A Two-Public Key Scheme Omitting Collision Problem in Digital Signature

2004 ◽  
pp. 627-636
Author(s):  
Sung Keun Song ◽  
Hee Yong Youn ◽  
Chang Won Park
Keyword(s):  
Digital Signature ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Collision Problem

scholarly journals Comparison and intelligent analysis of NTRU and ETRU signature algorithms for public key digital signature

2021 ◽  
Vol 2083 (4) ◽  
pp. 042009
Author(s):  
Zifeng Zhu ◽  
Fei Tian
Keyword(s):  
Digital Signature ◽  
Public Key ◽  
High Dimensional ◽  
Public Key Cryptosystem ◽  
Fast Speed ◽  
Intelligent Analysis ◽  
Small Footprint ◽  
Integer Base ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract Three American mathematicians made the NTRU public-key cryptosystem in 1996, it has a fast speed, small footprint, and also it is easy to produce key advantages. The NTRU signature algorithm is based on an integer base, the performance of the signature algorithm will change when the integer base becomes other bases. Based on the definition of “high-dimensional density” of lattice signatures, this paper chooses the ETRU signature algorithm formed by replacing the integer base with the Eisenstein integer base as a representative, and analyzes and compares the performance, security of NTRU and ETRU signature algorithms, SVP and CVP and other difficult issues, the speed of signature and verification, and the consumption of resources occupied by the algorithm.

scholarly journals MISPLACED PRIORITIES: THE UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE ACT AND LIABILITY ALLOCATION IN A PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Bradford Biddle
Keyword(s):  
Digital Signature ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Digital Signatures ◽  
Public Key Infrastructure ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Electronic Documents ◽  
Online Databases ◽  
The Status ◽  
Computer Based

On March 9, 1995, the Utah Digital Signature Act (the “Utah Act”) was signed into law.1 Complex and ambitious, the Utah Act is intended to promote the use of digital signatures on computer-based documents and to facilitate electronic commerce.2 The Utah Act implements an infrastructure in which computer users utilize “certification authorities,” online databases called repositories, and public-key encryption technology in order to “sign” electronic documents in a legally binding fashion. In addition to setting out a regulatory scheme designed to implement this infrastructure, the Utah Act provides certain digital signatures with legal status as valid signatures and addresses a variety of issues relating to the status of digitally-signed electronic documents in contract and evidence law.

A Mobile Coalition Key-Evolving Digital Signature Scheme for Wireless/Mobile Networks

2011 ◽  
pp. 285-311
Author(s):  
Quanxing Zhang ◽  
Chwan-Hwa Wu ◽  
J. David Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Networks ◽  
Digital Signature ◽  
Mobile Ip ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Signature Scheme ◽  
The Public ◽  
New States ◽  
Dynamic Path ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Digital Signature Scheme

A scheme is proposed in this chapter to apply a secure digital signature scheme in a mobile-IP environment and treats the three entities in a dynamic path as either foreign agents (FA), home agents (HA) or mobile agents (MA), such that a coalition is formed containing each of the individual agents. Each agent has a pair of keys: one private and one public. The private key is evolving with time, and the public key is signed by a certification authority (CA). All the private keys of the three agents in the coalition are needed to sign a signature. Furthermore, all the messages are signed and verified. The signature is verified against a public key, computed as the product of the public keys of all three agents, and readily generated when a new dynamic path is formed. In addition, the key-evolving scheme prevents an adversary from forging past signatures under any circumstances. As a result of the schemes’ proactive refresh capability, an adversary must simultaneously compromise each MA, FA and HA in order to forge future signatures. When a new dynamic path is formed or private keys evolve to new states, an interactive, proactive synchronization scheme is employed among the agents. Thus, the loss of a mobile device, or its information, will cause minimal information damage.

