scholarly journals Being Realistic about Kant’s Idealism (Translated by M. Rouba)

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Tobias Rosefeldt
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Phenomenal Properties ◽  
Transcendental Object ◽  
Mental Objects

This paper deals with the question of whether Kant's transcendental idealism allows for an explanation of the a posteriori aspects of mental content by the properties of empirical objects. I first show that a phenomenalist interpretation has severe problems with assuming that we perceive an object as being red or as being cubical partly because the perceived object is red and cubical, and then present an interpretation that allows us to save the realistic intuition behind these claims. According to this interpretation, Kantian phenomenal properties are understood as response-dependent properties of extra-mental objects that also have to have some response-independent (in-itself-) properties. I show that this interpretation is well supported by Kant's remarks about the transcendental object in the A-edition of the first Critique and that it also makes intelligible why Kant took explanations of mental content by means of empirical properties to imply an explanation by means of noumenal properties without thereby violating his own doctrine of noumenal ignorance. This not only allows us to establish a realistic reading of Kant idealism but also to discern the true kernel in Adickes’ infamous talk about Kant's theory of double affection.

Materialism, Functionalism and Supervenient Qualia

Dialogue ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ausonio Marras
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Character ◽  
Phenomenal Properties ◽  
Mental Events ◽  
Mental Objects ◽  
Mental Contents

Qualia are phenomenal properties of sensations and perceptual states: they are whatever it is that gives such states their “felt,” qualitative character. (In speaking of sensations, I speak of course not of mental objects or mental contents, but of mental events—of sensings, not sensa.)

scholarly journals Naturalism’s maxims and its methods. Is naturalistic philosophy like science?

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-391
Author(s):  
Carin Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Error ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Philosophical Paper ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
Naturalistic Philosophy ◽  
The Brain

This paper argues that naturalistic philosophy does not meet its own empiricist mandate. It argues from an empiricist perspective. Naturalists either claim that philosophy is like science in significant ways, or they claim that philosophy ought to be like science. This paper, being chiefly focused on the former claim, argues that naturalistic philosophy is nothing like science. Using Papineau’s markers for the similarities between naturalistic philosophy and science, I argue, counter Papineau, that the method employed in naturalistic philosophy is not a posteriori and its claims are certainly not synthetic in the same way as that of science. This methodological distinction between science and philosophy is one made by Carnap. To show how the methods are distinct I compare two papers; I compare the method employed by Andy Clark in his philosophical paper on the brain as a prediction error minimisation machine with that employed by Rees and Haynes in their neuroscientific paper on mental content.

scholarly journals Marharita Rouba: Translator’s Comments of T. Rosefeldt: ‘Being Realistic about Kant’s Idealism’

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Marharyta Rouba
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Key Points ◽  
Content Of Experience

The preface to the translation of Tobias Rosefeldt’s article into Russian provides a discussion context, in which the author settles an issue of interpreting the a posteriori aspects of the content of experience in Kant’s transcendental idealism. Key points of the article are briefly formulated and the translator’s choices of certain terms are justified.

scholarly journals Metaphorics of phenomenal judgments and the problem of social verification

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-18
Author(s):  
Pavel N. Baryshnikov
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Semantic Space ◽  
The Body ◽  
Communicative Interaction ◽  
Phenomenal Properties ◽  
Linguistic Representations ◽  
Special Area

The article describes the basic semantic principles of generating phenomenal judgments. Phenomenal judgments are considered as linguistic representations of the phenomenal properties of consciousness and indirect descriptions of subjective experience that occur in a private subjective semantic space. Linguistic representation in propositional and conceptual forms creates a special area of metaphorical connections that are involved to the process of social verification in the communicative interaction. The most important component of phenomenal judgments is the speakers conviction that the recipient has similar properties of mental content. The mechanisms behind the emergence of phenomenal judgments are not entirely clear. In this case an interdisciplinary approach seems to be the most promising. The paper examines the results of methodological interferences of the body-oriented paradigm in cognitive sciences with the analytic philosophy of mind (consciousness). The problem of phenomenal judgments is an interaction area of ontology and semantics and requires a comprehensive linguo-philosophical research, a step on the path to which this article is made.

scholarly journals Transcendental Idealism and the Self-Knowledge Premise

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-41
Author(s):  
Chiu Yui Plato Tse
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
External World ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Self ◽  
Personal Perspective ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Philosophical Naturalism ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
And Function ◽  
Meaning And Function

AbstractThe relation between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism awaits more careful determination, i. e. whether the issue of their compatibility hinges on their ontological view on the relation between physical and mental phenomena (i. e. whether it is supervenience or emergence) or on their epistemological view on our access to mental content. The aim of this paper is to identify a tension between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism, which lies not in their ontological view on the nature of substances, but in their epistemological view on the relation between self-awareness and the first-personal access to mental content. I will first trace the (mis)understanding of transcendental idealism as Berkeleyan idealism to a misinterpretation of the self-knowledge premise in transcendental arguments. I will argue that transcendental idealism is not so much concerned with grounding reality of the external world as with establishing the agential nature of the first-personal perspective of experience, and it has an important implication on the meaning and function of self-awareness in transcendental idealism.

