Deductive Explanation of Scientific Laws

1973 ◽  
pp. 103-126
Author(s):  
Raimo Tuomela
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  

As it is known: in the state of the art, the like and the unlike polarity between two magnets remains independent of the distance between them. According to the invention: “Magnetic System of Three Interactions”, International office of patents WIPO-PCT, bearing the No WO/2013/136097of the inventor Georgios K. Kertsopoulos, the like and the unlike polarity between two magnetic constructions depends on the distance between them [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. The know-how of the invention makes it possible for interacting magnetic constructions to possess and perform interchangeable more than 96 polarities and interactions. Polarities and magnetic fields can in multiple ways interchange, depending on the varying distance between two interacting confronted magnetic constructions, offering many new variable design capabilities. For the first time, new types of poles are created, for example: simultaneous like-unlike poles or simultaneous unlike-like poles are created, causing stable or unstable balance as an interaction; also, for the first time in magnetism, new types of magnetic fields are formed never before observed, for example: remote fields of very strong attraction, without however, the contact of the magnetic constructions. The magnetic devices that perform these multiple interactions are fully patented internationally, published in a book in English, by the inventor a book in English, by the inventor [11]. The new scientific laws and principles, revealed through these experiments enrich the very basics, the foundation of magnetism, since many new types of polarities and interactions are introduced and are made possible for the first time in science and technology. In figure 1 of the article we observe the division and determination of the empty air space, between the magnetic constructions, at three distances and two boundaries which apply both for the like and the unlike front poles and in figure 2 we observe the three typical spatial distances, the three multi-plane polarities and the three interactions with properties and with spatial boundaries and interactions based on the bundles of the dynamic lines between the two magnetic constructions, on the guide, when the poles of the front poles of the arrangements are initially like. Furthermore, in figure 7 we observe a schematic representation of the three different fields (175), (177) and (178) between the above-mentioned magnetic arrangements of the constructions of the invention, with initially like front poles, in the sense of the general cause of the dynamic difference. This article is in continuation of the following published article that introduces the reader to the invention’s technology: Georgios K. Kertsopoulos (2018) Innovation article: 36 over passed restrictions of magnetism achieved by the 96 multiple magnetic polarities-interactions performed by the Kertsopoulos world patented invention vs. the known two. Advances in Nanoscience and nanotechnology [12]. https://www.opastonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/36-over-passed-restrictions-of-magnetism-achieved-by-the-96- multiple-magnetic-polarities-interactions-performed-by-the-kertsopoulos-world-ann-18.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1jYPFME5mhX2FLbKKTPAdu0YMe3FqHtoUdoRoeao8mKIp1GRuWeovEaA


HISTOREIN ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Brzechczyn

<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:WordDocument> <w:View>Normal</w:View> <w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom> <w:HyphenationZone>21</w:HyphenationZone> <w:PunctuationKerning /> <w:ValidateAgainstSchemas /> <w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid> <w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent> <w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText> <w:Compatibility> <w:BreakWrappedTables /> <w:SnapToGridInCell /> <w:WrapTextWithPunct /> <w:UseAsianBreakRules /> <w:DontGrowAutofit /> </w:Compatibility> <w:BrowserLevel>MicrosoftInternetExplorer4</w:BrowserLevel> </w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif]--> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">This paper has two main purposes. Its primary purpose is to present the reception of the discussion between positivism and narrativism in the Polish methodology of history. A secondary one is to paraphrase, using the notion apparatus of the idealisational theory of science, the issue of the accuracy of explanation. The article consists of six parts. In the first part, Hempel’s deductive-nomological (or covering-law) model of explanation is presented. In the second part, the main tenets and assumptions of the Poznań school of methodology are presented. The emergence of this school at the end of the 1960s delayed the popularisation of narrativism in Polish methodology of history. In the third part, the manifold reasons of this delayed reception are analysed. The popularization of narrativism was only possible in Poland after 1989, but it had a primarily imitative character. This outline of cultural and scientific context allows Chris Lorenz’s proposals (on the problem of the accuracy of explanation) to be put in a wider perspective (part four). Namely, this author describes “a theoretical historical debate” on the status of scientific laws and refers to a post-positivistic approach to science represented by Nancy Cartwright. This approach was to introduce new perspectives to the understanding of lawfulness. In the fifth part, the main assumptions and tenets (for example, modes of explanation) of another post-positivistic approach to science, namely the idealisational theory of science, are presented and compared with the Hempelian model of explanation. In the sixth part, Hempel’s explanatory sketch is paraphrased using the notion apparatus of the idealisational model of science which provides a solution in this theoretical framework, to the problem of accuracy of explanation posed by Lorenz.</p> <!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" LatentStyleCount="156"> </w:LatentStyles> </xml><![endif]--><!--[if !mso]><object classid="clsid:38481807-CA0E-42D2-BF39-B33AF135CC4D" id=ieooui></object> <mce:style><! st1\:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) } --> <!--[endif] --><!--[if gte mso 10]> <mce:style><! /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:Standardowy; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} --> <!--[endif] -->


Problemos ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 60-69
Author(s):  
Ave Mets

[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] This article presents the results of a broader research project which aims to argue for the normativity of scientific laws. Usually scientific laws are regarded as descriptive, which contrasts them to prescriptive norms. To show their normativity, I utilize the logical account of explicitly normative systems by Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin (1971). I identify the characteristic elements of normativity and analyse accounts of implicit normativity in science using those terms to show the affinities of explicit and implicit normativities. The research project continues with the substantiation of the normativity of scientific laws in detail and the results will be presented in Normativity of Scientific Laws (II) (Mets 2018).


Author(s):  
Fabrizio D’Errico ◽  
Maurizio Dalla Casa
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Cheryl Misak

This chapter argues, contrary to the received view, that Frank Ramsey was not part of the logical analyst programme of the early Russell and the Tractarian Wittgenstein. He did not identify a primary language comprising observation and logic and then go on to argue that open generalizations and scientific laws must be given a different, pragmatist, treatment. Rather, he started from the pragmatist account of belief as a habit of behaviour and came to a global pragmatist account of belief and its evaluation.


Author(s):  
Andy Hamilton

Mach was an Austrian physicist and philosopher. Though not one of the great philosophers, he was tremendously influential in the development of ‘scientific philosophy’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A vigorous opponent of ‘metaphysics’, he was celebrated as a progenitor of logical positivism. His work is regarded as a limiting case of pure empiricism; he stands between the empiricism of Hume and J.S. Mill, and that of the Vienna Circle. Mach’s positivist conception of science saw its aims as descriptive and predictive; explanation is downgraded. Scientific laws and theories are economical means of describing phenomena. Theories that refer to unobservable entities – including atomic theory – may impede inquiry. They should be eliminated where possible in favour of theories involving ‘direct descriptions’ of phenomena. Mach claimed to be a scientist, not a philosopher, but the ‘Machian philosophy’ was ‘neutral monism’. Close to phenomenalism, it saw the world as functionally related complexes of sensations, and aspired to anti-metaphysical neutrality.


1976 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimo Tuomela

1961 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 260-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Bunge
Keyword(s):  

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