Retrenchment by a Thousand Cuts

Chapter 6 explores a case of clean energy retrenchment by a thousand cuts. Kansas first implemented a clean energy law in 2009. The state seemed poised to withstand retrenchment of the renewable portfolio standard due to strong growth in the wind energy industry. However, opponents returned to attack the law year after year and eventually wore down the advocates. Unable to directly overturn the law through the legislature, opponents—including Koch Industries and their allied Americans for Prosperity—worked to weaken support for the policy. They backed politicians in primaries and appointments that were anti-renewables, and they funded astroturfing campaigns. Advocates responded by organizing the public, but they were less politically influential— particularly after the Republican Party made supporting the clean energy rollback a requirement for election funding. Despite the established wind energy industry backing pro-renewable Republicans in primaries, the fossil fuel opponents were eventually able to retrench the law.

A Direct Line to Legislators and Regulators

Chapter 5 concludes the Texas story. Over time, fossil fuel companies and industrial energy consumers came to oppose Texas’s renewable energy policies. Given their political influence over both politicians and regulators, these opponents were able to block reforms from passing in the legislature or being implemented by regulatory bodies. These opponents were successful because they had a direct link to the legislature, with a fossil fuel industry lobbyist reportedly working from a desk in a key senator’s office. This chapter shows how opponents can also use the fog of enactment strategically to resist policy during implementation and how opponent interest groups with sufficient influence can directly undermine policy, even if advocates have previously succeeded in winning policy conflict and initiating positive feedback.

Policy Feedback Takes Hold

Chapter 4 examines one of the earliest renewable energy laws in the United States: Texas’s renewable portfolio standard, enacted under then-governor George W. Bush in 1999. This chapter provides the early history of clean energy leadership in Texas, when wind energy grew rapidly. Relying on original archival research and primary interviews, it explains why Texas acted on clean energy before California and other more progressive states. It shows how savvy advocates used public opinion to drive policy change during windows of opportunity. More broadly, this case reveals a classic positive feedback dynamic: a growing wind energy sector increased its influence over the legislature and successfully expanded clean energy policy. Here, advocates relied on the fog of enactment to get a clean energy target and an ambitious infrastructure spending bill passed in the legislature. They also worked through the public to convince legislators that clean energy leadership was important for Texans.

An Institutional History of Electricity Politics and Climate Inaction

Chapter 3, examines the historical roots of the current conflict over the electricity system. Electric utilities have long held a privileged position in energy policy, controlling state regulatory bodies for most of the twentieth century. Early regulatory decisions surrounding electricity ownership and pricing structures paved the way for contemporary conflicts over renewable energy policies. Notably, utilities used their power to shape policy and technology to their advantage in three ways: they resisted innovation, they shaped the rate structure in ways that exacerbated environmental harms, and they denied the climate crisis and other environmental problems. Taking a historical view, we can see that the electricity system developed the way it did—with large, fossil fuel plants and expensive, privately owned, and poorly maintained electric grids—because it served the interests of these powerful private utilities. This chapter shows how utilities’ delay and denial have undermined progress on climate change.

Introduction

Chapter 1 introduces the book, providing the framework for the theory. It explains policy feedback theory and its limitations. Next, it provides an overview of the book’s theory, which places interest group combat at the center of policy change. It unpacks the theory of the fog of enactment and explains why implementation matters for policy feedback. It then explains how retrenchment can occur both directly—through legislators and regulators—and indirectly—through the parties, the public, and the courts. The chapter also introduces the main policies examined in the book: renewable portfolio standards and net metering laws. It explains why the US electricity system is not building renewable energy fast enough and why alternative technologies face significant barriers to adoption. It concludes with an overview of the entire book, with chapter-by-chapter summaries.

When the Fog of Enactment Lifts

Chapter 8 examines how networked interest groups can learn about policies in other states and use this information to swiftly drive retrenchment. Ohio was one of the last states to enact a renewable energy target. For this reason, electric utilities understood more quickly that the policy would undermine the financial viability of their existing fossil fuel assets. The American Legislative Exchange Council, which has prominent electric utility and fossil fuel companies as members, played an important role in Ohio, putting retrenching clean energy “mandates” on the agenda. In 2019, the utilities finally succeeded in repealing the state’s efficiency and renewable standards, replacing them with a bailout for coal plants. In this case, one can see how policy feedback can fail when opponents networked across the states learn from earlier policies’ implementation and weaken the policy before it is able to generate lock-in.

When New Policies Fail to Create a New Politics

Chapter 2 provides the book’s theory and core argument. The chapter reviews models of policy change that emerged from debates over social policy in advanced democracies at the national level. It defines the book’s key concepts, including interest groups, policy expansion, and retrenchment. It then develops a new model of policy change focused on the fog of enactment and organized combat, outlining both direct and indirect pathways that advocate and opponent interest groups exploit to influence policy post-implementation. Drawing on original survey data from US state legislators and their staff, it provides additional evidence for the book’s theory, supplementing the historical institutionalist case studies in the rest of the book.

Conclusion

Chapter 9, the book’s conclusion, charts a path forward both theoretically and empirically. It shows how using a more complex model of policy feedback enables a better understanding of the conditions under which retrenchment is likely. This chapter makes the case that understanding organized combat between policy advocates and opponents is crucial to explaining policy change. It also shows how advocates and states can get climate policy back on track, reviewing more hopeful recent developments in state clean energy laws. For too long, a small set of interest groups has captured the regulatory process—the very mechanism that is supposed to serve and protect the public interest. They have used their power to imperil the health and well-being of all people on the planet. To address climate change, policy advocates need to win policy conflicts more often. Clean energy advocates must learn from their opponents’ success in retrenching policy.

Regulatory Capture Thwarts Feedback

Chapter 7 examines net metering. These laws have been crucial across the country for the development of the solar market. They set the rules for how to compensate individuals and organizations supplying energy to the grid, typically excess solar energy. After passing a series of clean energy targets in the 1990s and early 2000s that the state never implemented, Arizona finally began to get serious about renewable energy in 2008, passing a net metering law that year. However, the state regulator made a series of decisions from 2013 to 2017 that weakened and ultimately retrenched the state’s solar policies. Here, regulatory capture was key to electric utilities’ success in controlling the policymaking process. One utility, Arizona Public Service, spent over $55 million across several elections to block clean energy policies and elect anti-solar politicians. This chapter shows how opponent interest groups can directly drive retrenchment through regulatory capture.