The Main Staff of the Second Army and the Development of Russian Military Thought, 1815–1834

Research into the Greek revolution was only one of the tasks that Kiselev had assigned to his Main Staff. Kiselev was also committed to two much larger projects — the writing of a complete history of previous Russo-Turkish wars and the making of preparations for a possible future one. This chapter deals with the Second Army's research into previous Russo-Turkish wars (1711–1812) in an attempt to arrive at strategic and tactical innovations for future conflicts. The discussion traces the development of this process within the Russian army, with particular reference to the search of the Second Army for guidance in a future Russo-Turkish war. It also covers the military ideas of I. P. Liprandi and the impact of KiseIev's empirical school.

The Origins and Conduct of the Russo-Persian War, 1826–1828

This chapter considers the origins and conduct of the 1826–8 Russo-Persian War. While the actions of certain individuals were responsible for the outbreak of war, more profound causes were also at work. These were to be found in recent international history and the sudden entrance of Persia into the orbit of Great Power diplomacy. The discussion considers the Russo-Persian relations under Ermolov from 1817 to 1823; the origins of the 1826–8 Russo-Persian war; the campaign of 1826; the developments over the winter of 1826–7 and the controversy between Ermolov, Paskevich and Diebitsch; the occupation and liberation of Armenia; the 1828 Treaty of Turkomanchai; the conclusion on the war of 1826–8; and the Great Game in Asia.

The Development of the Imperial Russian Army up to the Early Reign of Nicholas I: Organization, Doctrine, and Politics

This chapter covers the developments prior to 1801, the Imperial Army during the reign of Alexander I, the origins and programmes of the revolutionary ‘military intelligentsia’ from 1815 to 1825; the Caucasus Corps and the Second Army during 1816 to 1825; the character and policy of Nicholas I and the struggle against the ‘Russian Party’. The regime's belief in the existence of a Russian party certainly aids in understanding tsarist Eastern policy under Nicholas. On one hand, the regime attempted to defuse nationalist passions by presenting the war as a dispute between two courts. Alternatively, the domestic benefits of a forward Eastern policy were well understood. By leading his troops to a short and glorious war, Nicholas could enhance his image and deliver a public rebuke to Metternich.

The Treaty of Adrianople and Its International Consequences

This chapter discusses the negotiations for the Treaty of Adrianople, the response of the other powers, and the implications Russia's Balkan crossing had for future strategy. When news of the peace of Adrianople arrived in St Petersburg the sense of euphoria was understandable. The treaty — through its strategic annexations and extension of Russia's commercial and political rights — served to weaken the Ottoman Empire while preserving its existence, thus complementing perfectly the committee's decision. The chapter also considers the British reaction to Adrianople and the execution and revision of Adrianople in 1830–32.

War Planning and Diplomacy, 1819–1828

This chapter covers the search for strategy, the Greek question in the period of Congress diplomacy from 1822 to 1825, the accession of Nicholas I and the drift to war. The previous research was accompanied by the formulation of an innovative war plan which envisaged, for the first time in Russian military history, the crossing of the Balkan mountain range and an assault on Constantinople One of Kiselev's first actions on becoming head of the Second Army's Main Staff in 1819 was to draw up a war plan against the Ottoman Empire. He was assisted in this enterprise by the large body of experience acquired by the Russian army during its five previous Turkish wars fought between 1711 and 1812.

The Second Army and the Greek Revolution, 1821–1822

This chapter covers the outbreak of the Greek revolt in 1821 and the early diplomacy of the crisis. It considers the origins of Ypsilantis's revolt in 1820–21; the Tsarist reaction in 1821–22; the Second Army and the study of the Greek revolt. Following the receipt of reports from Pestel, lnzov, and other military agents, Kiselev established his Main Staff as the centre for the investigation of the Greek revolt. In early 1822, he informed lnzov of his intention to commission the writing of the first historical account of the revolution. To this end, Kiselev outlined the various areas of research that were still required. They related to the connection between the first Greek secret society and the Russian Hetairia movement; the role of Napoleon and the French revolutionaries in these societies; the level of co-ordination between the revolts of Ypsilantis and Vladimirescu; and the character of Ypsilantis.

The Danubian Principalities: Occupation and Reform, 1828–1834

This chapter covers Russia's occupation and reform of the Danubian Principalities — a classic example of the ‘weak neighbour’ policy in action. It examines Russia and the Principalities; the Second Army and the Principalities; the wartime occupation of the Principalities in 1828–9; Kiselev and the Reform of the Principalities.

State Propaganda and Public Opinion during the Campaigns of 1828–1829

This chapter, on public opinion, charts the growth and spread of nationalist sentiment in educated society during the Turkish war. It reveals the tension between the popular demand for unilateral, expansionist action and the conservative official tsarist policy which aimed at the conservation of the Ottoman Empire. It shows that official coverage of the 1828–9 war turned this conflict into the Russian Empire's first ‘media war’, and gave rise to the idea that popular nationalist sentiment might be harnessed as a means of ensuring the future stability of the regime. The discussion also considers the origins of the Third Section; the quest for social stability in 1826–9; the Cult of Nicholas; and public opinion during the 1829 campaign.

The Russian Army’s Use of Balkan Irregulars during the 1828–1829 Russo-Turkish War

This chapter considers the role Balkan partisans were assigned in the war of 1828–9 — a role tempered by the tsarist regime's fear that their participation might unleash a general uprising in the Balkans. It tackles the 1828 campaign, the developments over the 1828–9 winter, the 1829 campaign. It also examines whether the Balkan irregulars are freedom-fighters or brigands; Russia and the formation of the militia in the Principalities.

Conclusions: Crimea and Beyond

The Eastern crisis of the 1820s, the war of 1828–9, and the Russo-Turkish treaties of 1829 and 1833 collectively constituted the most decisive blows ever delivered to the Ottoman Empire by Russia. The confidence that Russian forces would win all major tactical encounters against an ‘Asiatic’ semi-regular enemy influenced the Russian strategists of the 1820s. Yet, the lingering feeling that Russia stretched the rules of the game in 1829 and the conviction that it overturned them by the terms of Unkiar-Skelessi in 1833 were to have crucial long-term significance for the Eastern Question. Nicholas was content to engage in brinkmanship and a succession of incidents and developments appeared to have set Russia and Britain on an inevitable collision course. After Nicholas, Catherine's dreams and the sense of Russia's historical destiny in the East would now continue to live on in the popular imagination.