How Does the Fusion of Sensory Information From Audition and Vision Impact Collective Behavior?

The present study investigates how combined information from audition and vision impacts group-level behavior. We consider a modification to the original Vicsek model that allows individuals to use auditory and visual sensing modalities to gather information from neighbors in order to update their heading directions. Moreover, in this model, the information from visual and auditory cues can be weighed differently. In a simulation study, we examine the sensitivity of the emergent group-level behavior to the weights that are assigned to each sense modality in this weighted composite model. Our findings suggest combining sensory cues may play an important role in the collective behavior and results from the composite model indicate that the group-level features from pure audition predominate.

The pragmatics of discovery constrains children’s tendency to map novel labels onto novel objects

When taught a label for an object, and later asked whether that object or a novel object is the referent of a novel label, preschoolers favor the novel object. This article examines whether this so-called disambiguation effect may be undermined by an expectation to communicate about a discovery. This expectation may explain why 4-year-olds do not show the disambiguation effect if a sense modality shift occurs between training and test. In Study 1, 3- and 4-year-olds learned a label for a visible object, then examined two hidden objects manually and predicted which one they would be asked about. Only the older group predicted that they would be asked about the object that matched the visible object. Study 1 also included a test of the standard disambiguation effect, where both the training and test objects were visible. Both 3- and 4-year-olds showed a weaker disambiguation effect in this test when the matching object was unexpected rather than expected. In Study 2, both age groups predicted they would be asked about this object when it was unexpected. In Study 3, both age groups showed a stronger disambiguation effect when allowed to communicate about this object before deciding which object was the referent of a novel label. Metacognitive ability predicted the strength of this disambiguation effect even after controlling for age and inhibitory control. The article discusses various explanations for why only 4-year-olds abided by the pragmatics of discovery in the test of the cross-modal disambiguation effect, but both 3- and 4-year-olds abided by it in the test of the standard disambiguation effect.

Multimodal Mental Imagery and Perceptual Justification

There has been a lot of discussion about how the cognitive penetrability of perception may or may not have important implications for understanding perceptual justification. The aim of this chapter is to argue that a different set of findings in perceptual psychology poses an even more serious challenge to the very idea of perceptual justification. These findings are about the importance of perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality (such as amodal completion and multimodal completion). These findings show that everyday perception is in fact a mixture of sensory-stimulation-driven perceptual processing and perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality and that we have strong reasons to doubt the epistemic pedigree of the latter process. The implication of this is not that we should become skeptics or deny the possibility of perceptual justification. It is, rather, that the only way in which we can understand when and whether a perceptual state justifies beliefs is by paying close attention to empirical facts about the reliability of perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. In this sense (a very narrow sense) epistemology needs to be naturalized.

Learned Attention II

This chapter explores the relationship between sensory substitution devices and the training of attention. Sensory substitution devices, typically used by the blind, deliver information about the environment by converting the information normally received through one sense (e.g., vision) into information for another sense (e.g., audition or touch). When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the integration process involves perceptual learning. This chapter explores two questions. First, in what ways can sensory substitution illuminate how the training of attention works more generally? Second, how does knowledge of the way attention is trained in perceptual learning help us to better understand sensory substitution? The chapter draws on findings in these areas to answer a philosophical question: Should the post-perceptual learning experience be classified in the substituted modality (e.g., as vision), in the substituting modality (e.g., as auditory or tactile), or in a new sense modality?

