The Hobbesian Moment

2021 ◽  
pp. 103-148
Author(s):  
Julio F. Carrión
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Inflection Point ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Chief Executives ◽  
Political Dominance ◽  
Electoral Democracy ◽  
Permissive Condition ◽  
Hybrid Regime ◽  
Institutional Actors

This chapter reviews how once in power, populist leaders try to assert their political dominance, which is invariably contested by some societal and institutional actors, and shows how this moment of decisive political confrontation determines the ulterior trajectory of the populist government. If populist chief executives succeed during this moment, an aggrandized executive emerges and electoral democracy will transition to a hybrid regime; if they are defeated or constrained, the possibility of regime change is averted. The chapter identifies the permissive and productive conditions that explain the failure or success of populist leaders in emerging victorious from this inflection point. The key permissive condition is voters’ support for radical institutional change. The key productive condition is the ability of populist leaders to use the state’s repressive apparatus to impose their political will. An additional productive condition is sometimes present: the organization and mobilization of low-income voters to support the populist project.

A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power

2021 ◽  
pp. 25-52
Author(s):  
Julio F. Carrión
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Dynamic Theory ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Institutional Actors

This chapter considers how populism in power leads to regime change in some cases, but not in others and shows how the difference is explained by the ability of populist leaders to navigate a key moment of confrontation with the opposition and the courts. This ability is determined by the strength of permissive conditions (public opinion support for institutional change). The necessary productive conditions are given by their decision to use the state’s repressive apparatus to prevail against the opposition. In some cases, another productive condition is present: the mobilization of civil society. Once the opposition is severely weakened, populist leaders find it much easier to accumulate greater power and to create an uneven playing field that reproduces their hold on power. By contrast, if the courts and other institutional actors defeat populist leaders in a key moment of confrontation, they will also constrain populist rule and avoid regime change.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Julio F. Carrión
Keyword(s):  
Regime Change ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Political Strategy ◽  
Hybrid Regimes ◽  
Significant Power ◽  
Alberto Fujimori ◽  
Hugo Chavez ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Institutional Actors ◽  
Scholarly Attention

The global rise of populism is driving a process of democratic erosion. Accordingly, scholarly attention has shifted from processes of democratization to de-democratization trajectories; or, how democracies perish after they have transitioned from authoritarianism. This chapter distinguishes between populism (a political strategy) and competitive authoritarianism (a regime type). The chapter enumerates the conceptual contributions of this book, primarily, that the rise to power of populism can lead to regime change by creating significant power asymmetries. However, while unconstrained populism in power can lead to hybrid regimes or even full-scale authoritarianism, strong judiciaries, and other institutional actors, can contain or constrain populism in power, preventing regime change. The chapter offers a new definition of populism that includes a governance dimension that is missing in other definitions and argues that Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chávez, Álvaro Uribe, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa are examples of populism.

Year 15 and the Preservation of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Projects: Lessons from Detroit, Michigan

2020 ◽  
pp. 0739456X2096221
Author(s):  
Lan Deng
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Tax Credits ◽  
Tax Credit ◽  
Institutional Actors ◽  
National Housing ◽  
Low Income Housing

This study examines the efforts to preserve the Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) projects that are at risk from their year-15 transition in Detroit, Michigan. Using the preservation framework recommended by the National Housing Trust, the paper first identifies the risks LIHTC projects in Detroit face. It then reports what major institutional actors in LIHTC developments have done in addressing those risks, with particular attention to the roles these actors have played in shaping preservation needs and actions. The study concludes by discussing what broader lessons can be learned from Detroit with regard to the preservation of LIHTC projects nationwide.

scholarly journals Economic Barriers to Democratization in MENA

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmet Alkan Çelik
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Economic Power ◽  
Mena Region ◽  
Political Liberalization ◽  
Political Dominance ◽  
The World ◽  
Economic Barriers

The literature on regime change in the MENA region had claimed the occurrence of political liberalization and democratization during the 1990s, foreseeing a transition from the dominant authoritarianism in the region to politically more liberal regimes. These analyses neglect the state of permanent authoritarian political regimes with the centralized economic power and their role as periphery states in the world system. In this paper, we have reassessed the existing literature on regime change in the MENA region taking into account the economic and political impacts of rentier economies, with a close look at the countries in the region where popular uprisings took place to overthrow authoritarian leaders during the first half of 2011. We have followed Schlumberger's (2002) method of classification and comparative approach in order to pinpoint a correlation between the authoritarian regime's economic power based on resource allocation, its political dominance and the leaders' role in neo-liberal global political economy.

scholarly journals Changing Forms of Corruption in India

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (6) ◽  
pp. 1862-1890 ◽  
Author(s):  
AKHIL GUPTA
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Low Income ◽  
The State ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
The Other ◽  
Low Income Countries ◽  
Develop Nation ◽  
The Past ◽  
Neoliberal Reforms ◽  
Nation States

AbstractThis article has four important goals. First, I want to ask why liberalization and market-friendly reforms failed to curb corruption in India. Indeed, confounding the predictions of most proponents of reform, corruption seems to have increased after the neoliberal reforms of 1991. Second, I aim to develop a typology in which the importance of particular sectors to corrupt practices is highlighted and explained. Third, I point out that India has failed to make the ‘transition’ historically seen in low-income countries as they develop. Nation-states have in the past moved from a system of vertical corruption—marked by the extraction of small sums from a large number of transactions with citizens in everyday life—to a system of horizontal corruption, in which governmental elites extract large sums in a small number of transactions from corporate and commercial bodies. Finally, I argue that anti-corruption movements cannot be understood without paying attention to the affective and emotional ties that bind citizens to the state. We have to take account of contradictory feelings about the state: cynicism about the state and popular anger against corruption on one side, and an attachment to popular sovereignty and patronage on the other. These contradictory sentiments will better enable us to understand the conjunctures that lead to effective institutional change.

Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Coordinated Financial Systems since 1990

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pepper D. Culpepper
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Financial Systems ◽  
Collective Actors ◽  
Industrial Democracies ◽  
The World ◽  
Patterns Of Behavior ◽  
European Economies ◽  
Institutional Actors ◽  
Legal Mechanism

What happens when the unstoppable force of liberalization collides with the immovable object of national financial institutions in the advanced industrial democracies? To answer this question and evaluate alternative mechanisms to explain institutional change, this article examines the cases of the three large European economies with concentrated share ownership—France, Germany, and Italy. In the formal legal mechanism, interest coalitions adopt new laws, leading actors to deviate from formerly stable patterns of behavior in shareholding. In the joint belief shift mechanism, collective actors use a triggering event to jointly reevaluate their views of how the world works and thus how their interests can best be pursued. Using the metric of patient capital, this article shows that institutional change took place in France but not in Germany or Italy, despite the fact that Germany and Italy experienced significant regulatory change in the area of corporate governance while France did not. This evidence fits joint belief shift and is inconsistent with the formal legal mechanism. It is likely that the importance of the two mechanisms of institutional change depends on the degree of strategic interdependence among institutional actors: where it is high, the joint belief shift mechanism is likely to precipitate change; and where it is low, the formal legal mechanism is likely to precipitate change.

scholarly journals Migration-Related Conflicts as Drivers of Institutional Change?

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-112
Author(s):  
Maria Budnik ◽  
Katrin Grossmann ◽  
Christoph Hedtke
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Conflict Theory ◽  
Local Context ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Institutional Settings ◽  
Institutional Actors ◽  
Syriac Orthodox

This article examines the role of social conflicts in the context of migration and discusses the relation between such conflicts and institutional change. We understand conflicts as tensions that evoke contradiction between different social groups or institutional actors. Varied urban contexts together with dynamic immigration of heterogeneous population groups can induce negotiation processes that affect institutional settings and actors. Conflicts have therefore been an integral part of urban coexistence, and cities have always been places where these conflicts play out. We assume that conflicts are social phenomena, which have multiple causes and effects. Public assumptions about conflicts in connection with migration often have a negative or destructive impetus, while conflict theory ascribes to conflicts potential positive effects on societal change. Conflicts can represent forms of socialization and the possibility of adapting or changing social conditions. This article discusses the extent to which migration-related conflicts induce institutional change. Using qualitative empirical results from the BMBF-funded research project MigraChance, we present a case study that reconstructs the emergence and course of a conflict surrounding the construction of a Syriac-Orthodox church in Bebra (Hesse) in the 1990s. Analyzing this conflict both in depth and in relation to its local context, we show that migration is only one part of what we refer to as migration-related conflicts, and we shed light on the complexity of factors that can result in institutional change. Change can also occur indirectly, in small steps, and with ambivalent normative implications.

19. Pakistan

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Regime Change ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Regime Changes ◽  
Electoral Democracy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Military

This chapter examines Pakistan’s history of regime change and the military’s persistent influence on the country’s political process. Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has struggled to develop a system of sustainable democratic government. It has experienced a succession of regime changes, alternating between qualified or electoral democracy and either military or quasi-military rule. Underlying apparent instability and regime change in Pakistan is the dominance of the military in domestic politics. Ironically, the reintroduction of military rule has often been welcomed in Pakistan as a relief from the factional disputes among the civilian political leaders and accompanying high levels of corruption. The chapter first traces the history of Pakistan from independence to its breakup in 1971 before discussing government instability from 1971 to 1999. It then describes General Pervez Musharraf ’s rule from 1999 to 2008 and concludes with an assessment of the armed forces’ continuing involvement in Pakistani politics.

Urban Protests, Coups d’état and Post-Coup Regime Change

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lena Gerling
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Urban Centers ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Autocratic Regimes ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Coups D'etat

AbstractThis study investigates the impact of urban protests on coup attempts and subsequent regime change in a sample of 39 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period from 1990 to 2007. Widespread public discontent, especially when occurring in urban centers, can act as a trigger of coups d’état in autocratic regimes. Yet, it is less clear how elites respond to protests in terms of post-coup institutional change and democratization. To account for potential endogeneity of protests and coups, variation in rainfall is used as an instrument for urban protests. The results show that rainfall-related urban protests raise the likelihood that a coup is staged, but have no effect on subsequent democratization.

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