Lull before the Storm

This chapter offers a historical and statistical analysis of ceasefire violations (CFVs) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) since the ceasefire was agreed upon in 2003. The chapter is divided into two broad sections. Section one focuses on the occurrence of CFVs prior to 2003 when the current ceasefire agreement (CFA) was signed and explains the immediate background to the CFA of 2003. Section two analyses the various datasets on CFVs, including the one this book has put together, and draws conclusions regarding the locations, causes of and various factors relating to CFVs. This section also discusses how CFVs are counted, how they are spread horizontally and vertically and the existing explanations for the occurrence of CFVs.

(Mis)managing the Border

This chapter examines the management of the India–Pakistan border with particular reference to the border in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the various terminologies used in the context of the India–Pakistan border. It provides a historical overview of the early role played by the United Nations (UN) monitoring group in helping the management of the India–Pakistan borders in J&K as well as the occasional, though minor, reworking of the border that took place between India and Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s. The chapter then outlines the various border management practices and mechanisms used by India and Pakistan in managing the International Border (IB) and the Line of Control (LoC). The chapter provides a technical and historical background to understanding the occurrence of CFVs on the LoC and IB in J&K.

Conceptualizing Escalation Dynamics in South Asia

This chapter serves as the theoretical and conceptual basis of the book. The chapter discusses the classical views on escalation, followed by an analysis of the various debates on India–Pakistan escalation dynamics. The chapter thereafter examines the traditional understanding of the India–Pakistan escalation ladder. The chapter concludes by highlighting the missing link in the traditional understanding of the India–Pakistan escalation ladder, that is, the potency of ceasefire violations (CFVs) to trigger bilateral escalation. In short, the chapter argues that that escalation can and do begin from local factors rather than due to central directives, something the existing literature on South Asian escalation does not account for.

Military Gamesmanship and Moral Ascendency

This chapter discusses the causes of ceasefire violations (CFVs) using a template of five types of causes which are, operational reasons, politico-strategic reasons, retributive reasons, cultural factors, and inadvertent firing. The order in which these causes have been mentioned is based on their ability to cause CFVs. This chapter also explains CFVs using the concept of ‘autonomous military factors’ (AMFs). A large chunk of the causes of CFVs identified earlier fall under the category of AMFs. The chapter uses interviews with over 80 officials and a survey of primary and secondary sources to examine the causes of CFVs.

Implications for Theory and Practice

This chapter highlights some of the conceptual and theoretical implications of the arguments that have been made in this book. This chapter argues that the traditional theorization of escalation dynamics in South Asia does not expect the possibility of: i) autonomous military factors triggering severe ceasefire violations (CFVs); ii) CFVs triggering escalation, and; iii) accidental/inadvertent escalation to some extent. The absence of such expectations further cements the strongly held belief that escalation is controllable especially due to the existence of a general context of nuclear deterrence-induced stability. The chapter, besides highlighting the theoretical finding of the book, also discusses various measures that can be taken to control CFVs and India–Pakistan crisis escalation.

Introduction

This chapter explains the rationale of the book and discusses the book’s key puzzles and arguments. The book makes four key arguments. One, ceasefire violations (CFVs) are generally not planned, directed, or cleared by higher military commands or political establishments, but are instead driven by the dynamics on the frontlines. Two, the 2003 ceasefire agreement tends to hold when a dialogue process is under way between India and Pakistan on key disputes, autonomous military factors having little or no influence under such a positive environment. During times of bilateral tension, the agreement tends to break down and CFVs are routine. During such phases, local factors tend to have a dramatic influence on CFVs. Three, CFVs contribute to India–Pakistan escalation dynamics in a significant manner. Conventional wisdom suggests that terror attacks are the primary cause of India–Pakistan escalation. However, evidence shows that political, diplomatic, and military tensions between the two adversaries have occurred even when there have been no terror attacks. Finally, ad hocism in managing the border has historically been a key factor behind border tensions between India and Pakistan. Unsettled borders, among other factors, have played a major role in escalating tensions between the two sides.

Ceasefire Violations and Crisis Escalation

This chapter argues that there is an empirically evident linkage between ceasefire violations (CFVs) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and India–Pakistan escalation dynamics. It examines this relationship using empirical evidence since the academic literature on South Asian escalation dynamics seems to, by and large, ignore the crucial links between CFVs and crisis escalation. The chapter also shows that CFVs have a cumulative snowballing effect; once they begin, several things could happen including political rhetoric, military posturing and diplomatic standoff which can lead to more CFVs and even more escalation. This chapter discusses eight cases to show how CFVs by themselves can lead to crisis escalation between India and Pakistan. In doing so, it juxtaposes quantitative data on CFVs and escalation during specific periods to highlight how escalation has resulted from CFVs and how the two have fed off of each other.