Business Legitimacy from a Catholic Perspective: Thomas Aquinas, Papal Encyclicals, and Human Rights

2020 ◽  
pp. 179-202
Author(s):  
Giorgio Baruchello
2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Francis Crane

Philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) embraced a quest for sanctity at the core of his vocation as a French Catholic intellectual. Known as an exponent of the teachings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, he also devoted considerable energies to the promotion of democracy and human rights, as well as the combat against antisemitism. Maritain has been lauded for his sometimes courageous attempts to eradicate anti-Jewish prejudice from the Christian conscience, though some prevailing interpretations oversimplify this thinker's motivations and ideas. Keeping in mind the historically-contingent and often ambivalent nature of philosemitism, this article analyzes Maritain's postwar writings on the Jewish Question and his interactions with Popes Pius XII and Paul VI, Anglican theologian James Parkes, Jewish historians Leon Poliakov and Jules Isaac, and fellow Catholic writers Paul Claudel and Francois Mauriac.


2020 ◽  
pp. 269-286
Author(s):  
Therese Marie Ignacio Bjørnaas

Theologians and philosophers have historically privileged the faculty of rationality in their exegesis of what it means to be created in the image of God. They have argued that we were made in God’s image when we were endowed with a rational soul. This argument is contested by contemporary disability theologians. They argue that by equating the imago Dei with the faculty of rationality Christian theology effectively strips people with cognitive disabilities of their human rights. It justifies elevating the cognitively able over the cognitively disabled in the same way that it justifies elevating the human species over other species. In this article, I will first show that the contemporary Western conviction that ability and independence are normal while disability and dependence are deviant owes much to definitions of the human first proposed by Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant. I will then propose that Aquinas himself offers us a way out of these destructive binarisms. He defines the imago Dei as an embodied soul, an imperfectly intelligent substance that can fulfill its destiny only if it receives the support of society and the intervention of God’s grace. Aquinas’s theology of embodiment does not merely expose false assumptions about ability and disability; it compels us to appreciate the radical dependency and vulnerability of human nature.


Author(s):  
Jenifer Booth

This chapter applies the modified philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre to mental health law, and in particular to the mental health tribunal. The natural law approach of Thomas Aquinas is used to assist in this. It is argued that, for law to be just in pre-modern terms, it requires that it be assessed as rational together with the care it supports as a single entity. As such, according to a modified version of the Thomistic Aristotelian ethics of MacIntyre, justice would require reconciliation of both doctor and patient narratives regarding care, possibly at the tribunal. It is suggested that psychiatric intensive care, in particular, could benefit from this approach. The approach might be seen as an additional protection to human rights-based considerations. It is also argued that the tribunal can be seen differently, according to the tradition of enquiry.


Author(s):  
Carlos Ramos Rosete

Toda disciplina de tipo humanista o de carácter social asume como uno de sus presupuestos fundamentales una noción de lo que es el ser humano. Llevar a cabo una reflexión de tipo filosófico sobre las nociones de hombre, persona y dignidad se vuelve imprescindible para aclarar elementos antropológicos que son fundamentos teóricos de las ciencias humanas y sociales. La palabra “hombre” admite significados que en parte coinciden y en parte difieren con la noción de persona. La expresión “persona humana” no es siempre una redundancia. Siguiendo el pensamiento de Santo Tomás de Aquino, que distingue entre las nociones de hombre y persona, la subsistencia de la persona humana se vuelve fundamento de la dignidad humana y fuente de los derechos humanos.All humanist or social discipline assumes as one of its fundamental principles an idea of what human being is. Accomplishing a philosophical reflection about the man notions, person and dignity become essential to clarify antropological elements which are theorical fundaments of human and social sciences. The Word man accepts meanings that are partly the same and partly different with the concept of human person, in some way, is not totally a redundancy. Following Saint Thomas Aquinas´s thought who distinguishes between the notions of man and person, it is noted that the subsistency of the human person turns into the human dignity basis and source of all human rights.


