The contribution of shadow banking risk spillover to the commercial banks in China: based on the DCC-BEKK-MVGARCH-Time-Varying CoVaR Model

Author(s):  
Chen Zhu
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Mehmood Raza Shah ◽  
Qiang Fu ◽  
Ghulam Abbas ◽  
Muhammad Usman Arshad

PurposeWealth Management Products (WMPs) are the largest and most crucial component of China's Shadow banking, which are off the balance sheet and considered as a substitute for deposits. Commercial banks in China are involved in the issuance of WMPs mainly to; evade the regulatory restrictions, move non-performing loans away from the balance sheet, chase the profits and take advantage of yield spread (the difference between WMPs yield and deposit rate).Design/methodology/approachIn this study, the authors investigate what bank related characteristics and needs; influenced and prompted the issuance of WMPs. By using a quarterly panel data from 2010 to 2019, this study performed the fixed effects approach favored by the Hausman specification test, and a feasible generalized least square (FGLS) estimation method is employed to deal with any issues of heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation.FindingsThis study found that there is a positive and significant association between the non-performing loan ratio and the issuance of WMPs. Moreover, profitability and spread were found to play an essential role in the issuance of WMPs. The findings of this study suggest that WMPs are issued for multi-purpose, and off the balance sheet status of these products makes them very lucrative for regulated Chinese commercial banks.Research limitations/implicationsNon-guaranteed WMPs are considered as an item of shadow banking in China, as banks do not consolidate this type of WMPs into their balance sheet; due to that reason, there is no individual bank data available for the amount of WMPs. The authors use the number of WMPs issued by banks as a proxy for the bank's exposure to the WMPs business.Practical implicationsFrom a regulatory perspective, this study helps regulators to understand the risk associated with the issuance of WMPs; by providing empirical evidence that Chinese banks issue WMPs to hide the actual risk of non-performing loans, and this practice could mislead the regulators to evaluate the bank credit risk and loan quality. This study also identifies that Chinese banks issue WMPs for multi-purpose; this can help potential investors to understand the dynamics of WMPs issuance.Originality/valueThis research is innovative in its orientation because it is designed to investigate the less explored wealth management products (WMPs) issued by Chinese banks. This study's content includes not only innovation but also contributes to the existing literature on the shadow banking sector in terms of regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, the inclusion of FGLS estimation models, ten years of quarterly data, and the top 30 Chinese banks (covers 70% of the total Chinese commercial banking system's assets) make this research more comprehensive and significant.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (8) ◽  
pp. 1694-1709
Author(s):  
Vladimir K. BURLACHKOV

Subject. The article addresses the non-banking financial intermediation (shadow banking system) as it is successfully expanding nowadays both in developed countries and emerging economics. Objectives. The study aims at conducting a comprehensive analysis of the specifics of non-banking financial intermediation, revealing its impact on economic agents’ activities, causes and consequences, and elaborating the methodological framework for effectiveness of modern monetary policy. Methods. I employ methods of scientific abstraction, induction, deduction, synthesis, and comparative analysis. Results. In the modern national economy, along with the money, created by the central bank and commercial banks, there are highly liquid financial instruments called shadow money. The scope of its application is shadow banking (financial intermediation) outside the banking system. The use of shadow money is caused by high demand for credit resources. Conclusions. The high activity of shadow banking and increased turnover of shadow money resulted from a transfer to Basel standards of banking regulation in the 1990s, which affected the lending activity of commercial banks. Under these conditions, the demand for loans provided by non-bank credit and financial institutions increased. The market of non-bank credit products was formed. However, the process of lending in the shadow banking is associated with high risks and non-stability of shadow money, widely used in this sphere.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 45-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher L. Culp ◽  
Andrea M. P. Neves

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050019
Author(s):  
GIANG THI HUONG VUONG ◽  
MANH HUU NGUYEN

Our paper investigates the influence of state ownership on the linkage between revenue diversification and risk of Vietnam domestic commercial banks in the period 2009–2018. By using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation for a dynamic panel model, the empirical results indicate that Vietnamese domestic commercial banks with higher state equity are promoted to take more risks in the revenue diversification process. Our findings are robustly checked by a variety of measures of banking risk, income diversification, and state equity. Empirical results from our dynamic model are not only accordant with the previous findings of Batten and Vo [(2016). Bank risk shifting and diversification in an emerging market. Risk Management, 18(4), 217–235] estimated by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression on the positive relationship between banking risk and income diversification in Vietnamese domestic commercial banks but also provide new evidence on the tradeoff relationship between risk-return in the operating strategy of Vietnamese state-owned banks in the post-financial crisis. This paper proposes a framework for evaluating the nexus between revenue diversification and risk from the state ownership aspect in other frontier markets.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sijia Wen ◽  
Jishan Ma ◽  
Yawen Pan ◽  
Yuan Qi ◽  
Ruizhi Xiong

In this article, according to search for the definition of shadow banking, we can make sure the business kinds of “shadow banking”, discuss the influence of business in “shadow banking” on credit risk of commercial banks, and study the elements which may increase the credit risk of commercial banks by using the semi-annual panel data during 2011-2016 of 10 listed banks. Then we can come to some primary conclusions: The credit risk of commercial banks is related to the shadow banking business. All the survival scale increment of financial products increasing, the size of entrusted loans increasing in increment, and the increasing in the size of guarantee commitments will increase the credit risk of commercial banks. There is no obvious relationship between trust loan business and bank credit risk. Our study is of great significance for the government to supervise the off-balance-sheet business of commercial banks. At the same time, it also fills the vacancy of domestic commercial banking “shadow banking” business empirical research.


2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 1470-1497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Jeanne ◽  
Anton Korinek

Abstract How should macroprudential policy be designed when policymakers also have access to liquidity provision tools to manage crises? We show in a tractable model of systemic banking risk that there are three factors at play: first, ex post liquidity provision mitigates financial crises, and this reduces the need for macroprudential policy. In the extreme, if liquidity provision is untargeted and costless or if it completely forestalls crises by credible out-of-equilibrium lending-of-last-resort, there is no role left for macroprudential regulation. Second, however, macroprudential policy needs to consider the ex ante incentive effects of targeted liquidity provision. Third, if shadow banking reduces the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments, it is optimal to commit to less generous liquidity provision as a second-best substitute for macroprudential policy.


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