scholarly journals Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Chen ◽  
YingHua He

AbstractWhen participating in school choice, students may incur information acquisition costs to learn about school quality. This paper investigates how two popular school choice mechanisms, the (Boston) Immediate Acceptance and the Deferred Acceptance, incentivize students’ information acquisition. Specifically, we show that only the Immediate Acceptance mechanism incentivizes students to learn their own cardinal and others’ preferences. We demonstrate that information acquisition costs affect the efficiency of each mechanism and the welfare ranking between the two. In the case where everyone has the same ordinal preferences, we evaluate the welfare effects of various information provision policies by education authorities.

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 399-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu ◽  
Yeon-Koo Che ◽  
Yosuke Yasuda

Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the DA in ex ante welfare, that it may not harm but rather benefit participants who may not strategize well, and that, in the presence of school priorities, the Boston mechanism also tends to facilitate greater access than the DA to good schools for those lacking priorities at those schools. (JEL D82, I21, I28)


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Calsamiglia ◽  
Francisco Martínez-Mora ◽  
Antonio Miralles

Abstract We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the latter renders the best public schools more elitist. The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is resilient to cardinal segregation.


Author(s):  
Jacob D Leshno ◽  
Irene Lo

Abstract This paper develops a tractable theoretical framework for the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism for school choice that allows quantifying welfare and optimizing policy decisions. We compute welfare for TTC and Deferred Acceptance (DA) under different priority structures, and find that the choice of priorities can have larger welfare implications than the choice of mechanism. We solve for the welfare-maximizing distributions of school quality for parametrized economies, and find that optimal investment decisions can be very different under TTC and DA. Our framework relies on a novel characterization of the TTC assignment in terms of a cutoff for each pair of schools. These cutoffs parallel prices in competitive equilibrium, with students’ priorities serving the role of endowments. We show that these cutoffs can be computed directly from the distribution of preferences and priorities in a continuum model, and derive closed-form solutions and comparative statics for parameterized settings. The TTC cutoffs clarify the role of priorities in determining the TTC assignment, but also demonstrate that TTC is more complicated than DA.


2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (12) ◽  
pp. 3635-3689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu ◽  
Nikhil Agarwal ◽  
Parag A. Pathak

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement. (JEL C78, D82, I21, I28)


2021 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 554-559
Author(s):  
Zach Y. Brown ◽  
Jihye Jeon

In markets with complicated products such as insurance, why do firms offer many products even when consumers appear to receive little benefit? We show that when consumers face information acquisition costs, firms may have an incentive to introduce many undifferentiated products. This allows firms to gain market share and increase markups. We document initial evidence consistent with the model using data from Medicare prescription drug insurance. Insurers that offer more duplicate or similar plans have higher-cost plans. These results suggest a role for policymakers to restrict product proliferation in markets with complicated products.


2018 ◽  
Vol 120 (5) ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Jack Schneider ◽  
Rebecca Jacobsen ◽  
Rachel S. White ◽  
Hunter Gehlbach

Purpose/Objective Under the reauthorized Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), states and districts retain greater discretion over the measures included in school quality report cards. Moreover, ESSA now requires states to expand their measurement efforts to address factors like school climate. This shift toward more comprehensive measures of school quality provides an opportunity for states and districts to think intentionally about a basic question: What specific information should schools collect and report to their communities? Setting This study took place in the community surrounding a small, highly diverse urban school district. Population/Participants Forty-five local residents representing a range of demographic backgrounds participated in a modified deliberative poll with an experimental treatment. Intervention/Program/Practice We randomly assigned participants into two conditions. In the first, participants accessed the state web portal, which houses all publicly available educational data about districts in the state. In the second condition, participants accessed a customized portal that contained a wider array of school performance information collected by the research team. Research Design This mixed-methods study used a modified deliberative polling format, in conjunction with a randomized controlled field trial. Data Collection and Analysis Participants in both conditions completed a battery of survey items that were analyzed through multiple regressions. Findings/Results When users of a more holistic and comprehensive data system evaluated unfamiliar schools, they not only valued the information more highly but also expressed more confidence in the quality of the schools. Conclusions/Recommendations We doubt that more comprehensive information will inevitably lead to higher ratings of school quality. However, it appears—both from prior research, from theory, and from this project—that deeper familiarity with a school often fosters more positive perceptions. This may be because those unfamiliar with particular schools rely on a limited range of data, which fail to adequately capture the full range of performance variables, particularly in the case of urban schools. We encourage future exploration of this topic, which may have implications for school choice, parental engagement, and accountability policy.


Author(s):  
Haifeng (Charlie) Zhang ◽  
Lorin W. Anderson ◽  
David J. Cowen ◽  
Lisle S. Mitchell

Despite years of research and debate, household choice between public and private schools is not well understood. This article investigates factors associated with parental choice between public and private schools using unique census-based school enrollment data for school districts in South Carolina and for neighborhoods in the Columbia Metropolitan Area. This study extends the existing literature by examining patterns of public-private school choice for whites and blacks separately in order to control racial disparities in school choice. Results of multiple regression analyses for the whole population and subdivided racial groups generally support the assumption that public-private school enrollment rate is subject to socioeconomic status, racial proportion, and public school quality. Findings of this study not only suggests the reconciliation of the market-based theory and the racial preference theory, but also provides insights into education policies in terms of stemming white enrollment losses and fostering public school education in the United States.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haifeng (Charlie) Zhang ◽  
Lorin W. Anderson ◽  
David J. Cowen ◽  
Lisle S. Mitchell

Despite years of research and debate, household choice between public and private schools is not well understood. This article investigates factors associated with parental choice between public and private schools using unique census-based school enrollment data for school districts in South Carolina and for neighborhoods in the Columbia Metropolitan Area. This study extends the existing literature by examining patterns of public-private school choice for whites and blacks separately in order to control racial disparities in school choice. Results of multiple regression analyses for the whole population and subdivided racial groups generally support the assumption that public-private school enrollment rate is subject to socioeconomic status, racial proportion, and public school quality. Findings of this study not only suggests the reconciliation of the market-based theory and the racial preference theory, but also provides insights into education policies in terms of stemming white enrollment losses and fostering public school education in the United States.


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