A stackelberg model for Server-Proxies-Users systems

2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 185-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hai-Shan Han ◽  
Zun-Quan Xia
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Model

scholarly journals Strategies for Capital Constrained Timber and Carbon Sink Supply Chain under the Cap-and-Trade Scheme

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4380
Author(s):  
Xinyue Yang ◽  
Ye Song ◽  
Mingjun Sun ◽  
Hongjun Peng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Sink ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Emission Rights ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Reduction Costs

We consider a capital constrained timber and carbon sink supply chain under the cap-and-trade scheme, where the forest company produces timber and carbon sink. We consider two subsidy modes: financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests and financing subsidy to the manufacturer’s emission reductions. We apply a Stackelberg model and mainly consider the impact of subsidies on the profits and the strategies of the supply chain members. The results show that when the government gives a financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests, it is conducive to promoting the expansion of carbon sink forests, as well as the enhancement of the forest company’s profit. However, a larger supply of carbon sinks generates a lower price, which leads to the manufacturer reducing the technical emission reduction level and purchasing more carbon emission rights instead. On the other hand, when the manufacturer receives a financing subsidy for the technical emission reduction costs, its production becomes cleaner than before, and the profits of the forest company and the manufacturer increase.

scholarly journals LICENSING CONTRACT IN A STACKELBERG MODEL*

2005 ◽  
Vol 73 (5) ◽  
pp. 582-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
LUIGI FILIPPINI
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Model

scholarly journals Welfare-Improving Effect of a Small Number of Followers in a Stackelberg Model

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroaki Ino ◽  
Toshihiro Matsumura
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Number ◽  
Welfare Effect ◽  
Cournot Model ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Number Of Firms

AbstractWe investigate a Stackelberg oligopoly model in which m leaders and $N - m$ followers compete. We find an important welfare effect that relates to anti-monopoly policies when we move from the Cournot model ($m = N$) to the Stackelberg model: Exchanging a small number of Cournot firms for Stackelberg followers always improves welfare under moderate conditions. This contrasts with the welfare effect that can reduce welfare when a small number of Cournot firms are exchanged for Stackelberg leaders. The key result behind this asymmetry is the contrasting limit results in the cases where m converges to N and m converges to 0. We also discuss the optimal number of leaders and the integer constraint for the number of firms.

A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis

1984 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 390-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanif D. Sherali
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Model

scholarly journals Endogenous Stackelberg leadership within a team. The coalition effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-79
Author(s):  
E.M. Skarzhinskaya ◽  
◽  
V.I. Tsurikov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretical Investigation ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Stackelberg Strategy ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Leadership Formation ◽  
Stackelberg Leadership ◽  
Diminishing Returns ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Specific Individual

The article engages in a theoretical investigation of the possibility of implementing the Stackelberg strategy within a team. It is assumed that the team gene-rates aggregate income that increases as the efforts invested by each agent intensify, subject to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each agent in a team is to maximize his own individual gain. In order to achieve an outcome that is Paretopreferable over Nash equilibrium, two approaches may be used: identifying a leader or forming a smaller group (coalition) within the team whose members, in pursuance of increased individual gains, choose the route that maximizes coalition gains. It is shown that the advent of a coalition in a team results in Pareto-improvement in a simultaneous game. We analyse the possibility of endogenous leadership forming according to the Stackelberg model when using the mechanism of timing decisions. It is established that under autonomy of all team members, leadership formation can only be confidently predicted in specific individual cases. In a significantly more general case, all of the prerequisites for the formation of leadership are created by the presence of a single coalition interested in implementing the Stackelberg strategy.

scholarly journals Simulation model for the coordination of environmental and economic interests

2022 ◽  
Vol 962 (1) ◽  
pp. 012011
Author(s):  
I P Glazyrina ◽  
S M Lavlinskii
Keyword(s):  
Mineral Resource ◽  
Simulation Model ◽  
Mining Industry ◽  
Target Function ◽  
The State ◽  
Operating Costs ◽  
Financial Resources ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Resource Sector

Abstract The purpose of the work is to develop a simulation model that could be used as the basis for a practical methodology for forming a ‘green’ program for the development of mining industry. For this purpose, the Stackelberg model and the apparatus of two-level mathematical programming are used and thus take into account the peculiarities of the hierarchy of interaction between the state and the private investor in the mineral resource sector. The obtained data make it possible to determine the quantitative parameters of expenditures of public financial resources, at which the target function of the state reaches its maximum. It is concluded that the strategy of choosing higher operating costs and, as a result, lower postproject environmental losses is preferable for both the state and the investor.

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