Becoming Brass: Issues in the Testing, Recruiting, and Selection of American Military Officers

1992 ◽  
pp. 79-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark J. Eitelberg ◽  
Janice H. Laurence ◽  
Dianne C. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Military Officers ◽  
American Military ◽  
Selection Of

Presidents and Generals: Systems of Government and the Selection of Defense Ministers

2020 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1990036
Author(s):  
Octavio Amorim Neto ◽  
Pedro Accorsi
Keyword(s):  
Selection Criteria ◽  
Defense Policy ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
National Data ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Cross National

Defense ministers are among the most central players in democracies’ civil–military relations. This article aims to identify the determinants of the selection criteria of defense ministers in democracies and semi-democracies. More specifically, it attempts to measure the effects of systems of government on decisions to appoint civilians or military officers to head the defense ministry. We argue that some characteristics of presidentialized regimes lead to the appointment of military defense ministers. This is a novel contribution, one that connects the literature on civil–military relations and that on systems of government. To assess our hypothesis and its mechanisms, we use comprehensive cross-national data in 1975–2015. Our tests indicate a robust association between presidentialized systems of government and the appointment of military ministers. We also show that military defense ministers are associated with some relevant outcomes. These findings have important implications for the study of civil–military relations, defense policy, and democracy.

scholarly journals Colonizing Workers: Labor, Race, and U.S. Military Governance in the Southern Philippines

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-47
Author(s):  
Oliver Charbonneau
Keyword(s):  
State Building ◽  
Public Works ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Industrial Education ◽  
American Military ◽  
Local Actors ◽  
Mandatory Service

Management of labor was central to articulating and constructing U.S. colonialism in the southern Philippines. Governed by American military officers for fifteen years (1899–1914), the major island of Mindanao and those of the Sulu Archipelago became sites of intensive race management efforts. Colonial officials identified racialized Muslim and Lumad societies as out of step with the modern world of work and developed myriad programs to address this “problem,” including mandatory service on public works projects, carceral labor, industrial education, and directed markets. Unevenly applied and frequently contested, these initiatives generated a range of responses from local actors. The drive to create disciplined laborers through incentive, coercion, and violence shaped state building in the region and linked it to preoccupations with work and racial reform in other U.S. imperial possessions and the wider colonized world.

Plays and Amusements Offered for and By the American Military During the Revolutionary War

1978 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-24
Author(s):  
Jared A. Brown
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
American Revolution ◽  
Revolutionary War ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
American Military ◽  
Continental Congress ◽  
British Military ◽  
The Revolution

In October, 1774, the Continental Congress, meeting in Philadelphia, passed a resolution designed to ‘discountenance and discourage every species of extravagance and dissipation’, including the ‘exhibition of shews, plays, and other expensive diversions and entertainments’. The Revolution would begin within six months, and Congress was clearly attempting to prepare Americans for a period of austerity. But if Congress intended to eliminate all theatrical activities for the duration of the hostilities, it could not have failed more completely. Indeed, the American Revolution saw more theatrical activity on American soil than had ever taken place there before. British military officers – who brought with them a strong theatre-going tradition – sponsored lavish performances of plays in New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere between 1775 and 1783. In turn, the remarkable number of British theatrical productions stimulated certain American military officials to countenance performances given by American officers for audiences of soldiers and civilians. This may have been illegal, but it boosted morale and it was intended to demonstrate that Americans could compete with the British on any level, including the theatrical.

The Japanese Emperor, II

1932 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 828-845
Author(s):  
Kenneth Colegrove
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Martial Law ◽  
Selection Of

The executive powers of the Emperor include: (1) appointments and general administration, (2) pardons, (3) organization of the army and navy, (4) declaration of war, (5) conclusion of peace and treaty-making, and (6) establishment of martial law.Article X of the constitution defines the appointing power of the Emperor. His competence is not confined to mere selection of officials, since the constitution provides that “the Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and the salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same.” Clearly, the appointing power of the Emperor is unlimited. There is no necessity for securing the consent of any confirming body. The Emperor is thus unhampered by the restrictions that bind the president of the United States. This prerogative also extends to the power of dismissal—a potent instrument for the promotion of executive efficiency as well as autocracy.

