scholarly journals Modeling Control System Failures and Attacks – The Waterloo Campaign to Oil Pipelines

Author(s):  
Jonathan Butts ◽  
Mason Rice ◽  
Sujeet Shenoi
Author(s):  
R. L. Duncan ◽  
H. W. Brown

A data base system has been developed to analyze root causes of failures and unplanned outages in combined-cycle power plants and related equipments. Raw data in the form of plant work orders and outage reports are provided by thirteen utilities. Data encompasses both scheduled and unscheduled maintenance activities involving all plant equipments of mostly combined cycle installations. Primary objectives are to evaluate combined-cycle plant maintenance records to determine root causes of equipment failures, to analyze maintenance data to identify key areas for reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) improvement, and to develop an automated data processing system for feedback to project participants. ERAS (EPRI Reliability Assessment System) data were analyzed to determine failure rates and mean downtimes of critical equipment used in combined-cycle plants and integrated gasification combined-cycle plants of the future. A primary ERAS data requirement is to document plant equipment failures involving planned outages, unplanned outages, and noncurtailing maintenance. Maintenance data are mailed directly from the plant on a monthly or weekly basis. In order to maintain significant coordination and feedback, documentation is also mailed by ARINC Research to manufacturers and EPRI project personnel. ERAS is foremost a repository, based on dBASE II software, of raw data records which address combined-cycle plant equipment scheduled and unscheduled maintenance activity. By using dBASE II commands, data contained in “DAILY”, “MONTHLY”, “PROBLEMS”, and “FIREHRS” data base files (DBFs) are analyzed in many ways. Data may be separated by manufacturer or utility. RAM statistics may be analyzed according to six data hierarchies, grouping data by common plant design, system, subsystem, or components. Special report forms can be developed depending on specific data processing needs. During 1982 a total of 1744 maintenance records for the thirteen participating plants were processed. Seventy percent of the events were noncurtailing, of which 612 events involved component failures. The data base included 968 failure events to over 200 different combined-cycle plant components each described by a three digit code. Component repairs accounted for over 50 percent of these failures. Detailed descriptions of these failures identifying causes and failed piece parts can be listed by the computer from the “PROBLEMS” DBF using “FRM’s SYSCOMP” (failures grouped by components) or “SYSPLANT” (failures grouped by plant). It is concluded that work orders do provide insight into possible root cause and can assist engineering in followup failure investigations, although discussions with power plant personnel are often required for additional insight into root cause. The extent of successful root cause determination in the ERAS data base is difficult to quantify due to different root cause interpretations. However, project efforts have successfully identified the failed piece part in 86 percent of equipment failures. An analysis of plant reliability problems showed that failures of combustion turbine and heat recovery boiler panel controls and remote sensing equipment are the most frequent cause of combined-cycle plant unavailability. Each plant appears to have specific problem areas generic to these control system failures. Generic problems were observed in drum level set points, control valves, panel cards and timers, computers and data links, flame scanners, and thermo-couples. Many of the control related problems documented in ERAS records identify the failed part number of the control circuit affected. It is expected that these documented control system failures will begin to yield better insight into root cause as the number of records increase, and cause and effect relationships are established.


Author(s):  
Carlos Magno Couto Jacinto

This paper presents the HAZID/HAZOP [1,2,3,4] applied in risk analysis for the Cascade 5 well and this methodology main results, including possible failure or deviation events during the well construction, their causes and detection resources, consequences, criticality, and recommendations for mitigating safety risks. The HAZID/HAZOP is a systematic method to analyze step by step each well operation, mapping possible deviation processes and proposing recommendations either to prevent causes or mitigate consequences. The probabilities of some final events in the phases Liner 10”, Logging 12.25” and contingencies, were out of the ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) [1] levels of risk tolerance, and it was recommended the improvement of the safeguards in these phases using BOP tests program designed. The greater number of subsea control system failures compared to those that occurred on surface testing is believed to be primarily due to system complexity and hydrostatic issues that come into play in deeper water. It is important to keep in mind that control system failures are discovered during function tests. In fact, a very large percentage of all failures could have been identified with only a simple function test. It is important to distinguish between those failures that are found from pressure and those found from function testing. In this study it was calculated the interval of tests of the security system (BOP) for the period of 100 days of mission, in order to get an average unavailability within the ALARP level (10e−8, 10e−4). Following this approach it may be possible to avoid kicks and blowouts, saving costs and time in the well construction process.


