Least-Worst Decision-Making “in Extremis”

Given the immense physiological effect of being at war, and the unique effect this has on the physiology and psychology of the soldier, this chapter examines decisions implemented at the tactical level. It presents a dynamic, slow-burn operation to show the complicated process of implementing a least-worst decision on the ground and, importantly, how soldiers react when a plan does not work. The chapter also presents the decision-making in this case and other cases of operations on the ground to examine the psychological factors associated with successfully (and unsuccessfully) making military decisions in extremis. In many cases we examine the psychology of decision-making without referencing, or considering, the physiology of decision-making. These two are in fact intertwined and we attempt to bridge the two in this chapter.

Team Learning

In many military and critical incident situations, teams operate as part of a coalition or collective of other organizations. Interoperation adds complexity to the decision-making process because it brings together organizations with (potentially) disparate (and competing) values, priorities, and organizational practices. This chapter examines the issues of value congruence between the person and the organization. Specifically, it discusses value congruence at a situation-specific level (i.e., how does organizational/personal value congruence affect least-worst decision-making in operation) and also the factors within the organization that can facilitate or hinder effective decision-making. Finally, value congruence is extrapolated to examine the overall effects of “person–organization” fit, especially as it pertains to moral behavior and issues of retention.

How Do Soldiers Do What They Do and What Can We Learn from It?

This chapter reviews the psychology of making decisions in a conflict environment. Furthermore, it examines the reality that in many cases, a good decision can often still result in an adverse outcome. Finally, the chapter discusses how the changing character of conflict and how the insights gleaned from this book can be integrated into future training to help develop soldiers who are better able to handle situations they face in which there really are no good outcomes. Specifically, it focuses on the fact that soldiers often seem to outperform their non-military counterparts in navigating fraught psychological terrain with ease and conviction, proving decisive where others might falter.

Executing Plans

Once a decision has been made, it still needs to be implemented into the real world. Although a decision is a commitment to a course of action, it is important to consider the stages beyond mere commitment and the issues that are encountered during the execution of this commitment. Furthermore, although a decision may be an internal commitment or preference, in many cases decisions made by an individual are done so within an environment of multiple, competing individuals and agencies that may (or may not) share the individual’s priorities and values. As such, the commitment made by the individual may not reflect the decision that is executed. This chapter examines the wider social pressures that are present within the decision-making environment and also how these can interfere with an individual’s preference, resulting in changes in commitment and decision errors. This chapter also examines the barriers to executing decisions.

Formulating Plans

Plan formulation concerns how decision-makers arrive at the means to achieve their objectives, and it involves setting out various plans or courses of action that are constrained by an individual’s perception of the perceived risk. This chapter focuses on how options are evaluated and what determines “desirability.” The centrality of values and goals, at both the individual and the organizational level, and how the goals that people set can guide their judgments under uncertainty are examined. In addition, the chapter highlights how the nature of the situation affects the process through which options are generated and compared. Finally, chapter discusses inertia traps that individuals can fall into when they fail to decide between equally adverse choices.

Military Decision-Making

This chapter discusses three broad approaches to understanding how military decisions are made: (1) the military decision-making process (MDMP), based largely on historical experience and, arguably, best described as the nearest thing to a doctrine-based approach; (2) rational–cognitive approaches and the literature on heuristics and biases and the means to try to optimize decision-making; and (3) so-called “naturalistic decision-making” approaches based largely on observations of decision-making in the field and thus perhaps best considered as a descriptive observation-based framework. The chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches and notes that each weakness reveals considerable gaps in knowledge about the specific nature of the impossible decisions that soldiers face.

Situation Awareness

This chapter explores the process of sense-making in combat. It presents cases of sense-making from those involved in offensive operations in the field as well as those involved in more remote operations whose sense-making is solely reliant upon small snippets of the scene that they can observe through the technology they have deployed at that time. The chapter discusses the limitations (cognitive and situational) in trying to gain an accurate picture of what is happening on the ground and the implications of this for the ensuing stages of the decision-making process. Special attention is paid to the role of cultural differences and the difficulties in making sense and “storytelling” in environments that have little in common with one’s own. Finally, with reference to a real case of mission planning in Afghanistan, the fine balance between acting too soon and becoming inert is discussed.

The Science of Selecting Least-Worst Options

This chapter presents the SAFE-T model of decision-making—a descriptive model that offers an innovative insight-generating platform through which the process of making military decisions can come into better focus. It is simpler than most models and thus quicker, pragmatically connected to the military decision-making process in terms of being phase-based, and supported by empirical evidence (as well as retaining components of experience and expertise). There are several more specific benefits to applying the SAFE-T model to military decision-making. One is that the phased nature of the SAFE-T model helps identify not only factors that influence the decision-making process but also how the current decision-making phase is influenced differentially by each factor.

Thoughts That Haunt

Least-worst decisions, by their nature, have a high chance of an adverse outcome. The decisions that soldiers make during war cause them conflict, and such decisions can have major implications for reintegration post-war. This chapter discusses what happens after soldiers must engage in least-worst first decision-making and the sequelae often observed after soldiers return home from deployment—post-traumatic stress disorder and its effects. Based on interviews of soldiers, it is clear that least-worst decisions have a long-lasting impact due, in part, because they may constantly wonder “what if?” This chapter discusses the long-term implications of having to make such decisions.

Decisional Conflict

Members of the Armed Forces, at all levels, are required to make decisions in which every outcome appears to be averse and high risk. Neither the current military decision-making process nor contemporary psychological theory (e.g., recognition-primed decision-making) satisfactorily explains the process of making decisions such as these. This chapter discusses the prevalence of least-worst decisions, showing that they can occur at all levels, from the President’s decision to use a military option (e.g., in Syria) to the soldier on the ground who must decide whether to shoot or not (and the implications of the former on the latter and vice versa). The chapter also shows that effectively navigating combat, at all levels of command, is not a case of being able to select the best choice but, rather, often being able to grapple with choosing the least-worst.