Perceived Outcomes and Willingness to Retreat among Umbrella Movement Participants

Conventionally, it is believed that people are more likely to participate in protests if positive outcomes are probable. However, the significance of instrumental rationality seems to be weak in various occupation movements around the world. Against this background, we ask: How did the Umbrella Movement participants perceive the likelihood of various outcomes? How did such perceptions influence their preferred movement strategies? An analysis of onsite protest survey data shows that the majority of participants were not optimistic about the chances of achieving their goals. However, perceived likelihood of getting different types of government concessions indeed affected willingness to retreat, though the influence depended on the configuration of perceived outcome likelihood. The article discusses the place of instrumental rationality in the Umbrella Movement and the conceptualization of perceived outcomes in studies of protests.

Peatlands Restoration As A Potential Solution To Resolve Peatlands Damage Based On Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS) In Sungai Tohor, Indonesia

Peatland restoration is a potential solution to resolve peatland damage but faces an economic-social-environmental exchange (Sustainable Development Goals) that results in strong disagreements between stakeholders who have different interests such as company, community and local or regional government concessions. Successful peatland restoration will depend on how various priorities have been reconciled, as much as it depends on improving governance and cross-sector collaboration well done. The purpose of this paper is to find a solution how to be managing peatlands in Sungaitohor, Indonesia. We use social maps to show the communities concern to restoration of degraded peatland, we try to compare the level of public awareness to prevention efforts and the restoration of peatland damaged by fires Forest and peatlands. The findings of this paper are social map, that explain the community’s participation to efforts of peatland restoration in Sungai tohor, Indonesia.

Prospects for Iraq in 2020

Subject Prospects for Iraq in 2020 Significance Current protests will eventually peak and decline, following government concessions. Whether Iraq experiences a change of prime minister in late 2019 or new waves of repression, the same formula of intra-Shia fragmentation will deadlock national politics in 2020.

Protest, counter-protest and organizational diversification of protest groups

Whereas protests have been discussed predominantly in terms of collective action issues, achieving coordination does not always guarantee success. Protest groups must also back their demands with sufficient threats. Some assert that threats are enhanced by the mobilization of more resources. Yet this conventional wisdom fails to explain why not all large-scale protests win government concessions or why some protest groups spend resources on their organizational infrastructure even though it will not inflict immediate damage on the government. Formalizing protest in a bargaining model, I show that investing in organizational infrastructure improves the impact of protest groups’ threats by lowering the probability that a counter-protest will offset the impact of the original protest.

The Strategic Model of Terrorism Revisited

The dominant paradigm on terrorism is what I call the Strategic Model of Terrorism. This model posits that perpetrators of terrorism attack civilians because of the unmatched effectiveness in pressuring government concessions. The strategic model is rooted in bargaining theory, which emphasizes how under anarchy escalating signals the will and ability to punish the target for non-compliance. Over the past decade, however, empirical research has found that neither escalating to terrorism nor with terrorism helps non-state actors to coerce government concessions. In fact, terrorism increases the odds that target countries will dig in their political heels and go on the offensive. These empirical findings raise important questions about why people use terrorism given the negative political return.

Iran will be flexible in observing its planned budget

Significance Rouhani in late December 2018, when presenting his programme to the Majlis, reported that his administration plans to run a balanced budget for the fiscal year beginning March 21. Impacts The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) will maintain its key role in all areas. Deteriorating economic conditions will drive further protests, prompting more government concessions. Government borrowing will be drawn from the Central Bank and is likely ultimately to drive further inflation.

How Terrorism Expedites Organizational Demise

This chapter explains why terrorism reduces the lifespan of militant groups. Whereas previous chapters showed that terrorism is ineffective for achieving their demands, this chapter shows that the civilian attacks decrease support, membership size, and ultimately the prospects of survival. Current and prospective members must reconcile the benefits of participation with the near-universal norm against killing civilians. Not only does terrorism present moral barriers to participation, but governments are far more likely to violently oppose groups that attack civilians, raising the physical costs of being a member. It is thus important for militant leaders to follow Rule #1, refraining from harming civilians, even when they are uninterested in pressuring government concessions.

My West Bank Discovery

This chapter presents some preliminary evidence that terrorism does not pay politically in terms of pressuring government concessions. The author first came to this realization in the West Bank during the Second Intifada, when Palestinian terrorism backfired politically. His experience in the West Bank led the author to question and then probe whether terrorism helps the perpetrators to redress their grievances, as proponents of the Strategic Model assume. Although many scholars believe that groups turn to terrorism because of its political effectiveness, the author shows that this common assumption rests on a shaky empirical basis. His evidence that terrorism is a losing political tactic lays the basis for Rule #1 in the book—that aggrieved groups should refrain from targeting civilians.

The Role of the Opposition

This chapter analyses the opposition’s contribution to scrutiny of government bills and policy-making at Westminster. Westminster is classically seen as dominated by an adversarial ‘opposition mode’, giving opposition politicians little policy impact. This chapter argues that there are actually several distinct ‘opposition modes’, which can be more consensual. It summarizes existing literature on opposition, and sets out the basics of how opposition parties are organized in both chambers. The bulk of Westminster legislative amendments are proposed by opposition parliamentarians, and the motivations behind these are explored. Many amendments are actually driven by objectives other than policy change—including seeking government explanations, and embarrassing the government. Hence it is important not to overstate ‘failure’ of such amendments. In addition, many opposition amendments go on to trigger government concessions, particularly via the House of Lords. In various ways, the opposition at Westminster is hence more influential on policy than is often assumed.

Nigeria’s neo-Biafrans will push renewed rights claims

Significance As Nigeria marks the 50th anniversary of the start of its civil war -- when part of south-east Nigeria declared itself the independent state of Biafra -- President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration is facing the largest secessionist revival since the war concluded in 1970. Groups such as Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) have long limited their tactics to peaceful means. However, government repression is having a radicalising effect, with groups such as IPOB becoming more confrontational and new secessionist groups emerging. Impacts The government would struggle to function if ongoing mass protests combine with renewed insurgency north and south. The Islamic Movement in Nigeria organisation will watch the IPOB case for any government concessions they may also be able to extract. Nigeria’s five overwhelmingly Igbo states voted for the People’s Democratic Party in 2015 and could do so again in 2019.