A new framework for the psychology of norms

Social Norms – rules that dictate which behaviors are appropriate, permissible, or obligatory in different situations for members of a given community – permeate all aspects of human life. Many researchers have sought to explain the ubiquity of social norms in human life in terms of the psychological mechanisms underlying their acquisition, conformity, and enforcement. Existing theories of the psychology of social norms appeal to a variety of constructs, from prediction-error minimization, to reinforcement learning, to shared intentionality, to evolved psychological adaptations. However, most of these accounts share what we call the psychological unity assumption, which holds that there is something psychologically distinctive about social norms, and that social norm adherence is driven by a single system or process. We argue that this assumption is mistaken. In this paper, we propose a methodological and conceptual framework for the cognitive science of social norms that we call normative pluralism. According to this framework, we should treat norms first and foremost as a community-level pattern of social behavior that might be realized by a variety of different cognitive, motivational, and ecological mechanisms. Norm psychologists should not presuppose that social norms are underpinned by a unified set of processes, nor that there is anything particularly distinctive about normative cognition as such. We argue that this pluralistic approach offers a methodologically sound point of departure for a fruitful and rigorous science of norms.

Toward an Embodied, Embedded Predictive Processing Account

In this paper, I argue for an embodied, embedded approach to predictive processing and thus align the framework with situated cognition. The recent popularity of theories conceiving of the brain as a predictive organ has given rise to two broad camps in the literature that I call free energy enactivism and cognitivist predictive processing. The two approaches vary in scope and methodology. The scope of cognitivist predictive processing is narrow and restricts cognition to brain processes and structures; it does not consider the body-beyond-brain and the environment as constituents of cognitive processes. Free energy enactivism, on the other hand, includes all self-organizing systems that minimize free energy (including non-living systems) and thus does not offer any unique explanations for more complex cognitive phenomena that are unique to human cognition. Furthermore, because of its strong commitment to the mind-life continuity thesis, it does not provide an explanation of what distinguishes more sophisticated cognitive systems from simple systems. The account that I develop in this paper rejects both of these radical extremes. Instead, I propose a compromise that highlights the necessary components of predictive processing by making use of a mechanistic methodology of explanation. The starting point of the argument in this paper is that despite the interchangeable use of the terms, prediction error minimization and the free energy principle are not identical. But this distinction does not need to disrupt the status quo of the literature if we consider an alternative approach: Embodied, Embedded Predictive Processing (EEPP). EEPP accommodates the free energy principle, as argued for by free energy enactivism, but it also allows for mental representations in its explanation of cognition. Furthermore, EEPP explains how prediction error minimization is realized but, unlike cognitivist PP, it allocates a constitutive role to the body in cognition. Despite highlighting concerns regarding cognitivist PP, I do not wish to discredit the role of the neural domain or representations as free energy enactivism does. Neural structures and processes undeniably contribute to the minimization of prediction error but the role of the body is equally important. On my account, prediction error minimization and free energy minimization are deeply dependent on the body of an agent, such that the body-beyond-brain plays a constitutive role in cognitive processing. I suggest that the body plays three constitutive roles in prediction error minimization: The body regulates cognitive activity, ensuring that cognition and action are intricately linked. The body acts as distributor in the sense that it carries some of the cognitive load by fulfilling the function of minimizing prediction error. Finally, the body serves to constrain the information that is processed by an agent. In fulfilling these three roles, the agent and environment enter into a bidirectional relation through influencing and modeling the structure of the other. This connects EEPP to the free energy principle because the whole embodied agent minimizes free energy in virtue of being a model of its econiche. This grants the body a constitutive role as part of the collection of mechanisms that minimize prediction error and free energy. The body can only fulfill its role when embedded in an environment, of which it is a model. In this sense, EEPP offers the most promising alternative to cognitivist predictive processing and free energy enactivism.

Musicality as a predictive process

Savage et al. argue for musicality as having evolved for the overarching purpose of social bonding. By way of contrast, we highlight contemporary predictive processing models of human cognitive functioning in which the production and enjoyment of music follows directly from the principle of prediction error minimization.

Optimal Cooperative Guidance Laws for Two UAVs Under Sensor Information Deficiency Constraints

This paper presents closed-form optimal cooperative guidance laws for two UAVs under information constraints that achieve the required relative approach angle. Two UAVs cooperate to optimize a common cost function under a coupled constraint on terminal velocity vectors and the information constraint which defines the sensor information availability. To handle the information constraint, a general two-player partially nested decentralized optimal control problem is considered in the continuous finite-horizon time domain. It is shown that under the state-separation principle the optimal solution of the decentralized control problem can be obtained by solving two centralized subproblems which cover the prediction problem for the information-deficient player and the prediction error minimization problem for the player with full information. Based on the solution of the decentralized optimal control problem, the explicit closed-form cooperative guidance laws that can be efficiently implemented on conventional guidance computers are derived. The performance of the proposed guidance laws is investigated on both centralized and decentralized cooperative scenarios with nonlinear engagement kinematics of networked two-UAV systems.

