scholarly journals Critical Rationalism and Trust in Science

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Chmielewski
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Critical Rationalism ◽  
General Issue ◽  
Building Trust ◽  
Compelling Argument ◽  
Critical Rationalist ◽  
Time Demands

AbstractIn this paper, I consider whether the critical rationalist philosophy of science may provide a rationale for trusting scientific knowledge. In the first part, I refer to several insights of Karl Popper’s social and political philosophy in order to see whether they may be of help in offsetting the distrust of science spawned by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the second part, I address the more general issue of whether the theoretical principles of the critical rationalist philosophy of science may afford a foundation for building trust in science. Both parts of the discussion, confined for the sake of the argument largely to the repudiation of the concept of good reasons for considering a theory to be true, imply that this question would have to be answered negatively. Against this, I argue that such a conclusion is based on a misconception of the nature of scientific knowledge: critical rationalism views science as a cognitive regime which calls for bold theories and at the same time demands a rigorous and continuous distrust towards them, and it is precisely this attitude that should be adopted as a compelling argument for trusting science.

scholarly journals Institutions as a Philosophical Problem: A Critical Rationalist Perspective on Guala’s “Understanding Institutions” and His Critics

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Agassi ◽  
Ian Jarvie
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Critical Rationalism ◽  
Critical Commentary ◽  
The Social ◽  
Theoretical View ◽  
Critical Rationalist ◽  
Philosophical Viewpoint

The symposium on Francesco Guala’s Understanding Institutions was thought provoking. Five critical papers took issue with Guala’s reconciliation of the game-theoretical view of institutions and the rule-governed view. We offer some critical commentary that adopts a different perspective. We agree that institutions are central to social life and, thus, also to the social sciences; they are also prior to and more fundamental than individuals. We add some historical points on the ways previous philosophers thought about institutions, and we come at this from a philosophical viewpoint that is not that of analytic philosophy but rather that of Popper’s critical rationalism. In that framework, we espouse an idea of the relation between philosophy and the philosophy of science that is different from that of Guala and his commentators, and we recommend a reformist philosophy of institutions that is neither radical nor traditionalist and that makes better sense of the institution of the scholarly symposium than do games or rules.

The Theory of Social Relay by M.A. Rozov: Pathway for Understanding

2021 ◽  
pp. 146-160
Author(s):  
Nataliya I. Kuznetsova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
New World ◽  
Social Memory ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Russian Philosopher ◽  
Methodological Problems ◽  
The Empirical Analysis ◽  
Goals And Objectives

The article analyzes the problems of modern epistemology in the context of pre­senting the views and philosophical heritage of the famous Russian philosopher Mikhail Alexandrovich Rozov. The relevance of the theory of social relay devel­oped by him and the corresponding “wave” ontology, especially in the period of thematic, terminological and substantial transformations of modern epistemo­logy, is shown. The author carry out the idea that without solving the ontological and methodological problems of the empirical analysis of scientific knowledge, it is impossible to correctly investigate knowledge. The article describes in detail the logic of Rozov’s reasoning, and also demonstrates the scale of M.A. Rozov on the reforming of epistemology and philosophy of science, on the formulation of an urgent agenda, problems, goals and objectives of the study of knowledge. The bottom line is that understanding semiotic objects (scientific knowledge) as phenomena of social memory, which are reproduced according to direct or indi­rect (verbalized) patterns, opens a new world of social relay races. The broad ap­plicability of Rozov’s theory in various empirical contexts is demonstrated, which allows discussing both traditional and modern philosophical and method­ological problems of the natural and socio-humanitarian sciences, as well as in epistemology and philosophy of science.

Critical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 69-72
Author(s):  
Dominik Giese ◽  
Jonathan Joseph
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Critical Realism ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Science And Society ◽  
The Real ◽  
Critical Realist ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
The World

This chapter evaluates critical realism, a term which refers to a philosophy of science connected to the broader approach of scientific realism. In contrast to other philosophies of science, such as positivism and post-positivism, critical realism presents an alternative view on the questions of what is ‘real’ and how one can generate scientific knowledge of the ‘real’. How one answers these questions has implications for how one studies science and society. The critical realist answer starts by prioritizing the ontological question over the epistemological one, by asking: What must the world be like for science to be possible? Critical realism holds the key ontological belief of scientific realism that there is a reality which exists independent of our knowledge and experience of it. Critical realists posit that reality is more complex, and made up of more than the directly observable. More specifically, critical realism understands reality as ‘stratified’ and composed of three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real. Here lies the basis for causation.

