Extending the Body Ownership to Affective Experience of an Embodied Artificial Hand: a Power Spectra Investigation

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Davide Crivelli ◽  
Michela Balconi
Keyword(s):  
Power Spectra ◽  
Body Representation ◽  
The Body ◽  
External Object ◽  
Affective Processing ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Alpha Power ◽  
Affective Experience ◽  
Stimulation Condition ◽  
Affective Factors

Abstract According to implicit accounts, human self-awareness grounds on the so-called sense of ownership (SoO). Empirical investigations of SoO have mostly focused on the manipulation of self-ascription of sensations and experiences involving the body via the induction of bodily illusions, such as the Rubber-Hand Illusion (RHI). While it has been proposed that the affective dimension necessarily contributes to the development of a full ownership ascription, the relationship between affective experience and body ownership still presents many open questions. This study thus aimed at investigating the boundaries of ownership ascriptions and the extent to which an external object can be incorporated within one’s own body representation, with a specific focus on the possibility for it to become a potential object of own affective experience marked by specific electrophysiological responses. Therefore, we induced RHI in 16 participants and then applied an aversive vs. pleasant stimulation to the embodied external object, while monitoring their electrophysiological activity for central physiological markers of affective processing. Data analysis revealed the effect of the stimulation condition on alpha band power over frontal areas, with higher alpha power during the pleasant stimulation condition with respect to the aversive stimulation one over medial and right frontal electrode sites. The present findings add to the limited pieces of evidence concerning the link between experiences of illusory body ownership, embodiment mechanisms, and affective factors, suggesting that the boundaries of body ownership might be extended to making incorporated objects the source of complex emotional responses beyond basic defensive reactions.

Cross-referenced body and action for the unified self: empirical, developmental, and clinical perspectives

2021 ◽  
pp. 194-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Imaizumi ◽  
Tomohisa Asai ◽  
Michiko Miyazaki
Keyword(s):  
Body Representation ◽  
Body Part ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Phantom Limb ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Motor Rehabilitation ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
The Brain

This chapter discusses how the self emerges in the brain through the body and bodily actions. In terms of minimal selfhood, self-representation has two aspects: sense of body ownership and sense of agency over action. In the rubber hand illusion paradigm, multisensory and sensorimotor signals induce illusory ownership over a fake hand. Studies in healthy adults suggest a cross-referenced relationship between body and action as a mechanism of the self-representation. Specifically, one’s own hand can spontaneously move towards the fake hand due to illusory ownership, suggesting a body-to-action relationship. In contrast, an object which is moving synchronously with one’s hand can entail a sense of body ownership as well as a sense of agency, suggesting an action-to-body relationship. The chapter also discusses developmental and clinical perspectives. Immature self-recognition and body part localization in children suggest a prerequisite of representations of the self and body. Although such representations can deteriorate due to damage to the body and brain, amputees can incorporate phantom limb and prosthesis into their body representation through visuo-motor rehabilitation, regaining senses of ownership and agency over these limbs once again. The chapter proposes generation-loss-regeneration dynamism in self-representation originating from the cross-referenced body and action.

scholarly journals The role of self-touch in somatosensory and body representation disorders after stroke

2011 ◽  
Vol 366 (1581) ◽  
pp. 3142-3152 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. E. van Stralen ◽  
M. J. E. van Zandvoort ◽  
H. C. Dijkerman
Keyword(s):  
Body Representation ◽  
The Body ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Structural Representation ◽  
Bodily Experience ◽  
Left Hand ◽  
Patient Reported ◽  
Haptic Object ◽  
Tactile Detection

Somatosensory impairments occur in about half of the cases of stroke. These impairments range from primary deficits in tactile detection and the perception of features, to higher order impairments in haptic object recognition and bodily experience. In this paper, we review the influence of active- and self-touch on somatosensory impairments after stroke. Studies have shown that self-touch improves tactile detection in patients with primary tactile deficits. A small number of studies concerned with the effect of self-touch on bodily experience in healthy individuals have demonstrated that self-touch influences the structural representation of one's own body. In order to better understand the effect of self-touch on body representations, we present an informal study of a stroke patient with somatoparaphrenia and misoplegia. The role of self-touch on body ownership was investigated by asking the patient to stroke the impaired left hand and foreign hands. The patient reported ownership and a change in affect over all presented hands through self-touch. The time it took to accomplish ownership varied, based on the resemblance of the foreign hand to the patient's own hand. Our findings suggest that self-touch can modulate impairments in body ownership and affect, perhaps by helping to reinstate the representation of the body.

