Games and Collective Decisions

1997 ◽  
pp. 158-173
Author(s):  
Tapan Biswas
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Anne Nassauer

This book provides an account of how and why routine interactions break down and how such situational breakdowns lead to protest violence and other types of surprising social outcomes. It takes a close-up look at the dynamic processes of how situations unfold and compares their role to that of motivations, strategies, and other contextual factors. The book discusses factors that can draw us into violent situations and describes how and why we make uncommon individual and collective decisions. Covering different types of surprise outcomes from protest marches and uprisings turning violent to robbers failing to rob a store at gunpoint, it shows how unfolding situations can override our motivations and strategies and how emotions and culture, as well as rational thinking, still play a part in these events. The first chapters study protest violence in Germany and the United States from 1960 until 2010, taking a detailed look at what happens between the start of a protest and the eruption of violence or its peaceful conclusion. They compare the impact of such dynamics to the role of police strategies and culture, protesters’ claims and violent motivations, the black bloc and agents provocateurs. The analysis shows how violence is triggered, what determines its intensity, and which measures can avoid its outbreak. The book explores whether we find similar situational patterns leading to surprising outcomes in other types of small- and large-scale events: uprisings turning violent, such as Ferguson in 2014 and Baltimore in 2015, and failed armed store robberies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-278
Author(s):  
Ariane Dupont-Kieffer ◽  
Sylvie Rivot ◽  
Jean-Loup Madre

The golden age of road demand modeling began in the 1950s and flourished in the 1960s in the face of major road construction needs. These macro models, as well as the econometrics and the data to be processed, were provided mainly by engineers. A division of tasks can be observed between the engineers in charge of estimating the flows within the network and the transport economists in charge of managing these flows once they are on the road network. Yet the inability to explain their decision-making processes and individual drives gave some room to economists to introduce economic analysis, so as to better understand individual or collective decisions between transport alternatives. Economists, in particular Daniel McFadden, began to offer methods to improve the measure of utility linked to transport and to inform the engineering approach. This paper explores the challenges to the boundaries between economics and engineering in road demand analysis.


1964 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 166-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
James S. Coleman
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 284 (1862) ◽  
pp. 20170347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reena H. Walker ◽  
Andrew J. King ◽  
J. Weldon McNutt ◽  
Neil R. Jordan

In despotically driven animal societies, one or a few individuals tend to have a disproportionate influence on group decision-making and actions. However, global communication allows each group member to assess the relative strength of preferences for different options among their group-mates. Here, we investigate collective decisions by free-ranging African wild dog packs in Botswana. African wild dogs exhibit dominant-directed group living and take part in stereotyped social rallies: high energy greeting ceremonies that occur before collective movements. Not all rallies result in collective movements, for reasons that are not well understood. We show that the probability of rally success (i.e. group departure) is predicted by a minimum number of audible rapid nasal exhalations (sneezes), within the rally. Moreover, the number of sneezes needed for the group to depart (i.e. the quorum) was reduced whenever dominant individuals initiated rallies, suggesting that dominant participation increases the likelihood of a rally's success, but is not a prerequisite. As such, the ‘will of the group’ may override dominant preferences when the consensus of subordinates is sufficiently great. Our findings illustrate how specific behavioural mechanisms (here, sneezing) allow for negotiation (in effect, voting) that shapes decision-making in a wild, socially complex animal society.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaosu Matsumori ◽  
Kazuki Iijima ◽  
Yukihito Yomogida ◽  
Kenji Matsumoto

Aggregating welfare across individuals to reach collective decisions is one of the most fundamental problems in our society. Interpersonal comparison of utility is pivotal and inevitable for welfare aggregation, because if each person's utility is not interpersonally comparable, there is no rational aggregation procedure that simultaneously satisfies even some very mild conditions for validity (Arrow's impossibility theorem). However, scientific methods for interpersonal comparison of utility have thus far not been available. Here, we have developed a method for interpersonal comparison of utility based on brain signals, by measuring the neural activity of participants performing gambling tasks. We found that activity in the medial frontal region was correlated with changes in expected utility, and that, for the same amount of money, the activity evoked was larger for participants with lower household incomes than for those with higher household incomes. Furthermore, we found that the ratio of neural signals from lower-income participants to those of higher-income participants coincided with estimates of their psychological pleasure by "impartial spectators", i.e. disinterested third-party participants satisfying specific conditions. Finally, we derived a decision rule based on aggregated welfare from our experimental data, and confirmed that it was applicable to a distribution problem. These findings suggest that our proposed method for interpersonal comparison of utility enables scientifically reasonable welfare aggregation by escaping from Arrow's impossibility and has implications for the fair distribution of economic goods. Our method can be further applied for evidence-based policy making in nations that use cost-benefit analyses or optimal taxation theory for policy evaluation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Longzhao Liu ◽  
Xin Wang ◽  
Xuyang Chen ◽  
Shaoting Tang ◽  
Zhiming Zheng

Confirmation bias and peer pressure are regarded as the main psychology origins of personal opinion adjustment. Each show substantial impacts on the formation of collective decisions. Nevertheless, few attempts have been made to study how the interplay between these two mechanisms affects public opinion evolution on large-scale social networks. In this paper, we propose an agent-based model of opinion dynamics which incorporates the conjugate effect of confirmation bias (characterized by the population identity scope and initiative adaptation speed) and peer pressure (described by a susceptibility threshold and passive adaptation speed). First, a counterintuitive non-monotonous phenomenon arises in the homogeneous population: the number of opinion clusters first increases and then decreases to one as the population identity scope becomes larger. We then consider heterogeneous populations where “impressionable” individuals with large susceptibility to peer pressure and “confident” individuals with small susceptibility coexist. We find that even a small fraction of impressionable individuals could help eliminate public polarization when population identity scope is relatively large. In particular, the impact of impressionable agents would be greater if these agents are hubs. More intriguingly, while impressionable individuals have randomly distributed initial opinions, most of them would finally evolve to moderates. We highlight the emergence of these “impressionable moderates” who are easily influenced, yet are important in public opinion competition, which may inspire efficient strategies in winning competitive campaigns.


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