Praise as Moral Address

While Strawsonians have focused on the way in which our ‘reactive attitudes’—the emotions through which we hold one another responsible for manifestations of morally significant quality of regard—express moral demands, serious doubt has been cast on the idea that non-blaming reactive attitudes direct moral demands to their targets. Building on Gary Watson’s proposal that the reactive attitudes are ‘forms of moral address’, this chapter advances a communicative view of praise according to which the form of moral address distinctive of the praise-manifesting reactive attitudes (approbation, gratitude) is moral invitation. Like moral demand, moral invitation is a species of directive address presupposing its target’s possession of distinctive agential capacities and, when valid, provides its addressee with reason to give the addressor’s directive discursive uptake. While blame’s demands issue imperatival reasons for compliance (e.g. to acknowledge wrongdoing, apologize), praise’s invitations provide discretionary reasons to accept credit in jointly valuing the significance of the act for the praiser. In addition to its phenomenological plausibility and contribution to the already fecund Watsonian-cum-Strawsonian program, the invitational view helps renders intelligible the power of our praise practices to facilitate the formation and enrichment of our interpersonal relationships.

Equipoise and ethics in educational research

Does the moral requirement that medical research comparing the effectiveness of two treatment methods be done only when there is community level equipoise also apply to research in teaching and learning comparing the effectiveness of two instructional methods? This article argues that it does. It evaluates three claims that the requirement does not apply to research in teaching and learning. One is the idea that the equipoise standard mixes up the ethical rules for practice with those for research. So it applies neither to research in medicine nor research in teaching and learning. The second is the idea that research in teaching and learning is different than research in medicine. The ethical basis for the equipoise requirement in medical research does not exist for research in education and so does not apply. Finally, the point is sometimes made that satisfying the equipoise requirement can be outweighed or more than compensated for by other factors when evaluating the ethics of research. For example, the knowledge gained about the comparative merits of different methods of teaching and learning might be so significant that it offsets any moral demand for equipoise or uncertainty.

Towards Confucian democratic meritocracy

In the past two decades, Confucian meritocrats have justified the unequal distribution of political power by appeal to the ideal of Confucian virtue politics. In this article, I demonstrate that at the heart of Confucian virtue politics lies a political leader’s affective accountability and show that non-democratic Confucian meritocracy fails to embody this moral ideal. Then, I argue that the ideal of Confucian virtue politics can be better realized in democratic system. To this end, I first describe how ordinary citizens’ moral demand for a political leader’s affective accountability in a consolidated democratic society can make theoretical space for a Confucian political leader. Next, I articulate the role of a Confucian political leader in contemporary democratic society from a normative standpoint and show that at the core of Confucian democratic meritocracy lies ‘mutual moral transformation’, formed by dialectical interactions between a virtuous Confucian political leader and empowered citizens.

Cultures of Objectivity

This introductory chapter provides an overview of objectivity, the presence of which is evidently required for basic justice, honest government, and true knowledge. It differentiates disciplinary objectivity from mechanical objectivity. Mechanical objectivity has been a favorite of positivist philosophers, and it has a powerful appeal to the wider public. A faith in objectivity tends to be associated with political democracy, or at least with systems in which bureaucratic actors are highly vulnerable to outsiders. The appeal of numbers is especially compelling to bureaucratic officials who lack the mandate of a popular election, or divine right. Arbitrariness and bias are the most usual grounds upon which such officials are criticized. A decision made by the numbers (or by explicit rules of some other sort) has at least the appearance of being fair and impersonal. Scientific objectivity thus provides an answer to a moral demand for impartiality and fairness. Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity lends authority to officials who have very little of their own.

The problem of moral liberation of personality in the philosophy of Russian populism

The subject of this research is the problem of moral liberation of personality in ideological heritage of Russian Populism. In the social philosophy of Russian populism this problem is an integral part of the theory of holistic liberation of personality (moral, socioeconomic, political). Emphasis is made on the concept of “rational egoism” and principle of oneness of human nature (unity of material and moral) of N. G. Chernyshevsky; significance of subjective method in social sciences in formation of anthropological (“moral”) ideal of P. L. Lavrov; as well as theory of solidary relations as the key concepts of ethicism of social philosophy of Russian Populism. The scientific novelty consists in examination of the problem of moral liberation in the context of theory of holistic liberation of personality, developed by the Russian populists on the basis of socio-philosophical ideas of Enlightenment. The problem of autonomous (sovereign) personality in the social philosophy of Russian populism is viewed in the context of “liberation of personality”, with emphasis on the anthropological ideal of “moral personality”. Advancing the theory of “rational egoism”, N. G. Chernyshevsky came to the conclusion that autonomy of personality is achieved due to social solidarity. P. L. Lavrov, having continued the inner logics of populist thought on the development of solidary relations in the society, basically neglected the autonomy of personality. An attempt to solve the problem of correlation between moral freedom and moral demand, applicable to the ideal personality, led to formation of the fundamentals of solidarism within the philosophy of Russian populism.

