12. Intensive Animal Farming and Moral Status

2021 ◽  
pp. 172-186
Author(s):  
William Abel ◽  
Elizabeth Kahn ◽  
Tom Parr ◽  
Andrew Walton
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Human Consumption ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Animal Farming ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Relevant Community

This chapter studies which principles should govern the state’s regulation of the treatment of non-human animals raised for human consumption. It defends the claim that it is wrong to inflict pain on or to kill animals, and that the state should prohibit intensive animal farming on these bases. The chapter then considers the objection that there is no moral duty to act in this way because animals are not part of the relevant community of moral concern. It demonstrates that it is implausible to restrict the scope of moral duties in this way. Finally, the chapter explores the claim that it would be wrong for the state to enforce compliance with these duties, but it contends that limiting the state’s role in this way leads to various implausible conclusions regarding how it should regulate the treatment of both animals and humans.

Group Duties

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Collins
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Systemic Reform ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Tripartite Model ◽  
Group Level ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Fundamental Categories ◽  
Group Pattern

Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into three fundamental categories. First, combinations are collections of agents that do not have any goals or decision-making procedures in common. Combinations cannot bear moral duties. Instead, we should re-cast their purported duties as a series of duties—one held by each agent in the combination. Each duty demands its bearer to ‘I-reason’: to do the best they can, given whatever they happen to believe the others will do. Second, coalitions are groups whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures. Coalitions also cannot bear duties, but their alleged duties should be replaced with members’ several duties to ‘we-reason’: to do one’s part in a particular group pattern of actions, on the presumption that others will do likewise. Third, collectives have group-level procedures for making decisions. They can bear duties. Collectives’ duties imply duties for collectives’ members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty.

scholarly journals Guns or Food: On Prioritizing National Security over Global Poverty Relief

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco García-Gibson
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
International Relations ◽  
National Security ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Global Poverty ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Risk Of Death ◽  
Poverty Relief ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
International Anarchy

Political realists claim that international relations are in a state of anarchy, and therefore every state is allowed to disregard its moral duties towards other states and their inhabitants. Realists argue that complying with moral duties is simply too risky for a state’s national security. Political moralists convincingly show that realists exaggerate both the extent of international anarchy and the risks it poses to states who act morally. Yet moralists do not go far enough, since they do not question realism’s normative core: the claim that when national security is really at risk, states are allowed to disregard their moral duties. I contend that there is at least one moral duty that states should not disregard even if their inhabitants are at risk of death by military aggression: the duty to reduce extreme global poverty. The reason is that even granting that national security is about securing individuals’ right to life, global poverty relief is about that as well.

A Puzzle of Enforceability: Why do Moral Duties Differ in their Enforceability?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Christian Barry ◽  
Emily McTernan
Keyword(s):  
Social Costs ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Duties

Abstract When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle.

The Principle of Original Cleanliness (Taharah)

2021 ◽  
pp. 49-56
Author(s):  
Mohammad Hashim Kamali
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Human Consumption ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Life Itself ◽  
Temporal Dimensions

Original Cleanliness (taharah) is a supportive principle to that of original permissibility, and what it says is that all things are clean and nothing is unclean in the state of nature. Life itself is the origin of cleanliness, and this includes even pigs and dogs, although this is not without some disagreement. But only some animals are clean for human consumption, according to the rules of ritual slaughter. Juridically, taharah means cleanliness from impurity and filth in both the physical and nonphysical senses. Both of these can be temporary or permanent. Taharah is inclusive of both the religious and temporal dimensions of cleanliness.

Unravelling the Conditions and Limitations Impacting the Prospect of Developing Rural Eco-Tourism in Oyo State, Nigeria

2020 ◽  
pp. 283-305
Author(s):  
Ayobami Abayomi Popoola ◽  
Babatunde Adewale Adeleke
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Laboratory Test ◽  
Tourism Development ◽  
The State ◽  
Human Consumption ◽  
Inferential Statistics ◽  
Chemical Content ◽  
Structured Questionnaire ◽  
Area Data

Many eco-tourism sites in Oyo State continue to lay in waste. Two are the focus of this chapter: Ikere Gorge Dam and the Ado-Awaye Hanging Lake in Iseyin LGA. Authors examine the condition and prospect of eco-tourism in the rural Iseyin local government area. Data was captured from a structured questionnaire administered to tourists and rural residents. A laboratory test was further carried out on the Iyake water of the hanging lake, indicating that the water is not safe for human consumption because of the lead chemical content. Findings based on inferential statistics established that the host communities perceive no remarkable dividends of tourism in the area and that people have a good impression about the prospect and development of eco-tourism. The study concluded with the need for a tourism masterplan and involvement of the private sector in tourism development in the state. The need for an improvement in complimentary infrastructures such as access roads and electricity was identified to be imperative for improved tourism sites.

