The Women Are Up to Something

Author(s):  
Benjamin J.B. Lipscomb

This book tells two intertwined stories, centered on twentieth-century moral philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe, Mary Midgley, Philippa Foot, and Iris Murdoch. The first is the story of four friends who came up to Oxford together just before WWII. It is the story of their lives, loves, and intellectual preoccupations; it is a story about women trying to find a place in a man’s world of academic philosophy. The second story is about these friends’ shared philosophical project and their unintentional creation of a school of thought that challenged the dominant way of doing ethics. That dominant school of thought envisioned the world as empty, value-free matter, on which humans impose meaning. This outlook treated statements such as “this is good” as mere expressions of feeling or preference, reflecting no objective standards. It emphasized human freedom and demanded an unflinching recognition of the value-free world. The four friends diagnosed this moral philosophy as an impoverishing intellectual fad. This style of thought, they believed, obscured the realities of human nature and left people without the resources to make difficult moral choices or to confront evil. As an alternative, the women proposed a naturalistic ethics, reviving a line of thought running through Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas, and enriched by modern biologists like Jane Goodall and Charles Darwin. The women proposed that there are, in fact, moral truths, based in facts about the distinctive nature of the human animal and what that animal needs to thrive.

Philosophy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liz McKinnell

Mary Beatrice Midgley (née Scrutton; b. 13 September 1919–d. 10 October 2018) wrote twenty philosophical books that use an engaging style and surprisingly domestic metaphors to convey profound thought about a diverse range of topics, including human nature, animals, environmentalism, ethics, science, gender, and the practice of philosophy itself. Her first book was the influential Beast and Man, published in 1978, and her last was What Is Philosophy For?, a defense of the need for philosophical thinking, published just before her death at the age of ninety-nine. Midgley has recently garnered more philosophical attention and is now widely recognized as an original and incisive voice in philosophy. The daughter of a pacifist curate, Midgley was born in Dulwich, London, before moving to Cambridge, Greenford, and Kingston. A nature-loving child, with passions for drama and poetry, she was educated at Downe House School near Newbury, before reading Classics and Greats at Somerville College, Oxford, between 1938 and 1942. Here she met her fellow members of the wartime Quartet of women philosophers (see the separate Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy articles on “G. E. M. Anscombe,” “Philippa Foot,” and “Iris Murdoch”). The four became great friends and influenced each other throughout their working lives. Their connections include a frustration with the narrowness of the systematic philosophy that was in vogue during their formative years, and the revival of virtue in moral philosophy. Unlike her contemporaries, Midgley published little work until her fifties, after she had raised children and left academic philosophy. As Midgley said, “I wrote no books until I was a good 50, and I’m jolly glad because I didn’t know what I thought before then.” For this reason, Midgley’s writing is striking in its consistency. Articles of this kind often chart changes of mind and theoretical revisions. While Midgley’s thought undoubtedly developed and expanded, there are no early or late periods, marked by stark differences of view. One of Midgley’s criticisms of her predecessors concerned their neglect of the history of ideas. Midgley holds that to understand a philosophical system, we must understand the context in which it arose. Philosophy and culture are interconnected: the great thinkers of any era are influenced by their historical circumstances, and the patterns of thought within a culture are, whether we realize it or not, profoundly philosophical. Philosophy, she argues, is indispensable, because it allows us to make sense of our current predicaments and—where necessary—make changes to our patterns of thought.


Author(s):  
Kevin Carnahan

Reinhold Niebuhr’s moral realism can be confusing, as he draws upon multiple categories that are often in tension in contemporary discussions of moral reality. This chapter lays out three frameworks Niebuhr used to discuss moral reality: naturalism, moral ideals, and divine nature and command. It argues that these frameworks are mutually supportive in Niebuhr’s thought and locates each in the context of contemporary discussions in moral philosophy. In relation to naturalism, Niebuhr’s thought is compared with the neo-Aristotelian thought of Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. Concerning ideals, Niebuhr is put in dialogue with philosophers such as W. D. Ross, Martha Nussbaum, and Isaiah Berlin. Niebuhr’s treatment of divine command and nature is compared with the work of Robert M. Adams.


2007 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 149-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sobel

My own conclusion is that “One ought to be moral” makes no sense at all unless the “ought” has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. I am, therefore putting forward quite seriously a theory that disallows the possibility of saying that a man ought (free unsubscripted “ought“) to have ends other than those he does have.- Philippa FootH.A. Prichard's “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, like Descartes Meditations, is remembered better for the skeptical moment in the author's thinking than for its unskeptical conclusions. Prichard's paper is complicated, but the lore about its message is simple. The lore is that Prichard pointed out that in trying to vindicate the reason-giving power of morality we might do so by appealing to moral norms or to non-moral norms. If we appeal to moral norms, then we are only justifying a standard in terms of that standard and just about any old standard could survive such a test.


2020 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 7-30
Author(s):  
Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb

AbstractIn this essay, I offer an interpretation of the ethical thought of Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch. The combined effect of their work was to revive a naturalistic account of ethical objectivity that had dominated the premodern world. I proceed narratively, explaining how each of the four came to make the contribution she did towards this implicit common project: in particular how these women came to see philosophical possibilities that their male contemporaries mostly did not.


