Taking Public Administration Seriously

This chapter begins with a series of examples that illustrate the power wielded by unelected state officials. This power includes not only discretion but also control over the policy process, as well as the ability to bring pressure to bear upon elected officials. The exercise of this administrative power, far from being an imperfection in the system, contributes a great deal to the quality of public decision-making. But it raises a difficult normative question concerning how unelected officials can wield power in a way that is consistent with the commitment to political neutrality of the permanent civil service and to the more general principles of democratic legitimacy that govern liberal-democratic states. A contrast is drawn between this position and the one defended by Pierre Rosanvallon.

Cost-Benefit Analysis as an Expression of Liberal Neutrality

The past few decades have seen an expansion in the use of cost-benefit analysis as a tool for policy evaluation in the public sector. This slow, steady creep has been a source of consternation to many philosophers and political theorists, who are inclined to view cost-benefit analysis as simply a variant of utilitarianism and consider utilitarianism to be completely unacceptable as a public philosophy. The chapter shows that this impression is misleading. When construed narrowly, cost-benefit analysis does look a lot like utilitarianism. However, when it is seen in its broader context, in the way that it is applied, and the types of problem to which it is applied, it is better understood as an attempt by the state to avoid taking sides with respect to various controversial conceptions of the good.

Efficiency and the Rise of the Welfare State

Even among supporters of the welfare state there are several different theoretical reconstructions of the normative commitments that are taken to underlie it, all of which are in tension with one another. The three normative purposes most commonly cited are equality, community, and efficiency. These give rise to a corresponding set of models, which I refer to as the egalitarian, communitarian, and public-economic models of the welfare state. The objective of this chapter is to show that the public-economic model of the welfare state, though the least popular among political philosophers, is actually the most plausible. Not only does it provide a superior account of the existing configuration of welfare-state activities, but it alone is able to explain why, in all Western democracies, state spending rose almost continuously over the course of the 20th century.

Conclusion

The growth of the administrative state creates a dilemma for the civil service. In order to guide the exercise of administrative power, it is compelled to develop its own conception of the public interest. And yet it appears to be prohibited from doing so both by democratic theory and constitutional convention. The solution to the dilemma lies in an understanding of the way that liberal principles inform the practice of public administration, in particular, the principles of efficiency, equality and liberty. This brief concluding chapter offers a summary of the argument, offered over the course of the book, in defense of this position.

Paternalism and Individual Freedom

The growth of state bureaucracy is seen by many as a threat to individual freedom. This concern has been mitigated in part by the commitment of the liberal state to refrain from engaging in paternalistic intervention. This chapter revisits John Stuart Mill’s classic arguments against paternalism to assess recent challenges to the traditional liberal deference of individual autonomy. The discovery of systematic deviations from rationality has suggested to many that state officials may in certain cases be able to improve individual welfare by intervening in ways that override individuals’ own judgment. These proposals can be analyzed under three categories: those having to do with temporal distortions of preference, with biases in cognition, and with manipulation of choice through non-rational means. This suggests certain valid exceptions to the general rule laid down by Mill.

Liberalism

This chapter analyses the rise of liberalism in terms of the desire to develop a set of normative principles to govern the state that exhibit neutrality with regard to controversial conceptions of the good. It traces the historical development to emphasize that these principles represented not just a solution to a conceptual difficulty but also a way to address a pressing practical problem. The classical formulation of the doctrine emphasized the state’s provision of three “neutral” goods: property, contract, and security. However, the very success of liberal states organized on this basis gave rise to a set of social problems that the doctrine was powerless to resolve. This gave rise, indirectly, to modern liberalism, which reconceptualizes liberal neutrality in terms of a commitment to a set of more abstract principles of efficiency, equality, and liberty.

Administrative Discretion and the Rule of Law

Empirical study of administrative decision-making shows that the power exercised by public officials is only loosely controlled by statutory law. Political theorists have traditionally viewed this discretion quite negatively, as a violation either of the rule of law or the principle of democratic legitimacy. This chapter presents a defense of administrative discretion, on the grounds that it is not just inevitable; it makes an important contribution to the quality of public administration. Both legislative and judicial strategies to reduce administrative discretion have failed or had perverse consequences. The best approach to reducing the potential for abuse of power has been through the development of a “rule of law” culture within the executive branch.

A General Framework for the Ethics of Public Administration

It is generally understood that civil servants, in carrying out their work, should be committed to promoting the “public interest” or the “common good.” This ideal, however, is too abstract to serve as a practical guide without further institutional specification. This chapter examines three different models of public-sector ethics, based on different ways of institutionalizing this commitment to the public interest: hierarchical, populist, and vocational. A critical survey of the strengths and weaknesses of each model is presented, leading to a qualified endorsement of the vocational model.