Gene Doping—in Animals? Ethical Issues at the Intersection of Animal Use, Gene Editing, and Sports Ethics

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAROLYN P. NEUHAUS ◽  
BRENDAN PARENT
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Gene Editing ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The State ◽  
Sports Ethics ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Animal Use ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals ◽  
Do So

Abstract:Gene editors such as CRISPR could be used to create stronger, faster, or more resilient nonhuman animals. This is of keen interest to people who breed, train, race, and profit off the millions of animals used in sport that contribute billions of dollars to legal and illegal economies across the globe. People have tried for millennia to perfect sport animals; CRISPR proposes to do in one generation what might have taken decades previously. Moreover, gene editing may facilitate enhancing animals’ capacities beyond their typical limits. This paper describes the state of animal use and engineering for sport, examines the moral status of animals, and analyzes current and future ethical issues at the intersection of animal use, gene editing, and sports. We argue that animal sport enthusiasts and animal welfarists alike should be concerned about the inevitable use of CRISPR in sport animals. Though in principle CRISPR could be used to improve sport animals’ well-being, we think it is unlikely in practice to do so.

scholarly journals The Civic Duty to Report Crime and Corruption

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Candice Delmas
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Civic Duty ◽  
The Public ◽  
Corrupt Activity ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Government ◽  
General Scope

Is the civic duty to report crime and corruption a genuine moral duty? After clarifying the nature of the duty, I consider a couple of negative answers to the question, and turn to an attractive and commonly held view, according to which this civic duty is a genuine moral duty. On this view, crime and corruption threaten political stability, and citizens have a moral duty to report crime and corruption to the government in order to help the government’s law enforcement efforts. The resulting duty is triply general in that it applies to everyone, everywhere, and covers all criminal and corrupt activity. In this paper, I challenge the general scope of this argument. I argue that that the civic duty to report crime and corruption to the authorities is much narrower than the government claims and people might think, for it only arises when the state (i) condemns genuine wrongdoing and serious ethical offenses as “crime” and “corruption,” and (ii) constitutes a dependable “disclosure recipient,” showing the will and power to hold wrongdoers accountable. I further defend a robust duty to directly report to the public—one that is weightier and wider than people usually assume. When condition (ii) fails to obtain, I submit, citizens are released of the duty to report crime and corruption to the authorities, but are bound to report to the public, even when the denunciation targets the government and is risky or illegal.

Duty and the Beast

Philosophy ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 53 (206) ◽  
pp. 529-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Benson
Keyword(s):  
Human Health ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Health Knowledge ◽  
The State ◽  
Complex Stimulus ◽  
Peter Singer ◽  
Western Thought ◽  
Stimulus Response ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Non-human animals are as a matter of routine used as means to human ends. They are killed for food, employed for labour or sport, and experimented on in the pursuit of human health, knowledge, comfort and beauty. Lip-service is paid to the obligation to cause no unnecessary suffering, but human necessity is interpreted so generously that this is a negligible constraint. The dominant traditions of Western thought, religious and secular, have provided legitimation of the low or non-existent moral status of beasts. The rival tradition, which includes the Neo-Platonists, Plutarch and Montaigne, is eccentric and archaic. But the teleologies and hierarchies of orthodoxy are equally incredible now and owe their greater respectability and influence to the inertia of custom. Disregard for beasts is supported partly by the vestigial and unowned belief that they are intended for our use, partly by a more recent piece of lore which is not only thought to be compatible with, but is sometimes held to be integral to, an enlightened scientific outlook, namely that beasts are mere complex stimulus—response mechanisms. The latter is a vexatious obstacle to progress but despite that the state of scientific and philosophical knowledge is now enormously more propitious for a re-appraisal of the moral status of beasts. Two moral philosophers, Peter Singer and Stephen Clark, have recently published books in which such a re-appraisal is attempted. Here I try to compare and assess some of the main features of their very different approaches.

UNDERIVATIVE DUTY: PRICHARD ON MORAL OBLIGATION

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
External World ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
History Of Ethics ◽  
Central Figure ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
Henry Sidgwick ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
History Of ◽  
Three Stages

AbstractThis paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one appealing to his conceptual minimalism, one an epistemological argument that parallels Moore's response to skepticism about the external world, and one arguing that attempts to justify moral duties on non-moral grounds distort the phenomena by giving those duties the wrong explanation or ground. The paper concludes by considering Prichard's critique of ancient ethics and in particular the ethics of Aristotle. The paper is broadly sympathetic to Prichard's position and arguments; its aim is partly to make a case for him as a central figure in the history of ethics.

scholarly journals Zwierzęta i ludzie, czyli granice moralności

Etyka ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 177-197
Author(s):  
Bernard Rollin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Relevant Feature ◽  
Natural Signs ◽  
Moral Attention ◽  
Intricate Argument

A much neglected question in the foundations of ethics concerns the moral status of non-human beings. Our intuitions are equivocal, and various theories have been advanced to distinguish between men and animals with regard to inclusion in the scope of moral concern. Various ground for drawing the distinction such as evolutionary supremacy, can be rejected as morally irrelevant. The key distinction historically employed for effecting a demarcation is rationality, which has been linked with the possession of language. The most systematic attempt to link language, rationality, and moral status is that of Kant, who can be seen as attempting to prove that only rational, linguistic, beings – and thus only human beings – fall within the scope of moral concern. This intricate argument can be criticized in a variety of ways. lf correct, it would exclude children, the retarded, the insane, the comatose, etc. from moral concern. More important, is follows from Kant’s argument that rationality is the only morally relevant feature of a rational being, in which case it is difficult to see why features of a human being which are or may be irrelevant to rationality – fur example pleasure or pain – are worthy of moral attention. Clearly morality encompasses more than rationality; in fact, rationa1ity is morally relevant only because it is an interest for a rational being. It is the presence of interest, and needs, wants, desires, etc., which are subject to fulfilment, nurture, and impediment which makes a being an object of moral attention. Language is relevant as a vehicle for conveying needs and interests, but natural signs serve just as well. Thus if men are objects of moral concern, animals are also, since no morally relevant distinction can be drawn between men and animals, and because animals display the same morally relevant features that humans do.

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