Well-Being and Human Rights

This chapter demonstrates how the conception of well-being developed in this book is a crucial part of the rationale for human rights. A variant of interest-based theories of human rights is defended against a number of objections. These objections include criticisms raised by proponents of control theories, dignity-based theories, and critics who maintain that the function of human rights is not limited to considerations of how human rights matter to the right-holder. The argument builds on an account of the contingent, but widespread linkage between structural unfairness and human rights violations to defend a pragmatic approach to problems of assigning responsibility for human rights. It addresses the specification of counterpart duties that correlate with human rights claims, and it offers guidance on questions pertaining to the more general responsibilities of institutional agents, paradigmatically nation-states, for maintaining background conditions of structural fairness.

The Responsibility of States

This chapter explores the rationale for the special responsibility of nation-states to secure human rights and structural justice. It explains what makes states unique moral agents, in particular their responsibility to address structurally unjust conditions that give rise to human rights violations within their borders. However, it rejects prominent arguments for the conclusion that states have only a preventive and remedial role in the presence of domestic structural unfairness and human rights violations. The chapter defends the Principle of Interstate Reciprocity, which sets moral limits on the pursuit of national benefit, global advantage, and the exercise of power over others, and it concludes with an account of four unfair forms of control exercised by various supranational institutions, often in combination with powerful states and other non-state institutional agents.

Well-Being

This chapter defends a conception of well-being that underpins the theory of structural injustice. The core elements are health; knowledge and understanding; personal security; personal attachments; equal respect; and self-determination. The chapter points out the distinct ways that the conception of human well-being grounds human rights, explains the depth of unfairness of systematic patterns of disadvantage, and locates the fundamental unfairness of power relations in several forms of control some groups have over the most vital well-being interests of other groups. The conception is developed by way of a series of arguments that supports the selection of the core elements, and it offers a defense against a variety of objections to the inclusion of some elements on the list. The way in which the theory rests on a conception of well-being is distinguished from some other ways well-being informs other moral norms and other theories of justice.

Resistance to Injustice

This chapter examines forms of justified resistance and other remedial strategies available directly to the aggrieved in circumstances in which states are unwilling or unable to secure human rights and address patterns of structural unfairness so often at the root of human rights violations. Forms of resistance involving direct action designed to halt unjust activities or force the divestment of undeserved benefits are central to the discussion. Several counterarguments are explored, including the contention that familiar forms of direct action constitute morally impermissible vigilantism or indiscriminately affect innocent beneficiaries. The chapter concludes with thoughts about how direct action, while far from the comprehensive kind of prevention and remedy that structural injustice demands, nevertheless can have value by enhancing the well-being of those who are deeply disadvantaged and relatively powerless.

What Structural Injustice Is

This chapter examines what makes a theory of justice a structural theory. Four key features of structural theories are surveyed in order to show what is distinctive about our theory. First, structural theories differ in their inventory of unjust impacts traceable to structural influences. Second, they vary in their understanding of the primary structural components having the relevant impact. Third, they diverge in the social groups selected for special scrutiny. Fourth, they differ in background assumptions regarding the circumstances to which they apply. Our theory applies to social arrangements that have a profound, pervasive, asymmetric, and near-inescapable impact on core elements of well-being of social groups. Social groups are defined by their relative position within the nexus of power and advantage. This nexus occurs in circumstances involving identifiable agents of injustice whose wrongful conduct is manifested in their roles in creating or sustaining injustices.

What Justice Is

The overarching question in this chapter is, what makes this theory—indeed, any theory—a theory of justice? Five criteria prominently discussed in the literature—special importance, stringency, claimability, specificity, and rightful enforceability—are examined. The position defended in this book is developed with respect to each criterion. In addition, two norms of structural unfairness pertaining to differentials of power and advantage are distinguished, as are the ways in which each differs from human rights norms. We look first at the ordinary language used in situations of everyday experience. We then extrapolate from basic intuitions about relatively simple patterns of unfairness in interpersonal relationships to gain a better understanding of fairness norms, applicable in more complex contexts where an array of institutions and social practices structure relationships between social groups.

Real-World Examples

This chapter utilizes four examples to highlight the characteristic features of structural injustice in a variety of settings around the world. The first section examines how structural injustice operates in environmental “sacrifice zones” both in the US and in low- and middle-income countries. The primary focus of this discussion is the impact on children and future generations. The second section provides a portrait of the kinds of mutually reinforcing mechanisms of structural injustice at work both in US cities and in the rapidly growing urban centers of low- and middle-income countries. The US urban context is examined primarily through the experience of communities of color, especially in areas of concentrated poverty. The experience of women is the centerpiece of the discussion of the slums of low- and middle-income countries. Each example emphasizes experiences and insights of social movement activists, investigative journalists, and non-governmental organizations.

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of some of the distinctive features of the theory of structural injustice developed in this book, and it concludes with a brief outline of the key topics and arguments presented in subsequent chapters. Among the distinctive features are the important links the theory forges between human rights norms and fairness norms and its intended application to circumstances in which structurally unfair patterns of power and advantage and human rights violations are routinely intertwined. These circumstances are found within different kinds of nation-states and in interactions across national boundaries. In addition, the theory is distinctive in its reliance on examples that illustrate the insights and perspectives of participants in social movements around the world, as well as its emphasis on justifiable forms of resistance in circumstances in which institutions are unwilling or unable to address pressing issues of injustice.