The Mechanism of the Ordinal Position Effect: Stability Across Sense Modalities and the Hands Crossed Context

The ordinal position effect posits that items positioned earlier in an ordinal sequence are responded to faster with the left key than the right key, and items positioned later in an ordinal sequence are responded to faster with the right key than the left key. Although the mechanism of the ordinal position effect has been investigated in many studies, it is unclear whether the ordinal position effect can extend to the auditory modality and the hands crossed context. Therefore, the present study employed days as the order information to investigate this question. Days were visually or acoustically displayed on a screen in random order, and participants were instructed to judge whether the probe day they perceived was before or after the current day (days-relevant task) or to identify the color or voice of the probe day they perceived (days-irrelevant task). The results indicate the following: (a) The days before the current day were responded to faster with the left key than the right key, and the days after the current day were responded to faster with the right key than the left key, both when the days-relevant task and the days-irrelevant task were performed, regardless of the sense modality. (b) The ordinal position effect for judgments of days was also obtained in the auditory modality even when the hands were crossed. These results indicate that the ordinal position effect can extend to the auditory modality and the hands crossed context, similar to the spatial-numerical association of response codes effect of numbers.

Perceptual Knowledge and Recognitional Abilities

Recognizing a thing as being some way from its appearance to some sense-modality is knowing that it is that way from that appearance. It is the exercise of a general ability to tell of things that are the way in question that they are that way from the way they appear. The ability is exercised only if the subject succeeds in that respect. Our fallibility in relation to those abilities consists in our not always exercising them whenever we make a judgement directed at recognition. For things to be recognized as being of some kind from their appearance, the environment has to be favourable to the exercise of the relevant ability. It will be so only if the appearance of things of the kind is distinctive of being of the kind. The view does not depend on the assumption that experiences have representational content in any rich sense.

Conceptual Metaphors and Perception Verbs in GĨKŨYŨ

This paper examines the polysemy that exists in the semantic field of perception verbs in Gĩkũyũ which is a Bantu Language of the Niger – Congo group spoken in Kenya. These verbs do not only convey the meanings that are related to the physical perception of each sense modality but they are extended to express varieties of meanings in other semantic fields. The paper also examines the link between the concrete and the abstract meanings within perception verbs in GĩKũYũ through conceptual metaphor.

The Silence of Movement

The kinetic silence of movement has formidable powers. Observations of a film critic, poet, professor of political history, and medical doctor attest to the fact that that silence is replete with meanings. Those meanings in turn testify to a movement-anchored corporeal semiotics that resounds not merely functionally but experientially in animate forms of life. It does so consistently and directly in kinesthesia, the ever-present sense modality by which we experience the qualitative dynamics of movement and synergies of meaningful movement. Phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives attest to these dynamics and synergies. So also does Aristotle’s description of movement as a sensu communis. Because a movement-anchored corporeal semiotics discovers and describes what is existentially meaningful in the lives of animate organisms, such a semiotics is the foundation of a cognitive semiotics. It is so in a number of everyday ways, most notably in terms of thinking in movement and of cognition itself.

Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Learning

When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptual learning, that is, ‘relatively long-lasting changes to an organism’s perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment’. In this chapter, I explore ways in which the extensive literature on perceptual learning can be applied to help improve sensory substitution devices. I then use these findings to answer a philosophical question. Much of the philosophical debate surrounding sensory substitution devices concerns what happens after perceptual learning occurs. In particular, should the resultant perceptual experience be classified in the substituted modality (as vision), in the substituting modality (as auditory or tactile), or in a new sense modality? I propose a novel empirical test to help resolve this philosophical debate.

Sensory Substitution and the Challenge of Acclimatization

I defend a refined characterization of sensory substitution that allows for its existence while denying that the substituting sense plus sensory substitution device is always appropriately classified as the substituted sense. Accepting that there are genuine cases of sensory substitution of this kind implies that acclimatization to a sensory substitution device may provide presentations of properties. Externalist accounts of experience together with objectivist characterizations of such properties have the upshot that properties putatively proprietary to a sense modality can be presented in another modality in cases of substitution. I consider three objections to this argument. I close by explaining how reflection on the phenomena of sensory substitution and, in particular, acclimatization is important for the development of any kind of representationalist or relationist theory of phenomenal properties or, at the very least, suggests we need to refine the idea of certain properties—rather than particular ways in which their presentation is bundled together—being proprietary to the particular senses.