Perceptual Paradigms

2021 ◽  
pp. 23-42
Author(s):  
William Fish
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Philosophy Of Perception ◽  
Visual Science ◽  
Research Programmes

Everyone would agree that contemporary philosophical thinking and theorizing about perception should both be aware of, and consistent with, the findings of visual science. Yet despite this consensus, there is little discussion—and even less agreement—about how this should work in practice. This chapter proposes that we can gain useful insights by bringing some tools from the philosophy of science to bear on this question. Focusing on the disagreement between Burge and McDowell as to whether or not disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception is ‘directly at odds with scientific knowledge’ (Burge 2005, 29), the chapter suggests that interesting insights can be gained by seeing this debate through a Kuhnian lens—as a clash of paradigms (or, more strictly, Lakatosian research programmes)—and then investigate the methodological consequences that flow from this. It contends that looking at this debate through this lens not only sheds light on why it can seem so intractable, but also provides us with reassurance that this might be a good thing.

Archē

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard McKirahan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Technical Term ◽  
Scientific Principles ◽  
Basic Entity

Archē, or ‘principle’, is an ancient Greek philosophical term. Building on earlier uses, Aristotle established it as a technical term with a number of related meanings, including ‘originating source’, ‘cause’, ‘principle of knowledge’ and ‘basic entity’. Accordingly, it acquired importance in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of science, and also in the particular sciences. According to Aristotle’s doctrine of scientific principles, all sciences and all scientific knowledge are founded on principles (archai) of a limited number of determinate kinds.

scholarly journals Notebook

Philosophy ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-151
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Academic Progress ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Philosophical Logic ◽  
Royal Institute ◽  
Postgraduate Study ◽  
History Of ◽  
One Year ◽  
Academic Year

Royal Institute of Philosophy BursariesThe Royal Institute of Philosophy proposes to make available annually four bursaries of £1,000 each, to be awarded to students who are already on courses of postgraduate study (e.g. MA, MPhil, PhD, DPhil, BPhil) in British Universities.The aim of the scheme is to assist students of promise and of proven postgraduate ability to continue or complete their courses of study or dissertations. Each Bursary will last for one year and will not be renewable, although successful candidates from one year will be able to re-apply for a second bursary in a succeeding year (to a maximum of two bursaries in toto).In order to apply, a candidate must submit a CV, a 1-2 page account of his or her future research and/or programme of study and the names of two academic referees from the institution at which he or she is currently studying. At the end of their tenure of a bursary, successful candidates will be expected to make a report to the Royal Institute of Philosophy on their academic progress.Candidates will not normally be called for interview. In making the awards, the Royal Institute of Philosophy will attempt to select one candidate annually from each of the following subdivisions of philosophy:1. Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science2. Philosophical Logic, Philosophies of Mind and Language3. Moral and Political Philosophy4. Aesthetics, Philosophy of Religion, Law and History (These areas may be treated by reference to the History of Philosophy).The bursaries will run from the beginning to the end of the academic year and will begin in September 1998. Those who wish to apply for the 1998-99 awards should submit their applications by 1 May, 1998 to the Secretary, Royal Institute of Philosophy, 14, Gordon Square, London WC1H 0AG. Those applying will be notified of the decision of the Royal Institute of Philosophy in July, 1998.

Social Organization of Science

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Carrier
Keyword(s):  
Social Organization ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Social Roles ◽  
Scientific Communities ◽  
Science Section ◽  
The Social ◽  
Organization Of Science ◽  
Knowledge Claims

The social organization of science as a topic of philosophy of science mostly concerns the question of which kinds of social organization are most beneficial to the epistemic aspirations of science. Section 1 addresses the interaction among scientists for improving epistemic qualities of knowledge claims in contrast to the mere accumulation of contributions from several scientists. Section 2 deals with the principles that are supposed to organize this interaction among scientists such that well-tested and well-confirmed knowledge is produced. Section 3 outlines what is supposed to glue scientific communities together and how society at large is assumed to affect the social organization of these communities. Section 4 attends to social epistemology (i.e., to attempts to explore the influence of social roles and characteristics on the system of scientific knowledge and confirmation practices).

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