Diagnostyka ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-47
Author(s):  
Salah Yahia Cherif ◽  
Djamel Benoudjit ◽  
Mohamed-Said Nait-Said ◽  
Nasreddine Nait-Said

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn M. Day ◽  
Griffin C. Beck ◽  
Scott A. Schubring

Abstract Gas-liquid scrubbers rely on level control systems (generally consisting of a level indicator, a level controller, and a pneumatic control valve for liquid release) to maintain an appropriate liquid level within the vessel. Scrubbers are often upstream of turbomachinery and failures at the scrubber can cause liquid ingestion or downtime. In natural gas service, these control systems are subject to harsh environments due to the influx of liquid slugs, high-velocity gases, corrosive fluids, vibrations, and a chaotic gas-liquid interface. In these severe conditions, level control system failures are commonplace and lead to safety and environmental hazards, equipment damage, and lost production. A need exists to augment or replace the typical liquid level control system with an alternative solution that is cost-effective, robust, and can operate reliably in the harsh natural gas environment. A project investigated failures related to scrubber level control systems, identified improvements to these systems, developed a prototype level controller, and tested the prototype controller and a variety of commercially available controllers at various conditions that emulated certain field conditions. The results of these tests gave insight into what type of controller may be best suited to the tested conditions and what controller options should be pursued further.


Author(s):  
Marcin Żugaj ◽  
Przemysław Bibik ◽  
Mariusz Jacewicz

1977 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. L. Basin ◽  
E. T. Burns ◽  
V. Cini ◽  
W. S. Loell

Author(s):  
V. T. Bolonny

The characteristics of the oil transportation system of Ukraine are presented, the emergency risks of domestic oil transportation pipeline sys­tems are established. The analysis of the accident rate of oil pipeline trans­port in Ukraine was carried out. The technique for estimating emergency oil leakages in the main pipeline depending on the energy characteristics of the fluid flow and changes in its level in the cross section is developed allowing to determine the volume of oil leakages into the environment from the de­tection of pressure drop to the establishment of stationary conditions of the pipeline operation and its final stop for the purpose of carrying out repairs. Based on the results of the calculations, the graphs which demonstrate the nature of the formation of soil pollution area by leakage from the pipeline are constructed. The linear part of the main oil pipelines is the most dangerous object, as all emergency situations are associated with emergency processes of dif­ferent intensity in the form of oil leakage into the environment and in fact are dangerous when system failures appear. The process and the time period for the formation of the ecological danger zone depend on the amount of oil leakage, its intensity. Emergency leakages of oil and petroleum products from pipelines enter the environment, which is often the soil, forming an area of gassiness, and then reach the surface, polluting the atmosphere.


Author(s):  
Florian Kroll ◽  
Annette Nielsen ◽  
Stephan Staudacher

The presentation of a control strategy for the most important SOFC / gas turbine hybrid system maneuvers like start-up, shutdown or system-failures is one of the main issues of this paper. For a successful system simulation during different operational states, a coupled model of a gas turbine and a SOFC was combined with the proposed control system. To keep the model structure lean enough for real-time calculation, a non-linear lumped volume model with modular set up was chosen to achieve an accurate reflection of the dynamic effects. The control strategy takes into account the requirements of the gas turbine components but also necessitates safe operation of the SOFC. Specified boundary conditions are strictly to be considered within the control structure to ensure failure-free and safe operation during the entire operation range. In the presented hybrid cycle a possibility of bypassing both, the cold side of the recuperator and the cathode side of the SOFC is suggested. These two bypasses, which introduce two additional actuators to the system, allow the SOFC stack temperature to be kept in its limits more easily.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document