Author(s):  
Thomas Dixon

This chapter retells the story of Darwin, the moral theorist. Although Charles Darwin himself neither used nor explicitly resisted the language of altruism, many others, from the 1870s to the present, have made claims about Darwin as a theorist of altruism and selfishness. Darwin, in fact, saw sympathy and love, alongside selfishness and violence, throughout the natural world. In insect societies as well as human ones, cooperation and benevolence had evolved for good reasons. The theory of the evolution of the moral sense that Darwin developed in The Descent of Man (1871) was complicated and not entirely ‘Darwinian’. It combined ideas from moral philosophy with observations of the instincts of insects, all within a theoretical framework that included a belief in the heritability of acquired characteristics and the ability of nature to select at the level of communities as well as individuals.


2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gereon Kopf

AbstractThe philosophers of the so-called Kyoto school famously synthesized Zen Buddhist thought and the academic philosophy of 19th and early 20th century Europe in their work. Shizuteru Ueda, one of disciples of Nishitani, developed a model to categorize three different types of Zen discourse. However, in the English language literature “Zen” is frequently essentialized as “mystical” and as at odds with the philosophical project. Such a misconception not only does injustice to the diverse and vibrant traditions of Zen Buddhism, it also belittles the contributions many of their members have made to the philosophical discourse in general. This essay will introduce Ueda’s model to present one of way of imagining “Zen philosophy” and to investigate how the project of philosophy in general can be understood from within the Japanese Zen Buddhist tradition. It will argue that since philosophy is not a matter of ideology but one of method, “doing philosophy within the Zen tradition” requires a translation of the Zen idiom. It will further demonstrate how Ueda identifies sources for and methods of philosophy within the Zen Buddhist traditions. The goal of this essay is to better understand the philosophical projects of one member of the Kyoto school, on the one side, and to envision a notion of “philosophy” that is relevant for the age of globalism and multiculturalism, on the other.


2020 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 249-262
Author(s):  
David E. Cooper

AbstractThis paper focuses on Mary Midgley's influential discussions, over more than thirty years, of the relationship between human beings and animals, in particular on her concern to ‘remove the barriers’ that stand in the way of proper understanding and treatment of animals. These barriers, she demonstrates, have been erected by animal science, epistemology and mainstream moral philosophy alike. In each case, she argues, our attitudes to animals are warped by approaches that are at once excessively abstract, over-theoretical and guilty of a collective hubris on the part of humankind. In keeping with Midgley's own position, it is argued in this paper that, to remove these barriers, what is required is not yet another theory of how and why animals matter, but attention to actual engagements with animals and to the moral failings or vices that distort people's relationships with them.


1995 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 273-337
Author(s):  
Jocelyne Couture ◽  
Kai Nielsen

Most of the essays collected here are essays in metaethics seeking in exacting and interesting ways to resolve problems raised by the familiar options in metaethics we outlined in our Introduction. Richard Brandt, for example, forcefully argues, going much against the at least modestly holistic grain of our time, for a foundationalism (noncognitivist though it be) which would be foundational in both metaethics and normative ethics. R.M. Hare makes a brief but systematic defense, which is both spirited and clear, of his prescriptivism (a species of what we, following tradition, have called ‘noncognitivism,’ but which he argues should instead be called ‘nondescriptivism’). His arguments here for his position - call it nondescriptivism or noncognitivism- are directed forcefully against ethical naturalism (descriptivism) and specifically against the naturalism of Philippa Foot. Nicholas Sturgeon and David Copp contribute elaborate and rigorously argued defenses of ethical naturalism, or, as they might prefer to call it, ‘moral realism.’


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 634-648
Author(s):  
Mara-Daria Cojocaru

Abstract Mary Midgley belongs to a small group of most inspiring women philosophers of the 20th and early 21st century. Her impressive oeuvre, characterised by an exceptionally clear and witty style, combines contributions to such different fields of philosophical inquiry as moral philosophy, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of science in general and of biology in particular, as well as philosophy of religion. With her early article “The Concept of Beastliness”, we have something like a germ cell of her philosophy, introducing a range of concerns that will remain central to her work. The commentary focuses on five of them, traces how they show up in later works of Midgley’s, and suggests how they could inform philosophizing about humans and (other) animals today. These are, first, Midgley’s adherence to the concept of ‘human nature’. Second, her insistence that a comparative, ethologically informed perspective on humans and (other) animals helps to refute myths about both the (generically understood) animal and the human animal. Third, her alerting us to the fact that concepts of ‘human nature’ always influence our moral self-understanding. Fourth, her focus on the positive, open instincts in humans like caring, friendship, loyalty, or sociality that exist not only alongside but in a complex interplay with negative, open instincts such as aggression, and the idea that both classes of instincts can be shaped to some extent. And, finally, her focus on the conditions of social life that are important for people to be able to structure their lives in meaningful ways.


Genealogy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 57
Author(s):  
Amy A. Oliver

Carlos Vaz Ferreira (1872–1958) was Uruguay’s leading twentieth-century philosopher. He worked on social and political philosophy, moral philosophy, aesthetics, and feminism. Considered to be one of Latin America’s most original thinkers, Vaz Ferreira’s philosophy was nonetheless responsive to and, in some cases, influenced by the work of a number of other figures. This article explores Vaz Ferreira’s roots in the thought of Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin, Dr. Gregorio Marañón, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo y Montenegro, Harald Höffding, Hugo Münsterberg, Wilhelm Dilthey, Miguel de Unamuno, John Stuart Mill, William James, José Enrique Rodó, and Henri Bergson. His feminist philosophy was influenced by his sister, María Eugenia Vaz Ferreira, Dr. Paulina Luisi, and other suffragists. I seek to distinguish among the influences Vaz Ferreira ultimately rejected, those he could not escape, those he adapted, and those he most favored as he developed his unique philosophy of freedom.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document