Groundwork for the Mechanics of Morals

Ethics is a skill set. But what skill set is it? An answer to this question would help make progress for both theory and moral agency. I argue that moral performance may best be understood on the model of athletic performance; both moral and athletic performance are rule-structured unions of efficiency and inefficiency, enabling us to engage in the wholehearted and autonomous pursuit of goals subject to constraints. By understanding how athletics demands embodied performance, we better understand moral demand and wrongdoing: less moral psychology, more moral kinesiology.

Menalar Dilema Etis Dalam Film Silence

Silence was a provocative film, particularly for Christians viewers. Aside from sketching stories of great interest concerning challenges endured by Jesuit missionaries to Japan, the film presents a deep ethical struggle one finds worthy of careful analysis. In the most climactic scene, the missionary Rodrigues faces an ethical dilemma. He must desecrate fumi-e, a bronze board depicting Christ Jesus, in an act of apostasy to save five tortured and dying hostages. Rodrigues must choose: apostasy or allowing people to die. In this article, the author attempts to reason through Rodrigues' ethical dilemma, without providing conclusive arguments in support of any ethical choices the author might prefer, to broaden the thinking of his readers. Following preliminary considerations for how to define the category of ethical dilemma, the author provides two key questions for evaluating solutions belonging to the moral agent. (α) Concerning competing moral demands, which one is highest in standing amid the rest? (β) Concerning available interventions by the moral agent, which action most effectively realizes the highest moral demand? These two lines of inquiry frame three proposed solutions. Finally, the author also proposes a fourth solution termed Kierkegaardian conflict, following the philosopher of ethics Phillip L. Quinn, whose own proposal, too, remains inconclusive for resolving the dilemma.

The Moral and Evidential Requirements of Faith

What is the relationship between faith and evidence? It is often claimed that faith requires going beyond evidence. In this paper, I reject this claim by showing how the moral demands to have faith warrant a person in maintaining faith in the face of counter-evidence, and by showing how the moral demands to have faith, and the moral constraints of evidentialism, are in clear tension with going beyond evidence. In arguing for these views, I develop a taxonomy of different ways of irrationally going beyond evidence and contrast this with rational ways of going against evidence. I then defend instances of having a moral demand to have faith, explore how this stands in tension with going beyond and against evidence, and develop an argument for the claim that faith involves a disposition to go against, but not beyond evidence.

人類的尊嚴、人權和自主性

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.人的尊嚴概念是一個包含多重含義的概念。其首要含義是作為一個整體的人類所具有的尊嚴。人類整體的尊嚴的來源是人類物種特有的本質，其道德要求在於維護人類本質並促進其發展。在生命倫理研究中，人的尊嚴概念常被視為同人權、自主相似的概念，甚至被認為可以被人權和自主的概念所替換。通過分析作為一個整體的人類所具有的尊嚴及其道德要求，可以論證，人的尊嚴不等同於人權，其更重要的角色是人權的基礎；人的尊嚴也不等同於自主，尊重人的尊嚴在很多情境下要求我們對自主行為進行限制。面對當代科學技術發展帶來的倫理挑戰，人類整體的尊嚴將在生命倫理研究中發揮更重要的作 用。Human dignity is a concept with multiple dimensions. Its primary dimension should be the dignity of the human species as a whole. The basis of the dignity of the human species rests on certain essential characteristics of the species, and the moral demand of the dignity of the human species is to maintain and promote these characteristics. In bioethical research, human dignity has often been equated with human rights or autonomy. Some people have even suggested that the concept of human dignity can be replaced with the concept of human rights or autonomy. However, the analysis of the dignity of the human species and its moral demand shows that human dignity cannot be equated to human rights or autonomy. Instead, it is the basis for human rights and requires restrictions on autonomous behaviors in certain situations. In the face of the ethical challenges posed by new technologies, the dignity of the human species will play a more crucial role in bioethical research.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 52 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.