Experimental and Cross-Cultural Epistemology

Chapter 10 examines how contemporary trends in experimental philosophy can benefit from the study of Buddhist epistemology. In particular, it explores the question of whether an appreciation of Buddhist epistemology could inform philosophers about both the merits of experimental epistemology and experimental philosophy’s emphasis on probing intuitions about knowledge. The second half of the chapter steps back from this examination of experimental philosophy and argues that there is value to be found in contemporary philosophers learning more about other traditions of epistemological theorizing, including the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist traditions of epistemology. Among other things, it can serve to change the way we view our own tradition of epistemology and lay bare the tacit assumptions that undergird contemporary discussions of knowledge.

Illuminating the Mind

This book provides readers with an introduction to epistemology within the Buddhist intellectual tradition. It is designed to be accessible to those whose primary background is in the “Western” tradition of philosophy and who have little or no previous exposure to Buddhist philosophical writings. The book examines many of the most important topics in the field of epistemology, topics that are central both to contemporary discussions of epistemology and to the classical Buddhist tradition of epistemology in India and Tibet. Among the topics discussed are Buddhist accounts of the nature of knowledge episodes, the defining conditions of perceptual knowledge and of inferential knowledge, the status of testimonial knowledge, and skeptical criticisms of the entire project of epistemology. The book seeks to put the field of Buddhist epistemology in conversation with contemporary debates in philosophy. It shows that many of the arguments and debates occurring within classical Buddhist epistemological treatises coincide with the arguments and disagreements found in contemporary epistemology. The book shows, for example, how Buddhist epistemologists developed an anti-luck epistemology—one that is linked to a sensitivity requirement for knowledge. Likewise, the book explores the question of how the study of Buddhist epistemology can be of relevance to contemporary debates about the value of contributions from experimental epistemology, and to broader debates concerning the use of philosophical intuitions about knowledge.

Preliminaries

This chapter lays the foundation for the remainder of the book. It provides a brief historical overview of the most central figures in the Buddhist epistemological tradition and emphasizes the importance of two figures in particular, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The chapter additionally provides an overview of several of the most important terms and concepts that are employed within Buddhist epistemological treatises. In particular, an extensive discussion is provided of the notion of a pramāṇa, which is the most important concept in all of Buddhist epistemology. Multiple different understandings of the term pramāṇa are elucidated, including those of a pramāṇa as an “instrument of knowledge” and as an “episode of knowledge.”

Mipam

Mipam (or “Mipham”; ’Ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) was one of the most influential figures in the Tibetan Buddhist world in the last 500 years. In his writings, he integrates aspects of the Buddhist epistemological tradition with a view of tantra and associates the view of the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen) with Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. The Great Perfection is for the Nyingma (rnying ma) tradition its highest esoteric teachings, and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka is the philosophy commonly accepted in Tibet as the highest exoteric view. Buddhist epistemology, as a system that delineates the means of reliable knowledge, in particular plays an important role in both esoteric (e.g., sutra) and exoteric (e.g., tantra) domains by outlining the authentic means of knowing reality. By integrating the esoteric teachings of Nyingma tantra with Buddhist epistemology and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, Mipam affirms the Nyingma not only as a tradition of tantric exegesis and ritual practice, but also as grounded within the rigorous intellectual traditions of Buddhist exoteric philosophy. Mipam systematized the Nyingma tradition’s view of the Great Perfection within his writings on the Buddhist literature that had become the predominant topic of study in the curriculum of monastic education. Central to Mipam’s writing is the prominent place of reasoned inquiry as a means to arrive at the view of the Great Perfection. This is a feature that distinguishes the character of his works and is a significant contribution to Nyingma philosophy. Indeed, the interplay of reason and the transcendence of reason is a central theme in his writings. His skill in engaging the Great Perfection within a rational, dialectical exchange underscores that the Great Perfection is not naive anti-intellectualism, but involves a subtly profound view that, at least in Mipam’s presentation, incorporates reason and transcends it. In his writings on Madhyamaka and other works, Mipam developed a platform for Nyingma monastic education by formulating a systematic presentation drawn from an interpretative framework based on the Great Perfection. This was his unique contribution to the Nyingma, but not all in the Nyingma tradition were ready or willing to adopt his interpretation. It did not take long, however, for this interpretative framework, forged for the Nyingma monastic colleges, to dominate the curriculum in these colleges in Tibet, India, and Nepal. His works continue to be widely studied in such institutions up to the present day.

The Epistemology of Yogic Perception: Dignāga – Dharmakīrti’s School

One of the specific features of Indian philosophical thought in comparison with Western tradition is its addressing the subject of yogic and contemplative prac­tices. The article focuses on the interpretation of yogic experience in terms of Buddhist epistemology (pramāṇavāda – the teachings on the instrument of valid cognition). The concept of yogic perception (yogipratyaksha), which dates back to the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga, later becomes the subject of pan-Indian philosophical debates. The author analyzes the Buddha’s teachings on the Four Noble Truths as an object of yogic perception. If, according to Dignāga, yogic perception grasps its object directly, beyond its verbal elucidation by teachers, while the Noble Truths are transmitted through the Buddha’s word, the question arises as to how can they constitute the object of direct apprehension? The article proposes to understand yogic perception in the light of the three stages of under­standing in Buddhism: 1) śrutamayī (consisting in hearing) – the memorization from the words of teacher; 2) cintāmayī (consisting in reflection) – a critical ana­lytical discourse about the form and meaning of what was learned at the previous stage; and finally, 3) bhāvanāmayī (consisting in contemplation) – an individual appropriation of the ideas analyzed at the previous stage in meditation. The author argues that, according to this algorithm, only the intellectual mastering of Buddha’s teachings can shape a mindset that brings forth yogic liberating in­sight – the goal of the Buddhist soteriological aspirations

Seeing as Cognizing: Perception, Concepts and Meditation Practice in Indian Buddhist Epistemology

As Buddhist literature makes abundantly clear, the Buddha’s knowledge is an instance of yogic perception; it radically differs from the ordinary cognition of empirical objects and results from a special training that includes ascetic toil and meditative practices. This essay aims to explore the role of special cognitive processes – in particular the Buddha’s vision of the Truths and cognitive processes relating to meditation practices – in the Buddhist epistemological tradition of South Asia. It argues that, given the Indian philosophical context, an epistemology with Buddhist presuppositions had to consider why and how meditation practices can make a difference as regards the results of cognition. Passages from Dharmakīrti’s work will be examined that show how Dharmakīrti represents yogic perception and the function of meditation practices (especially visualization) in transforming habitual processes of conceptualization.