scholarly journals Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caleb Liang ◽  
Wen-Hsiang Lin ◽  
Tai-Yuan Chang ◽  
Chi-Hong Chen ◽  
Chen-Wei Wu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Distinct Type ◽  
Body Part ◽  
The Body ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The One ◽  
First Time ◽  
Full Body

AbstractBody ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I am the one who is having a conscious experience. Are body ownership and experiential ownership actually the same phenomenon or are they genuinely different? In our experiments, the participant watched a rubber hand or someone else’s body from the first-person perspective and was touched either synchronously or asynchronously. The main findings: (1) The sense of body ownership was hindered in the asynchronous conditions of both the body-part and the full-body experiments. However, a strong sense of experiential ownership was observed in those conditions. (2) We found the opposite when the participants’ responses were measured after tactile stimulations had ceased for 5 s. In the synchronous conditions of another set of body-part and full-body experiments, only experiential ownership was blocked but not body ownership. These results demonstrate for the first time the double dissociation between body ownership and experiential ownership. Experiential ownership is indeed a distinct type of bodily self-consciousness.

The Role of Hand Size in the Fake-Hand Illusion Paradigm

Perception ◽  
10.1068/p5853 ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (10) ◽  
pp. 1547-1554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Pavani ◽  
Massimiliano Zampini
Keyword(s):  
Body Image ◽  
Body Schema ◽  
Body Representation ◽  
The Body ◽  
Video Image ◽  
Body Parts ◽  
Statistical Correlations ◽  
Hand Size ◽  
Visible Hand

When a hand (either real or fake) is stimulated in synchrony with our own hand concealed from view, the felt position of our own hand can be biased toward the location of the seen hand. This intriguing phenomenon relies on the brain's ability to detect statistical correlations in the multisensory inputs (ie visual, tactile, and proprioceptive), but it is also modulated by the pre-existing representation of one's own body. Nonetheless, researchers appear to have accepted the assumption that the size of the seen hand does not matter for this illusion to occur. Here we used a real-time video image of the participant's own hand to elicit the illusion, but we varied the hand size in the video image so that the seen hand was either reduced, veridical, or enlarged in comparison to the participant's own hand. The results showed that visible-hand size modulated the illusion, which was present for veridical and enlarged images of the hand, but absent when the visible hand was reduced. These findings indicate that very specific aspects of our own body image (ie hand size) can constrain the multisensory modulation of the body schema highlighted by the fake-hand illusion paradigm. In addition, they suggest an asymmetric tendency to acknowledge enlarged (but not reduced) images of body parts within our body representation.

scholarly journals Perception of visual-tactile asynchrony, bodily perceptual aberrations, and bodily illusions in schizophrenia

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Regine Zopf
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Detection Sensitivity ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Body Perception ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Bodily Experiences ◽  
Asynchrony Detection ◽  
Body Perceptions ◽  
Proprioceptive Drift ◽  
Insight Into

Body perception can be dramatically altered in individuals with schizophrenia resulting in experiences of undefined bodily boundaries, loss of body ownership, and size changes for parts of the body. These individuals may also be more susceptible to the rubber hand illusion (RHI: an illusion of body perception that can also be induced in neurotypical populations), but the findings are mixed. Furthermore, the perception of timing information about multisensory stimuli, which is thought to be fundamental for body perception, has been reported to be altered in schizophrenia. We tested here whether altered perception of the temporal relationship between visual and tactile signals in schizophrenia can predict self-reported perceptual aberrations and RHI susceptibility (indexed by both illusion self-ratings and a more objective proprioceptive-drift measure). We found that the sensitivity to detect temporal asynchronies is reduced in schizophrenia and this predicts bodily perceptual symptoms. In contrast, we found no evidence for a direct relationship between asynchrony detection sensitivity and RHI susceptibility. Instead, our findings suggest that experiencing more bodily perceptual symptoms increases the likelihood of endorsing unusual bodily experiences, resulting in higher RHI self-ratings but not higher proprioceptive-drift scores. Overall, our findings provide evidence for both direct and indirect links between temporal and body perception and thus new insight into the mechanisms that may underlie unusual body perceptions in schizophrenia.

Children's Preference for Body or External Object on a Task Requiring Transposition and Discrimination of Right-Left Relations

1975 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 291-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald A. Winer
Keyword(s):  
First Graders ◽  
The Body ◽  
External Object ◽  
Initial Series ◽  
Alternative Systems ◽  
External Objects ◽  
Practice Trials

First graders were tested on trials requiring the discrimination and transposition of right-left relations, with stimuli similar to (dolls) or different from (toy planes) the body. On an initial series of training and practice trials children were allowed to respond to body and external objects as referents providing right-left cues. A later series of test trials was then used to determine the referent the child actually preferred. Results of the test trials indicated that 24 children tested with the dolls preferred the body as referent, while 24 children tested with planes preferred the external referent. The results were interpreted as suggesting two alternative systems through which children develop an undersranding of right-left relations and possibly other concepts as well.

