Tariff elimination versus tax avoidance: free trade agreements and transfer pricing
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AbstractWe explore the new roles of rules of origin (ROO) when multinational enterprises (MNEs) manipulate their transfer prices to avoid a high corporate tax. The ROO under a free trade agreement (FTA) require exporters to identify the origin of exports to be eligible for a preferential tariff rate. We find that a value-added criterion of ROO restricts abusive transfer pricing by MNEs. Interestingly, an FTA with ROO can induce MNEs to shift profits from a low- to high-tax country. Because the ROO augment tax revenues inside FTA countries, they can transform a welfare-reducing FTA into a welfare-improving one.
2018 ◽
Vol 108
(8)
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pp. 2335-2365
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2008 ◽
Vol 62
(3)
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pp. 507-530
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2021 ◽
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