scholarly journals A Interpretação Epistêmica da Semântica Bidimensional

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-143
Author(s):  
Júlia Telles Menezes
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Linguistic Terms ◽  
Frank Jackson ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation

O presente artigo pretende apresentar e avaliar criticamente o projeto racionalista de David Chalmers e Frank Jackson na interpretação epistêmica da chamada semântica bidimensional. Diferentes versões do aparato formal da semântica bidimensional são lançadas para resolver certos problemas no âmbito da filosofia da linguagem, a saber, dar conta do conteúdo semântico de termos indexicais, produzir uma explicação para os híbridos modais como instâncias do necessário a posteriori e contribuir para o debate acerca da determinação do conteúdo mental. De um modo geral, a semântica bidimensional estipula uma dupla dependência de expressões linguísticas frente a possibilidades ou cenários. Uma das noções centrais para a construção das possibilidades relevantes é a noção de “cenário”. O presente trabalho procura responder a duas objeções aa noção de cenário empregada por David Chalmers em sua interpretação do aparato bidimensional. AbstractThis paper aims at presenting and critically assessing the epistemic interpretation advanced by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson of the two-dimensional semantic framework. Different versions of the formal apparatus of the two-dimensional framework are used to account for philosophical phenomena such as the content of indexical terms, modal hybrids, such as posteriori necessities and the individuation of mental content. Generally, two-dimensional framework stipulates a double dependence of linguistic terms on possibilities or scenarios. One of the central notions for the construction of the relevant kind of possibility is the notion of “scenario”. The aim of the paper is to defend the two- dimensional framework from two objections regarding the notion of scenario.

The return of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 19-68
Author(s):  
Robert Hanna
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
The Other ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Kantian Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Central Claim ◽  
Urban Legend

Without a doubt, the greatest urban legend of contemporary philosophy is the beliefthat Quine refuted the A-S distinction in the Two Dogmas of the Empiricism in1951. The central claim of this essay is that the right theory of mental content and humanrationality on the one hand, and the analytic-synthetic distinction on the other,are explanatorily complementary, mutually supporting, and jointly cogent. One veryimportant further consequence of this Kantian theory is that it demonstrates that thereare in fact no such things as necessary a posteriori statements or contingent a prioristatements, contrary to popular post-Quinean belief. So Kant was right, Quine waswrong, and perhaps even more surprisingly, Kripke was wrong too.

Mind wandering as data augmentation: How mental travel supports abstraction

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myrthe Faber
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
Data Augmentation ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Important Addition

Abstract Gilead et al. state that abstraction supports mental travel, and that mental travel critically relies on abstraction. I propose an important addition to this theoretical framework, namely that mental travel might also support abstraction. Specifically, I argue that spontaneous mental travel (mind wandering), much like data augmentation in machine learning, provides variability in mental content and context necessary for abstraction.

Practical Correction of Three Fold Astigmatism in the Philips CM TEM

1996 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 418-419
Author(s):  
Arno J. Bleeker ◽  
Mark H.F. Overwijk ◽  
Max T. Otten
Keyword(s):  
Optical Properties ◽  
Phase Contrast ◽  
The Other ◽  
Objective Lens ◽  
Symmetric Part ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Contrast Transfer Function ◽  
High Brightness ◽  
Rotationally Symmetric ◽  
Brightness Field

With the improvement of the optical properties of the modern TEM objective lenses the point resolution is pushed beyond 0.2 nm. The objective lens of the CM300 UltraTwin combines a Cs of 0. 65 mm with a Cc of 1.4 mm. At 300 kV this results in a point resolution of 0.17 nm. Together with a high-brightness field-emission gun with an energy spread of 0.8 eV the information limit is pushed down to 0.1 nm. The rotationally symmetric part of the phase contrast transfer function (pctf), whose first zero at Scherzer focus determines the point resolution, is mainly determined by the Cs and defocus. Apart from the rotationally symmetric part there is also the non-rotationally symmetric part of the pctf. Here the main contributors are not only two-fold astigmatism and beam tilt but also three-fold astigmatism. The two-fold astigmatism together with the beam tilt can be corrected in a straight-forward way using the coma-free alignment and the objective stigmator. However, this only works well when the coefficient of three-fold astigmatism is negligible compared to the other aberration coefficients. Unfortunately this is not generally the case with the modern high-resolution objective lenses. Measurements done at a CM300 SuperTwin FEG showed a three fold-astigmatism of 1100 nm which is consistent with measurements done by others. A three-fold astigmatism of 1000 nm already sinificantly influences the image at a spatial frequency corresponding to 0.2 nm which is even above the point resolution of the objective lens. In principle it is possible to correct for the three-fold astigmatism a posteriori when through-focus series are taken or when off-axis holography is employed. This is, however not possible for single images. The only possibility is then to correct for the three-fold astigmatism in the microscope by the addition of a hexapole corrector near the objective lens.

Expected A Posteriori Estimation of Multiple Latent Traits

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damon U. Bryant ◽  
Ashley K. Smith ◽  
Sandra G. Alexander ◽  
Kathlea Vaughn ◽  
Kristophor G. Canali
Keyword(s):  
A Posteriori ◽  
Latent Traits ◽  
Posteriori Estimation
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