Triadic body representations in the human cerebral cortex and peripheral nerves

2021 ◽  
pp. 133-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noriaki Kanayama ◽  
Kentaro Hiromitsu
Keyword(s):  
Peripheral Nerves ◽  
Sensory Modality ◽  
Body Schema ◽  
Body Representation ◽  
Neural System ◽  
The Body ◽  
Neural Representation ◽  
Structural Description ◽  
Research Fields ◽  
The Brain

Is the body reducible to neural representation in the brain? There is some evidence that the brain contributes to the functioning of the body from neuroimaging, neurophysiological, and lesion studies. Well-known dyadic taxonomy of the body schema and the body image (hereafter BSBI) is based primarily on the evidence in brain-damaged patients. Although there is a growing consensus that the BSBI exists, there is little agreement on the dyadic taxonomy because it is not a concrete and common concept across various research fields. This chapter tries to investigate the body representation in the cortex and nervous system in terms of sensory modality and psychological function using two different approaches. The first approach is to review the neurological evidence and cortical area which is related to body representation, regardless of the BSBI, and then to reconsider how we postulate the BSBI in our brain. It can be considered that our body representation could be constructed by the whole of the neural system, including the cortex and peripheral nerves. The second approach is to revisit the BSBI conception from the viewpoint of recent neuropsychology and propose three types of body representation: body schema, body structural description, and body semantics. This triadic taxonomy is considered consistent with the cortical networks based on the evidence of bodily disorders due to brain lesions. These two approaches allow to reconsider the BSBI more carefully and deeply and to give us the possibility that the body representation could be underpinned with the network in the brain.

scholarly journals Changing Body Representation Through Full Body Ownership Illusions Might Foster Motor Rehabilitation Outcome in Patients With Stroke

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Matamala-Gomez ◽  
Clelia Malighetti ◽  
Pietro Cipresso ◽  
Elisa Pedroli ◽  
Olivia Realdon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Body Representation ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Motor Rehabilitation ◽  
Rehabilitation Outcome ◽  
Full Body

scholarly journals Biosensing and Actuation—Platforms Coupling Body Input-Output Modalities for Affective Technologies

Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (21) ◽  
pp. 5968
Author(s):  
Miquel Alfaras ◽  
William Primett ◽  
Muhammad Umair ◽  
Charles Windlin ◽  
Pavel Karpashevich ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Low Cost ◽  
Body Awareness ◽  
Health Condition ◽  
The Body ◽  
First Person ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Affective Experience ◽  
Health Domains ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Feedback Modalities

Research in the use of ubiquitous technologies, tracking systems and wearables within mental health domains is on the rise. In recent years, affective technologies have gained traction and garnered the interest of interdisciplinary fields as the research on such technologies matured. However, while the role of movement and bodily experience to affective experience is well-established, how to best address movement and engagement beyond measuring cues and signals in technology-driven interactions has been unclear. In a joint industry-academia effort, we aim to remodel how affective technologies can help address body and emotional self-awareness. We present an overview of biosignals that have become standard in low-cost physiological monitoring and show how these can be matched with methods and engagements used by interaction designers skilled in designing for bodily engagement and aesthetic experiences. Taking both strands of work together offers unprecedented design opportunities that inspire further research. Through first-person soma design, an approach that draws upon the designer’s felt experience and puts the sentient body at the forefront, we outline a comprehensive work for the creation of novel interactions in the form of couplings that combine biosensing and body feedback modalities of relevance to affective health. These couplings lie within the creation of design toolkits that have the potential to render rich embodied interactions to the designer/user. As a result we introduce the concept of “orchestration”. By orchestration, we refer to the design of the overall interaction: coupling sensors to actuation of relevance to the affective experience; initiating and closing the interaction; habituating; helping improve on the users’ body awareness and engagement with emotional experiences; soothing, calming, or energising, depending on the affective health condition and the intentions of the designer. Through the creation of a range of prototypes and couplings we elicited requirements on broader orchestration mechanisms. First-person soma design lets researchers look afresh at biosignals that, when experienced through the body, are called to reshape affective technologies with novel ways to interpret biodata, feel it, understand it and reflect upon our bodies.

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