Asset Prices, Financial Stability, and the Role of the Central Bank

2015 ◽  
pp. 95-102
Author(s):  
Forrest Capie ◽  
Geoffrey Wood
2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 911-938 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansgar Belke ◽  
Edoardo Beretta

PurposeThe paper explores the precarious balance between modernizing monetary systems by means of digital currencies (either issued by the central bank itself or independently) and safeguarding financial stability as also ensured by tangible payment (and saving) instruments like paper money.Design/methodology/approachWhich aspects of modern payment systems could contribute to improve the way of functioning of today's globalized economy? And, which might even threaten the above-mentioned instable equilibrium? This survey paper aims, precisely, at giving some preliminary answers to a complex – therefore, ongoing – debate at scientific as well as banking and political levels.FindingsThe coexistence of State's money (i.e. “legal tender”) and cryptocurrencies can have a disciplining effect on central banks. Nevertheless, there are still high risks connected to the introduction of central bank digital currency, which should be by far not considered to be a perfect substitute of current cash. At the same time, cryptocurrencies issued by central banks might be exposed to the drawbacks of cryptocurrencies without benefiting from correspondingly strong advantages. A well-governed two-tier system to be achieved through innovation in payment infrastructures might be, in turn, more preferable. Regulated competition by new players combined with “traditional” deposits and central bank elements remains essential, although central banks should embrace the technologies underlying cryptocurrencies, because risk payment service providers could move to other currency areas considered to be more appealing for buyers and sellers.Research limitations/implicationsWe do not see specific limitations besides the fact that the following is for sure a broad field of scientific research to be covered, which is at the same time at the origin of ongoing developments and findings. Originality and implications of the paper are, instead, not only represented by its conclusions (which highlight the role of traditional payment instruments and stress why the concept of “money” still has to have specific features) but also by its approach of recent literature's review combined with equally strong logical-analytical insights.Practical implicationsIn the light of these considerations, even the role of traditional payment systems like paper money is by far not outdated or cannot be – at this point, at least – replaced by central bank digital currencies (whose features based on dematerialization despite being issued and guaranteed by a public authority are very different).Social implicationsNo matter which form it might assume is what differentiates economic from barter transactions. This conclusion is by far not tautological or self-evident since the notion of money has historically been a great object of scientific discussion. In the light of increasingly modern payment instruments, there is no question that money and the effectiveness of related monetary policies have to be also explored from a social perspective according to different monetary scenarios, ranging from central bank digital currencies to private currencies and cash restrictions/abolition.Originality/valueThe originality/value of the following article is represented by the fact that it (1) refers to some of the most relevant and recent contributions to this research field, (2) moves from payment systems in general to their newest trends like cryptocurrencies, cash restrictions (or, even, abolition proposals) and monetary policy while (3) combining all elements to reach a common picture. The paper aims at being a comprehensive contribution dealing with "money" in its broadest but also newest sense.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (237) ◽  
Author(s):  

Macroprudential oversight in Italy combines local elements with the European framework. At a local level, financial stability is a shared responsibility between Banca d’Italia (BdI), which is the national central bank and the prudential authority for banks and other financial institutions, the markets authority, Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), the insurance supervisor, Istituto per la Vigilanza Sulle Assicurazioni (IVASS), and the pension funds supervisor, Commissione di Vigilanza sui Fondi Pensione (COVIP).2 Each authority exercises its responsibility within a combination of sectoral and activity boundaries and the BdI plays a leading role in surveillance and coordination. Within the European framework, the BdI is both the national competent authority and the designated authority for the macroprudential tools considered under the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV), which are implemented and activated following the processes described in these regulatory texts and the guidelines provided by the European Central Bank (ECB) – within the competences assigned to it by the SSM Regulation - and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The ubiquitous role of the BdI on both fronts eases the challenges posed by the coexistence of these two frameworks.


Bankarstvo ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 109-139
Author(s):  
Vesna Martin

Central Bank digital currencies are a digital challenge to the international monetary and financial system. Since the development of cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, the modern world has faced the possibility of digital technological transformation and providing a digital form of payment for the economy and the household. In addition, the announcement of a digital currency that would have a global reach, such as the Libre issued by the social network Facebook, raised questions about legal and regulatory safeguards, financial stability, and the role of the digital currency in society. All this influenced the leading central banks to recognize the need to conduct a detailed analysis of the possibilities of issuing digital currency of the central bank, which would be a supplement to the cash and non-cash form of payment. These analyzes include considering the advantages and disadvantages of that currency, determining its design and technological solution, as well as the necessary regulatory adjustments. In the coming period, we will witness a technological transformation in the operations of central banks, which, as before, should take care of preserving price and financial stability as its main goals, but also respond to new challenges of digital business.