2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. i-xiv
Author(s):  
Yasien Mohamed ◽  
Norman K. Swazo

Islamic ethics (akhlaq islamiyah), which is concerned with good characterand the means of acquiring it, took shape gradually from the seventh centuryand culminated in the eleventh century with the teachings of Miskawayh(d. 1030), al-Raghib al-Isfahani (d. 1060), and al-Ghazali (d. 1111). Islamicphilosophical ethics combined Qur’anic teachings, the traditions of Muhammad(s), the precedents of Islamic jurists, and classic Greek (Hellenic) ethicalideas.Prophet Muhammad (s) said: “Verily I have been sent in order to perfectmoral character” (Fainnama bu`ithtu-li-utamima makarim al-akhlaq). Suchprophetic traditions, Qur’anic moral exhortations, and Hellenic ethical writingsbecame the main sources of inspiration for Miskawayh, al-Isfahani, andal-Ghazali. Inspired by the Arabic version of Aristotle’s NicomacheanEthics, these moral philosophers Islamized virtue ethics and focused on cultivatingcharacter and purifying the soul (al-nafs). Although al-Isfahaniinspired al-Ghazali and tried to maintain a balance between the justice of thesoul and the justice of society, the latter developed a Sufi ethics that becameincreasingly otherworldly with its focus on purifying the self. This ethicalmodel later became a source of inspiration for St. Thomas Aquinas andMaimonides.This special issue of the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciencesfocuses on Islamic ethics, especially ethics as applied to such contemporaryissues as bioethics, the environment, human rights, and evolution. Thepapers provide insight into how ethical problems are dealt with within ...


2001 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 187-205
Author(s):  
Joseph M. de Torre ◽  

2009 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adriano Pessina

La Dichiarazione universale dei Diritti dell’uomo del 1948 dell’ ONU ha posto in termini politici, e non soltanto filosofici o religiosi, al centro stesso della logica della cittadinanza l’affermazione della dignità umana e della libertà come qualità innate e non acquisite. Affermare che tutti gli uomini nascono liberi ed eguali in dignità significa affermare di fatto che la dignità è un attributo ontologico, una qualità intrinseca (e quindi inalienabile) dell’essere umano, al di là di differenze di sesso, di salute, di stato sociale. L’uso della nozione di persona come sinonimo delle qualità dell’adulto rischia di frantumare questo guadagno della politica. La biopolitica liberale rischia di essere fonte di discriminazioni tra gli uomini quando adotta un concetto di persona distinto da quello di essere umano. In essa rivive il dualismo antropologico proprio del platonismo. Le tesi di Hannah Arendt, di Eva Kittay e di Martha Nussabaum ci permettono di evidenziare i caratteri della persona umana sia come soggetto sia come essere corporeo diveniente nel tempo, secondo quell’intuizione che fu propria di Tommaso d’Aquino. Se si torna a pensare alla persona umana come essere umano diveniente nel tempo, è possibile salvaguardare i diritti di tutti e in particolare difendere quelle fasi della vita umana in cui la persona umana è esposta, per le fasi dello sviluppo o per la malattia, alla dipendenza. Solo così si può pensare ad una giustizia che includa tutti e tutte le fasi dell’esistenza, anche quelle segnate dalla disabilità. ---------- The United Nations Universal declaration of human rights (1948) has centred the assertion of human dignity and freedom as innate (not acquired) qualities in the logic of citizenship itself; this claim has been made not only in philosophical and religious terms, but also in political terms. Affirming that all men born free and equal for what concerns their dignity means to affirm actually that dignity is an ontological attribute, an intrinsic quality (and therefore inalienable) of the human being, beyond sex, health and social standing differences. The use of the notion of person as synonym of the qualities of adult risks to crush this gain of politics. The liberal biopolitics risks to be a source of discriminations among men when it adopts a concept of person different from that of human being. According to this view, the anthropological dualism peculiar to the Platonism lives again. Hannah Arendt, Evas Kittay and Martha Nussabaum’s thesis allow us to underline the human person characteristics as both subject and bodily being, according to the Thomas Aquinas’ intuition. If we think again human person as human being, it is possible to safeguard the everybody rights and particularly to defend those phases of human life in which human person is exposed, for the phases of the development or for the illness, to the dependence. Only in this way justice could be thought including all and all the phases of the existence, also those marked by disability.


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