Public-key cryptosystem based on quantum BCH codes and its quantum digital signature

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 197
Author(s):  
Haiqing Han ◽  
Siru Zhu ◽  
Qin Li ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Yutian Lei ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Digital Signature ◽  
Bch Codes ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Public Key Cryptosystem ◽  
Quantum Digital Signature

A Blind Proxy Re-Signatures Scheme Based on Random Oracle

2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 1062-1065 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Qiao Deng
Keyword(s):  
Digital Signature ◽  
Digital Signatures ◽  
Random Oracle ◽  
Proxy Signature ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Signature Scheme ◽  
Signature Schemes

Digital signature schemes allow a signer to transform any message into a signed message, such that anyone can verify the validity of the signed message using the signer’s public key, but only the signer can generate signed messages. A proxy re-signature, which is a type of digital signatures, has significant applications in many areas. Proxy signature scheme was first introduced by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss, but that scheme is inefficient and with limited features. After that, some Proxy re-signature schemes were proposed by researchers. This paper constructs a blind proxy re-signatures scheme. Comparing to the previous proxy re-signature schemes, the scheme adds a message blinded feature, and then the security of the scheme is proven.

Key Substitution Attack and Malleability of a Short Signature Scheme with Batch Verification

2011 ◽  
Vol 55-57 ◽  
pp. 1605-1608
Author(s):  
Fan Yu Kong ◽  
Jia Yu
Keyword(s):  
Digital Signature ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Signature Scheme ◽  
Batch Verification ◽  
Malicious Adversary ◽  
Short Signature ◽  
Digital Signature Scheme

At IWSEC 2008, F. Guo et al. proposed an efficient short signature scheme with batch verification based on C. Gentry’s scheme. In this paper, we firstly propose the key substitution attack on F. Guo et al.’s digital signature scheme and show that the malicious adversary can forge a valid signature, which can be verified with a substituted public key. Secondly, we prove that F. Guo et al.’s scheme is malleable and the attacker can produce a new valid signature on the message if he/she has known some valid signatures on the same message.

scholarly journals Survey on Techniques Developed using Digital Signature: Public key Cryptography

2015 ◽  
Vol 117 (16) ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Shivendra Singh ◽  
Md. Sarfaraz Iqbal ◽  
Arunima Jaiswal
Keyword(s):  
Digital Signature ◽  
Public Key Cryptography ◽  
Public Key

scholarly journals Public Key Infrastructure and Digital Signature Legislation: Ten Public Policy Questions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Bradford Biddle
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Digital Signature ◽  
Public Key Infrastructure ◽  
The State ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Foreign Countries ◽  
Long Term Consequences

Following the lead of the State of Utah, numerous states and several foreign countries have enacted “digitalsignature” legislation aimed at promoting the development of a public key infrastructure (PKI). While PKIlegislation has acquired significant momentum, it is not clear that lawmakers have carefully considered thepublic policy implications and long-term consequences of these laws. This article surveys ten public policyissues implicated by digital signature legislation.

scholarly journals Quantum Election Protocol Based on Quantum Public Key Cryptosystem

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Wenhua Gao ◽  
Li Yang
Keyword(s):  
Digital Signature ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Public Key ◽  
General Construction ◽  
Public Key Cryptosystem ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Quantum Digital Signature ◽  
Quantum Public Key ◽  
Quantum Public Key Cryptosystem

There is no quantum election protocol that can fulfil the eight requirements of an electronic election protocol, i.e., completeness, robustness, privacy, legality, unreusability, fairness, verifiability, and receipt-freeness. To address this issue, we employ the general construction of quantum digital signature and quantum public key encryption, in conjunction with classic public key encryption, to develop and instantiate a general construction of quantum election protocol. The proposed protocol exhibits the following advantages: (i) no pre-shared key between any two participants is required, and no trusted third party or anonymous channels are required. The protocol is suitable for large-scale elections with numerous candidates and voters and accommodates the situation in which multiple voters vote simultaneously. (ii) It is the first protocol that dismantles the contradiction between verifiability and receipt-freeness in a quantum election protocol. It satisfies all eight requirements stated earlier under the physical assumptions that there exists a one-way untappable channel from the administrator to the voter and that there is no collusion between any of the three parties in the protocol. Compared with current election protocols with verifiability and receipt-freeness, this protocol relies upon fewer physical assumptions. (iii) This construction is flexible and can be instantiated into an election scheme having post-quantum security by applying cryptographic algorithms conveying post-quantum security. Moreover, utilizing quantum digital signature and public key encryption yields a good result: the transmitted ballots are in quantum states, so owing to the no-cloning theorem, ballot privacy is less likely to be compromised, even if private keys of the signature and public key encryption are leaked after the election. However, in existing election protocols employing classic digital signatures and public key encryption, ballot privacy can be easily violated if attackers obtain private keys. Thus, our construction enhances privacy.

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