Critical Rationalism and Trust in Science

In this paper, I consider whether the critical rationalist philosophy of science may provide a rationale for trusting scientific knowledge. In the first part, I refer to several insights of Karl Popper’s social and political philosophy in order to see whether they may be of help in offsetting the distrust of science spawned by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the second part, I address the more general issue of whether the theoretical principles of the critical rationalist philosophy of science may afford a foundation for building trust in science. Both parts of the discussion, confined for the sake of the argument largely to the repudiation of the concept of good reasons for considering a theory to be true, imply that this question would have to be answered negatively. Against this, I argue that such a conclusion is based on a misconception of the nature of scientific knowledge: critical rationalism views science as a cognitive regime which calls for bold theories and at the same time demands a rigorous and continuous distrust towards them, and it is precisely this attitude that should be adopted as a compelling argument for trusting science.

What are markets? Selected market theories under genuine uncertainty in comparison

Since market economies are the dominant form of regulating economic action all over the world, the question arises how markets are conceived theoretically. Answering this is relevant because we need to know how existing and hypothetical markets work in general, what they “can do”, and how one can improve the market order. There are three different market approaches that consider genuine uncertainty. According to the new institutional economics approach, markets are institutions that increase boundedly rational actors’ utility. The markets-as-institutional-arrangements approach denies that markets maximize or minimize market outcomes and argues that they enable harmony between individual and common interests. According to the political-cultural approach, markets are political arenas with conflicts between the relevant actors. Deciding reasonably for a theory requires answering whether one theory is more adequate than another. Since literature has not answered this so far, the present paper deals with this issue from a critical-rationalist perspective. It finds that the institutional economics approach is not adequate because its assumptions contradict reality and each other. In contrast, the markets-as-institutional-arrangements approach and the political-cultural approach fulfill critical-rationalist requirements. Therefore, the paper compares them and finds that there are reasons to prefer the political-cultural approach and to interpret the markets-as-institutional-arrangements approach as its special case. Referring to the political-cultural approach has different consequences for analyzing and improving the market order. Taking a political-cultural view implies, e.g., not only focusing on desirable social values and market rules but also on the relevance of interpretative frameworks and power.

From Kant to Popper: Reason and Critical Rationalism in Organization Studies

The objective of this essay is to revisit the theoretical construction of Critical Rationalism, starting from the philosophy of Kantian reason contained in the works Critique of pure reason and Critique of practical reason to discuss their respective influences over the work of Karl Popper. We aim, with this exercise, to shed light on the critical-rationalist approach in Organization Studies. Our argument is that Kantian thought has been conducive, on the one hand, to a negative philosophy that considers idealism prior notions and a priori knowledge fundamental to the creative conception of knowledge and, on the other hand, to a hypothetical-deductive science that seeks to bring us closer to truth through criticism. The basis of critical rationalism lies in the search for reason and transcendental truth. This is a call not only for the production of theories, but for dedication to test their validity – a problem that has not received much attention from researchers in the field of organization studies.

De Kant a Popper: Razão e Racionalismo Crítico nos Estudos Organizacionais

The objective of this essay is to revisit the theoretical construction of Critical Rationalism, starting from the philosophy of Kantian reason contained in the works Critique of pure reason and Critique of practical reason to discuss their respective influences over the work of Karl Popper. We aim, with this exercise, to shed light on the critical-rationalist approach in Organization Studies. Our argument is that Kantian thought has been conducive, on the one hand, to a negative philosophy that considers idealism prior notions and a priori knowledge fundamental to the creative conception of knowledge and, on the other hand, to a hypothetical-deductive science that seeks to bring us closer to truth through criticism. The basis of critical rationalism lies in the search for reason and transcendental truth. This is a call not only for the production of theories, but for dedication to test their validity – a problem that has not received much attention from researchers in the field of organization studies.

Corporate Social Responsibility: A Fake Already According to the Theory of the Firm?Date submitted: October 4, 2017Revised version accepted after double blind review: August 31, 2018

This paper asks if we can support by argument the norm “we should hold firms responsible”. From a critical rationalist perspective, answering this question has an ethical and an empirical dimension. The ethical dimension discusses whether we should hold firms socially responsible for ethical reasons. However, since demanding that we should hold firms responsible requires that we can hold them responsible, this paper focuses on this empirical dimension. Thus, this paper asks whether we can hold firms responsible for theoretical reasons. Theoretical reasons means that this paper refers to theories of the firm and in particular to their hypotheses about the behaviour of firms and firm members. The paper finds that the nexus of contracts approach (which is the economic mainstream theory of the firm) ascribes behaviour to the firm that corresponds to the firm members’ behaviour. In consequence, we would not have reasons to ascribe responsibility to the firm from a social science perspective. Since the nexus of contracts approach is not adequate from a critical rationalist perspective, however, this paper develops an extended corporate actors approach. In contrast to the nexus of contacts approach, the extended corporate actors approach ascribes behaviour to the firm that differs from firm members’ actions. Thus, we do have reasons to ascribe responsibility to the firm from a social science perspective.