Belief formation by constructing models

1996 ◽  
pp. 171-186
Author(s):  
J. Paris ◽  
A. Vencovská
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation

Consciousness, Metacognition, & Perceptual Reality Monitoring

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwan Lau
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Reality Monitoring ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Brute Fact ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Subjective Level

I introduce an empirically-grounded version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception. Traditionally, theories of consciousness either focus on the global availability of conscious information, or take conscious phenomenology as a brute fact due to some biological or basic representational properties. Here I argue instead that the key to characterizing the consciousness lies in its connections to belief formation and epistemic justification on a subjective level.

The Dynamics of Belief Formation and Price Momentum

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Dontoh ◽  
Joshua Ronen ◽  
Bharat Sarath
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
Price Momentum

Why so Negative? Belief Formation in Boom and Bust Markets

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Kieren ◽  
Jan Müller-Dethard ◽  
Martin Weber
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
Negative Belief ◽  
Boom And Bust

Core Criteria I

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Epistemic Criteria ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.

Skepticism and Credulity: A Model and Applications to Political Spin, Belief Formation, and Decision Weights

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
James David Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Stylized Facts ◽  
Psychological Mechanism ◽  
Decision Weights

Abstract In this paper I model a decision maker who forms beliefs and opinions using a dialectic heuristic that depends on their degree of skepticism or credulity. In an application to political spin, two competing parties choose how to frame commonly observed evidence. If the receiver is sufficiently credulous, equilibrium spin is maximally extreme and generates short, superficial news cycles. When receivers vary in their skepticism, there is partisan sorting by skepticism parameter: the more credulous group systematically favors one party and displays hostility to evidence and a media they see as biased. In behavioral applications in which the frames arise from the decision maker’s internal deliberation, a decision maker with the same credulous nature would display known behavioral anomalies in forming beliefs and forming decision weights from stated probabilities. The dialectic model therefore captures a simple psychological mechanism and matches closely some stylized facts across these three disparate applications.

scholarly journals Emotional Tagging and Belief Formation: The Long-Lasting Effects of Experiencing Communism

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 567-571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Laudenbach ◽  
Ulrike Malmendier ◽  
Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi
Keyword(s):  
Formation Process ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Underlying Mechanism ◽  
Memory Formation ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Long Term Effects ◽  
Long Run

Growing evidence in macrofinance suggests long-lasting effects of personally experienced outcomes on beliefs. To understand the underlying mechanism we turn to the neurological foundations of memory formation. We propose that emotional tagging plays a crucial role in assigning weights in the belief formation process. We use exposure to communism as well as variation in its emotional tagging to predict long-run beliefs. We show that living under communism has long-term effects on beliefs about its benefits. In addition, positive and negative emotional tags strongly affect the (pro- or anti-communist) direction of beliefs, providing anchors to memory that seem hard to reverse.

scholarly journals Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben M Tappin ◽  
Stephen Gadsby
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Inference ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Hierarchical Bayesian Models ◽  
Common Occurrence ◽  
Substantial Evidence ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Bayesian Brain ◽  
Key Points ◽  
Study Designs

A recent critique of hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion argues that, contrary to a key assumption of these models, belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) mind is manifestly non-Bayesian. Here we provide a deeper examination of the empirical evidence underlying this critique. We argue that this evidence does not convincingly refute the assumption that belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. Our argument rests on two key points. First, evidence that purports to reveal the most damning violation of Bayesian updating in human belief formation is counterweighted by substantial evidence that indicates such violations are the rare exception—not a common occurrence. Second, the remaining evidence does not demonstrate convincing violations of Bayesian inference in human belief updating; primarily because this evidence derives from study designs that produce results that are not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles.

scholarly journals A Guideline and Cautionary Note: How to Use the Belief Update Task Correctly

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tali Sharot ◽  
Neil Garrett
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Cautionary Note ◽  
Helpful Tool ◽  
Wide Range

In 2011 we published a paper showing that people update their beliefs to a greater extent in response to good news (e.g., learning that the likelihood of robbery is lower than expected) than bad news (e.g., learning it is lower than expected) (Sharot et al., 2011). This phenomenon, which can lead to increased optimistic beliefs, is absent in depression. Since then, our belief update task has been used by many others to test a wide range of questions related to belief formation and optimism. Most of these studies are rigorous and well conducted. However, a small number of researchers have used the task inappropriately, inserting new confounds and failing to control for other potential ones. This has resulted in the report of false findings which have muddied the literature and caused confusion. Given these incidents and the enthusiasm for using the task across different disciplines, the need for guidelines on how to use the belief update task correctly has become apparent. The belief update task can be a helpful tool in studying beliefs in domains ranging from climate change to health, but like any other task it must be used properly if valid conclusions are to be reached. We hope this guide will be helpful for scientists who would like to use the belief update task, as well as readers, reviewers and editors who are required to evaluate studies using this task.

scholarly journals La irracionalidad y el auto-engaño

1983 ◽  
Vol 15 (45) ◽  
pp. 25-50
Author(s):  
Silvia Bello
Keyword(s):  
Irrational Beliefs ◽  
Irrational Belief ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Dividing Line

In this paper I have tried to present what seem to me the main problems to be confronted in explaining the formation of motivated, irrational beliefs, and the most important recent contributions to a solution of such problems. First, I make some classifications and present some important features of the different cases of motivated irrational belief formation. After expounding the problems and the central points that stand in need of explanation, I consider Davidson's view of the conflict between our standard way of describing and explaining mental phenomena and the idea that such phenomena can be irrational. Then, I present Davidson's suggestion to reconcile an explanation that shows a belief to be irrational with the element of rationality inherent in the description of any propositional attitude. I consider Davidson's and Pears' criteria for drawing a dividing line between mental systems, and argue that Davidson's criterion seems too wide and should be restricted to cases where motivation is involved. I also argue that it is the weaker version of Pears' criterion that must be defended and confronted with Davidson's. [S.B.]

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