Comment on “The Undeniable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Special Sciences”

Author(s):  
Tim Räz
Keyword(s):  
2009 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-141
Author(s):  
Gerrit Glas

What is the purpose of Friesen’s 95 theses and what is the audience he has in mind? The title refers to a major church historical event and suggests that — like in 1517 — we are dealing with a concise statement of a new and radical doctrine that is unfolded in opposition to an established canon. But who is the opponent in this case? What is the established canon that is rejected? And what is new or radical in the summary? Dooyeweerd’s philosophy was definitely new and radical at the time of its conception. It still has an enormous potential for the special sciences. It offers important resources for any (transcendental) critique of ‘immanence’ philosophies. However, on first reading and without knowledge of the context, Friesen does not seem to aim at offering a new or radical interpretation of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. I read the 95 theses as an attempt to wipe off the dust, to provide the overall picture, doing justice to aspects that (maybe) were neglected or (maybe) were wrongly understood in the reformational tradition. However, the audience he has in mind seems to be one that is already familiar with the basic concepts and the thrust of Dooyeweerdian thinking; not an audience that is opposed to reformational philosophical thinking, but one that might be helped by a succinct summary in order to encourage further study and discussion.


Phronimon ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Daniel Francois Strauss

Although the statement of Whitehead, asserting that European philosophy may be seen as footnotes to Plato, is exaggerated, it does provide us with a challenge to explain the element of truth in it. This article investigates a number of philosophical issues surfacing already in pre-Platonic thought in order to show how Plato mediated their impact upon subsequent philosophical developments and philosophical trends within some special sciences. The quest for a principle of origin explored alternative modes of explanation, such as number (the Pythagorean claim that everything is number), the metaphysics of space (Parmenides), the struggle with constancy and change (Heraclitus and Plato) as well as contemplating the limits of conceptual knowledge in Plato’s dialogue, Parmenides. Owing to the philosophical roots of the special sciences, a more detailed account is given of the influence of Platonism upon the disciplines of mathematics, physics and theology.


Author(s):  
В. Х. Акаев

Изучение философии и методологии науки, философских проблем специальных наук магистрантами, аспирантами, молодыми учеными в техническом вузе - важная часть их теоретико-методологической, общенаучной подготовки. Специальные научные знания, получаемые студентами в техническом вузе, исследования, проводимые учеными, в том числе и молодыми, должны осмысливаться как в контексте широкого социокультурного, так и в конкретно-научном диапазоне. Очень важно, чтобы в этом контексте молодой ученый - аспирант, ассистент, избравший научный путь развития, освоил рациональные и эмпирические способы, методы исследования. Это возможно в том случае, если повысить уровень теоретико-методологической подготовки будущих специалистов, инженеров, молодых ученых. The study of philosophy and methodology of science, philosophical problems of special sciences by undergraduates, graduate students, and young scientists at a technical university is an important part of their theoretical, methodological, general scientific training. Special scientific knowledge obtained by students in a technical university, research carried out by scientists, including young people, should be comprehended both in the context of a wide socio-cultural and in a specific scientific range. It is very important that in this context a young scientist - graduate student, assistant, who has chosen the scientific path of development, mastered rational and empirical methods, research methods. This is possible if the level of theoretical and methodological training of future specialists, engineers, and young scientists is raised.


2020 ◽  
pp. 89-106
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini

The first three chapters introduced mechanisms, including functional mechanisms—that is, mechanisms that have teleological functions. This chapter introduces a mechanistic version of functionalism. Functionalism is the view that the nature of something is functional. Mechanistic functionalism embeds this claim in the functions of mechanisms and their components. Mechanistic functions are inseparable from the structures that perform them at the relevant level of organization. Weak (mechanistic) functionalism entails multiple realizability; strong (mechanistic) functionalism entails medium independence. Thus, even if medium independence is closely related to computation, (mechanistic) functionalism about cognition does not entail that cognition is computational. In addition, (mechanistic) functionalism entails neither traditional anti-reductionism nor the autonomy of the special sciences.


2020 ◽  
pp. 004839312097682
Author(s):  
Gianluca Pozzoni

Compared to other philosophies of special sciences, the scope, object, and definition of the philosophy of political science remain vague. This article traces this vagueness to the changing subject matter of political science throughout its history, but argues that all social sciences are subject to radical changes in what count as their defining characteristics. Accordingly, the only legitimate definition of “philosophy of political science” is “the philosophical study of whatever happens to conventionally fall within the scope of political science at a given moment.” Moving from this assumption, this article makes the case for a unified philosophy of social science.


Philosophy ◽  
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Umut Baysan

“Realization” is a technical term used by philosophers of mind, philosophers of science, and metaphysicians to denote some dependence relation that is thought to exist between higher-level properties or states and lower-level properties or states. Some philosophers of mind hold that mental properties, such as believing that it is raining, having a painful sensation, and so on, are realized by physical properties. Understood this way, the term was introduced to philosophy of mind literature with the thesis that mental properties are multiply realizable by physical properties. Since different physical properties could realize the same mental property, it is thought that the phenomenon of multiple realization shows that the identity theory, namely the view that mental properties are identical with physical properties, is false. For similar reasons, some philosophers of the special sciences think that higher-level properties, such as biological properties, are realized by properties that are invoked in lower-level sciences such as physics. Some metaphysicians suggest that determinable properties, such as color properties (e.g., being red) are realized by their determinate properties (e.g., being crimson, being scarlet). Some argue that dispositional properties, such as being fragile, are realized by non-dispositional, categorical microstructural properties. It has been customary to think that functional properties, such as being a carburetor, are realized by first-order properties that play the specified functional roles. Due to the widely different usages of “realization,” it is difficult to determine if there should be one relation or several relations that this term denotes. Any relation that is denoted by this term can be seen as a realization relation. This article is about such relations. Whereas some theories explicitly formulate realization relations, some tangential theories that concern related issues (e.g., the mind-body problem) make crucial claims as to what counts as a case of realization. This article introduces the central questions about realization and clarifies the main issues and concepts that are invoked in the relevant literature.


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