Author(s):  
Zekayi Kaya ◽  
Erkan Tokucu

During the historical process, application of the monetary policies and the roles of the central banks have changed within the framework of the developments in the world economy, problems encountered and the economic policies as a solution to these problems. The financial crises after 1990 and the recent financial crisis as the biggest experienced one after 1930s, caused an increase in the importance of the task of providing financial stability besides price stability and in this context in the function of “lender of last resort” of the central bank. The crisis required using new policy instruments in addition to interest rate instrument which was not sufficient enough in providing financial stability and the roles of the central banks in providing financial stability changed. In this study, applications of monetary policies and the changing role of the central banks will be examined. Within this framework, traditional and non-traditional instruments will be explained and the problems that can be confronted by a central bank when providing price stability besides financial stability will be remarked.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Dudchenko

This paper is devoted to defining the role of the central bank in ensuring banking and financial stability. The main purpose of the study is to assess the direction and strength of the impact of central bank independence in terms of its individual aspects on the parameters of banking and financial stability for different groups of countries. Systematization of literature sources and the results of existing empirical research has shown that the expected effects of increasing the independence of the central bank are to improve banking and financial stability. For the study, a sample of statistical data for 10 developed and 10 developing countries for the period 1991-2012 was formed. The methodological basis of the study were the tools of panel regression modeling with fixed effects with Stata software use. The article presents the results of empirical analysis, which showed that the independence of the central bank is an important factor in ensuring banking stability. At the same time, the impact on financial stability has not been conclusively confirmed. The study empirically confirms and theoretically proves that the stage of development of the country determines the strength of such influence. Thus, developed countries generally show closer links between central bank independence and banking and financial stability, which in most cases are directly dependent, while developing countries have less lasting effects. The results of the analysis of the links between certain aspects of central bank independence and the level of banking and financial stability are of great practical value. The results of the study create a scientific basis for substantiating the sequence of actions aimed at strengthening the independence of the central bank. Thus, in developing countries, the focus should be on defining and prioritizing central bank goals, while developed countries should take a deeper approach to this issue and ensure the independence of monetary policy and financial independence of the central bank. Keywords: central bank, independence, banking stability, financial stability, Z-score, non-performing loans, capitalization, developed countries, developing countries, panel data.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 10-19
Author(s):  
Fouzan AL Qaisi

The study aims to test the role of the measures implemented by the Central Bank of Jordan to reduce the effect of financial crisis on the Jordanian banks, using two independent variables (loans and advances rate, overnight deposit window), which are the actions of the Central Bank of Jordan, and four dependent variables (liquidity ratio, ROA ratio, capital adequacy ratio, non-performing loans ratio), which are financial stability indicators for the banks for six years (2005–2011). To get the study results, these data are measured and analyzed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). It was found that the actions of the Central Bank of Jordan (loans and advances rate, overnight deposit window rate): have a statistically significant impact on the non-performing loans ratio (2005–2011); do not have a statistically significant impact on the capital adequacy ratio (2005–2011); have a statistically significant impact on ROA ratio (2005–2011); do not have a statistically significant impact on the liquidity ratio (2005–2011).


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 231-256
Author(s):  
Christos V. Gortsos

Immediately after the outbreak of the current pandemic crisis, the EU developed a (rather) consistent strategy, by taking measures in order to deal with health emergency needs, support economic activity and employment, preserve monetary and financial stability and prepare the ground for recovery; these contain a combination of government fiscal stimuli (with extensive resort to the principle of solidarity), emergency liquidity and monetary policy measures and measures relating to financial stability. After briefly reviewing all these measures from a systematic point of view, the present article further analyses the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) during the first phase of this crisis, both in its capacity as a monetary authority within the Eurosystem and in its capacity as prudential banking supervisory authority within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), with particular emphasis on the treatment of non-performing loans (NPLs). Its specific contribution to financial macro-prudential oversight within European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is also highlighted.


2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tristan Nguyen

PurposeIn the recent financial crisis, many observers have assigned monetary policy a central role in the crisis. Specifically, they claim that excessively easy monetary policy by the Federal Reserve in the first half of the decade helped to cause a bubble in housing prices in the USA. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of monetary policy within the regulatory frameworks of financial markets.Design/methodology/approachThe authors show within a macroeconomic framework a possible trade‐off between price stability and financial stability by differentiating between a technology‐driven bubble and an animal spirit bubble. In their conclusion: if there is a trade‐off between price stability and financial stability, the central bank will have to make a choice between the two objectives. In that case, the question arises of which of the two objectives should take precedence: price stability or financial stability?FindingsFrom this analysis, the authors conclude that a central bank which uses a lexicographic ordering favoring price stability over other objectives is likely to fuel the boom inadvertently (in the case of a technology‐driven bubble) or will decide to do nothing (in the case of an animal spirit bubble) allowing a process of excessive credit creation. The latter seems to be what happened between 2003 and 2008.Practical implicationsIf one wants to reduce the likelihood of future major financial busts, it must be accepted that the central banks (especially the Fed and the ECB) cannot only be responsible for price stability. Maintaining financial stability by preventing excesses in financial markets should be an equally important objective.Originality/valueThe paper gives a new perspective on the role of monetary policy within the regulatory framework. With this macroeconomic framework, the authors are able to show possible trade‐offs between price stability and financial stability. The micro‐ and macro‐prudential approach of this paper is a useful contribution to the discussion about regulatory reforms of financial markets.


Author(s):  
Jakob de Haan ◽  
Sylvester Eijffinger

This chapter reviews recent research on the political economy of monetary policymaking, both by economists and by political scientists. The traditional argument for central bank independence is the desire to counter inflationary biases. However, studies in political science suggest that governments may delegate monetary policy in order to detach it from political debates and power struggles. The recent financial crisis has changed the role of central banks, as evidenced by unconventional monetary and macro-prudential policy measures. Financial stability and unconventional monetary policies have stronger distributional consequences than conventional monetary policies, with implications for central bank independence. However, the authors’ results do not suggest that that has happened in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis, nor has there been higher turnover of central bank governors.


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