Blindness, Psychosis, and the Visual Construction of the World

The relationship between visual loss and psychosis is complex: congenital visual loss appears to be protective against the development of a psychotic disorder, particularly schizophrenia. In later life, however, visual deprivation or visual loss can give rise to hallucinosis, disorders of visual insight such as blindsight or Anton syndrome, or, in the context of neurodegenerative disorders, more complex psychotic presentations. We draw on a computational psychiatric approach to consider the foundational role of vision in the construction of representations of the world and the effects of visual loss at different developmental stages. Using a Bayesian prediction error minimization model, we describe how congenital visual loss may be protective against the development of the kind of computational deficits postulated to underlie schizophrenia, by increasing the precision (and consequent stability) of higher-level (including supramodal) priors, focusing on visual loss-induced changes in NMDA receptor structure and function as a possible mechanistic substrate. In simple terms, we argue that when people cannot see from birth, they rely more heavily on the context they extract from the other senses, and the resulting model of the world is more impervious to the false inferences, made in the face of inevitably noisy perceptual input, that characterize schizophrenia. We show how a Bayesian prediction error minimization framework can also explain the relationship between later visual loss and other psychotic symptoms, as well as the effects of visual deprivation and hallucinogenic drugs, and outline experimentally testable hypotheses generated by this approach.

Mechanistic unity of the predictive mind

It has recently been argued that cognitive scientists should embrace explanatory pluralism rather than pursue the search for a unificatory framework or theory. This stance dovetails with the mechanistic view of cognitive-scientific explanation. However, one recently proposed theory—based on an idea that the brain is a predictive engine—opposes pluralism with its unificatory ambitions. My aim here is to investigate those pretentions to elucidate what sort of unification is on offer. I challenge the idea that explanatory unification of cognitive science follows from the Free Energy Principle. I claim that if the predictive story is to provide a unification, it is by proposing that many distinct cognitive mechanisms fall under a single prediction-error-minimization schema. I also argue that even though unification is not an absolute evaluative criterion for mechanistic explanations, it may play an epistemic role in evaluating the relative credibility of an explanation.

From Unconscious Inference to the Beholder’s Share: Predictive Perception and Human Experience

Science and art have long recognized that perceptual experience depends on the involvement of the experiencer. In art history, this idea is captured by Ernst Gombrich’s ‘beholder’s share’. In neuroscience, it traces to Helmholtz’s concept of ‘perception as inference’, which is enjoying renewed prominence in the guise of ‘prediction error minimization’ (PEM) or the ‘Bayesian brain’. The shared idea is that our perceptual experience – whether of the world, of ourselves, or of an artwork – depends on the active ‘top-down’ interpretation of sensory input. Perception becomes a generative act, in which perceptual, cognitive, affective, and sociocultural expectations conspire to shape the brain’s ‘best guess’ of the causes of sensory signals. In this article, I explore the parallels between the Bayesian brain and the beholders’ share, illustrated, somewhat informally, with examples from Impressionist, Expressionist, and Cubist art. By connecting phenomenological insights from these traditions with the cognitive neuroscience of predictive perception, I outline a reciprocal relationship in which art reveals phenomenological targets for neurocognitive accounts of subjectivity, while the concepts of predictive perception may in turn help make mechanistic sense of the beholder’s share. This is not standard neuroaesthetics – the attempt to discover the brain basis of aesthetic experience – nor is it any kind of neuro-fangled ‘theory of art’. It is instead an examination of one way in which art and brain science can be equal partners in revealing deep truths about human experience.

Why use predictive processing to explain psychopathology? The case of anorexia nervosa

Predictive processing accounts are increasingly called upon to explain mental disorder. They seem to provide an attractive explanatory framework because the core idea of prediction error minimization can be applied to simultaneously account for several perceptual, attentional and reasoning deficits often implicated in mental disorder. However, it can be unclear how much is gained by such accounts: the proffered explanations can appear to have several weaknesses such as being too liberal, too shallow, or too wedded to formal notions of statistical learning. Here, we taxonomise the relatively unrecognised variety of explanatory tools under the framework and discuss how they can be employed to provide substantial explanations. We then apply the framework to anorexia nervosa, an eating disorder that is characterised by a complex set of perceptual, reasoning and decision-making problems. We conclude that the predictive processing framework is a valuable type of explanation for psychopathology.