Reduction in type A behavior in healthy middle-aged American military officers

1985 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Gill ◽  
Virginia A. Price ◽  
Meyer Friedman ◽  
Carl E. Thoresen ◽  
Lynda H. Powell ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Type A ◽  
Type A Behavior ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Middle Aged ◽  
American Military

Military Hegemony and the Transition Program

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-72
Author(s):  
J.’Kayode Fayemi
Keyword(s):  
Transition Program ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Party Formation ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Competing Interests ◽  
Whole Process ◽  
Military Elite ◽  
Transition Project ◽  
The Military ◽  
Selection Of

This article cautions that the democratization process in Nigeria is not a foregone conclusion. Given the nature of the competing interests within Nigeria’s military hierarchy, there is nothing to suggest that every officer within the ruling military elite has embraced this transition project. This article focuses on the place of the military in the transition program.Although entrenched military interests are not the only threat to the transition program, there is no doubt that the prominent role played by retired and serving military officers in the whole process of party formation and selection of presidential candidates has exacerbated concerns about the specter of militarism. While some in Nigeria simply see the military as the armed wing of the dominant oligarchy, others conclude that the military actually is the oligarchy.

Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States

1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 1131-1148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric A. Nordlinger
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Economic Change ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Marked Influence ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selection Of

When military officers are either sitting in the governmental saddle or have one foot securely in the stirrup, is it likely that such military controlled governments will pursue policies of socio-economic change and reform? What are the officer-politicians' motivations in reacting to the possibilities of such modernizing changes? Under what conditions are their motivations likely to vary? This essay attempts to answer these questions with regard to the contemporary non-western states. And in making the attempt, I believe that the analysis falls squarely within the purview of certain recent changes that are taking place in the study of comparative politics. These changes may be most broadly depicted as a movement away from that aspect of behavioralism that has focused exclusively upon “inputs,” and away from that dimension of “scientism” that has focused upon abstract concepts at the expense of empirical analysis. The change can also be described (in an overly facile manner) as a movement toward the politics in political science and the government in comparative politics.As is evidenced in LaPalombara's call for “parsimony” in the selection of problems, we should choose problems for analysis that are blatantly political and of obvious contemporary relevance. In approximately half of the contemporary non-western states military officers either occupy the topmost seats of government themselves or they have a marked influence upon the civilian incumbents. And when this fact is placed alongside the potential of most contemporary governments to influence the pace and direction of social and economic change, this essay's central concern fulfills LaPalombara's criterion.

How China Promotes Its Military Officers: Interactions between Formal and Informal Institutions

2018 ◽  
Vol 234 ◽  
pp. 399-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peng Wang ◽  
Jingyi Wang
Keyword(s):  
Professional Competence ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Informal Institution ◽  
Personal Connections ◽  
Political Integrity ◽  
System Information ◽  
Candidate Performance ◽  
Depth Interviews ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractHow does China promote its military officers? We present a qualitative study on the determinants (connections versus performance) of the selection of military officers. Drawing on 48 in-depth interviews with serving and retired military officers, we argue that the inability of the rule-based personnel system to assess candidate performance (professional competence and political integrity) leads to the rise of the informal institution ofguanxi– a Chinese version of personal connections – in promoting military officers.Guanxiboth substitutes for and competes with the formal personnel system. Information received throughguanxinetworks is used by superiors to evaluate subordinates’ professional competence and political integrity.Guanxiis also used by corrupt officers to distort democratic procedures and facilitate the buying and selling of military positions. We conclude that the co-existence of a rule-based personnel system andguanxileads superiors to promote competent candidates within theirguanxinetworks.

British Military Theatre in New York in 1780–81

1982 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-162
Author(s):  
Jared A. Brown
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
American Military ◽  
Dormant State ◽  
Continental Congress ◽  
British Military

From October 20, 1774, when the Continental Congress passed a resolution outlawing theatrical activities in America, until the formation of the Lindsay-Wall troupe that began performing illegally in Maryland in 1781 and, under the management of Dennis Ryan, shifted its base of operations to New York in 1783, the theatre in America was in a near-dormant state. The only significant exceptions to this condition were the productions of the occupying British military in various American localities, and a few productions by American military officers given in response.

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