose work is intimately interlinked with her sense of self. Anzaldúa’s message of overcoming shame is shown to have some affinities with Friedrich Nietzsche’s reflections on freedom from shame as the ultimate seal of liberation. Considered as Anzaldúa’s companion in a journey in self-overcoming at the crossroads of indigenous and Chicana/Tejana cultures, her new mestiza takes on a new significance.

Representation

Chapter 2 explores the relationship between consciousness and mental representation. Section 2.1 argues for a version of representationalism, the thesis that consciousness is a kind of mental representation. Section 2.2 argues against the representational grounding thesis, which says that all unconscious mental representation is grounded in consciousness. Section 2.3 argues that the representational grounding thesis is not supported by failure of the program of naturalizing mental representation. Section 2.4 examines the conceptual grounding thesis, which says that all conceptual representation is grounded in consciousness. The role of consciousness in thought is best explained as a consequence of the epistemic role of consciousness together with epistemic constraints on conceptual thought. Section 2.5 presents the epistemic grounding thesis, which says that all mental representation that provides epistemic justification for belief is grounded in consciousness. This thesis sets the agenda for the rest of the book.

Political Legitimacy Under Epistemic Constraints

The aim of this chapter is to provide an epistemological argument for why public reasons matter for political legitimacy. A key feature of the public reason conception of legitimacy is that political decisions must be justified to the citizens. They must be justified in terms of reasons that are either shared qua reasons or that, while not shared qua reasons, support the same political decision. Call the relevant reasons public reasons. Critics of the public reason conception, by contrast, argue that political legitimacy requires justification simpliciter—political decisions must be justified in terms of the reasons that apply. Call the relevant reasons objective reasons. The debate between defenders and critics of a public reason conception of political legitimacy thus focuses on whether objective reasons or public reasons are the right basis for the justification of political decisions. I will grant to critics of a public reason conception that there are objective reasons and allow that such reasons can affect the legitimacy of political decisions. But I will show, focusing on the epistemic circumstances of political decision-making, that it does not follow that the justification of those decisions is necessarily in terms of those reasons.

The Violation Imperative Part II: A Philosophical Critique of the Public Health Service’s Definition of Falsification as Research Misconduct

The purpose of this paper is to critique the definition of falsification as research misconduct according to the Public Health Service (PHS) in order to better understand what it entails. In support of this purpose, the approach decided upon for analysis was philosophical including framing the issue borrowing from both mereological and epistemological perspectives.   Through the consideration given to parthood relations of mereology, we gained insight from a cognitive imperfection standpoint about similarities that exist between the epistemic constraints on knowledge and the nature of violations concerning research misconduct.  Findings from the examination of a case study include the significance of accuracy in representation in falsification as misconduct and the core dimensions comprising an instance of falsification, which are Deliberateness, Alteration, and Inclusion.  Given that either behavior or actions must occur that violate these three aspects in order to qualify as an instance of misconduct under falsification, the author proposes that, at a minimum, any revisions made to the definition of falsification stipulate what he refers to as the Violation Imperative.

Questions and Answers: Metaphysical Explanation and the Structure of Reality

ABSTRACTThis paper develops an account of metaphysical explanation according to which metaphysical explanations are answers to what-makes-it-the-case-that questions. On this view, metaphysical explanations are not to be considered entirely objective, but are subject to epistemic constraints imposed by the context in which a relevant question is asked. The resultant account of metaphysical explanation is developed independently of any particular views about grounding. Toward the end of the paper an application of the view is proposed that takes metaphysical explanations conceived in this way to characterize reality's structure. According to this proposal, reality's structure is partly constituted by a projection of our explanatory practices onto reality.