Unification of Oligopolistic Markets for a Homogeneous Good in the Presence of an Antitrust Commission

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raúl Bajo-Buenestado ◽  
Dodge Cahan
2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis C. Corchón ◽  
Félix Marcos

We consider price regulation in oligopolistic markets when firms are quantity setters. We consider a market for a homogeneous good with a demand function of special form (-linearity), constant returns to scale, and identical firms. Marginal costs can take two values only: low or high. Values of all parameters except the marginal costs are known to the regulator. Assuming that the regulator is risk-neutral and maximizes expected social welfare (defined as the sum of consumer surplus and profits), we characterize the optimal policy and show how this policy depends on the basic parameters of demand and costs.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Maier-Rigaud ◽  
Ulrich Schwalbe ◽  
Felix Forster

AbstractThis article focusses on the non-coordinated effects of minority shareholdings in oligopolistic markets. It is demonstrated that minority shareholdings even when they fall below the usual thresholds can lead to a significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) on a purely non-coordinated basis. This is particularly likely in a market with differentiated products, when a firm partially acquires shareholdings in its closest competitor and when the next best alternative products are only weak substitutes.


Author(s):  
Jayaram (Jay) K. Sankaran ◽  
Danny Samson ◽  
Terence (Terry) H. Wilson

1989 ◽  
Vol 149 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Veprek ◽  
M. Heintze ◽  
R. Bayer ◽  
N. Jurčik-Rajman

ABSTRACTWe present new results of kinetic studies of the deposition of high quality a-Si:H which strongly support the reaction mechanism suggested in our earlier papers: 1. SiH4 → SiH2; 2. SiH2 + SiS4 → Si2H6 (SiH2 + Si2H6 → Si3H6); 3. Si2H6 → 2a-Si:H (Si3H8 → 3a-Si:H). The “SiH3 mechanism”, as promoted by several workers, is in contradiction with these experimental facts.The di- and trisilane, which have a much higher reactive sticking coefficient than monosilane, play the role of reactive intermediates which facilitate the heterogeneous decomposition of silicon carrying species at the surface of the growing film. The values of the reactive sticking coefficient of Si2H6 and Si3H8 depend on the surface coverage by chemisorbed hydrogen; they increase with decreasing surface coverage. Under the conditions of the growth of high quality a-Si:H films the reactive sticking coefficient of disilane amounts to 10−4 to 10−2 which is in a good agreement with recent data of other authors.The rate determining step of the growth of high quality a-Si:H films is the desorption of hydrogen from the surface of the growing film. This can be strongly enhanced by ion bombardment at impact energy of <100 eV. In this way, homogeneous, good quality films were deposited at rates up to 1800 Angströms/min, and there is a well justified hope that this rate can be further increased.


2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-63
Author(s):  
Jose Mendez-Naya ◽  
Tomas Gomez-Arias

The effects of production cost asymmetries on the sustainability of customs unions among producing countries are investigated using a homogeneous-product Cournot oligopoly model, in which three producing countries subsidize exports of an homogeneous good to a consumer country that imposes a tariff on imports. It is found that the only sustainable customs union is the one formed by the three-member customs union. However, although the said customs union will be in equilibrium if utility transferences among member countries are allowed, it could not be in equilibrium if such transferences are not allowed.


Author(s):  
Irene Samanta

One of the main characteristics of the global economy is the creation of oligopolistic markets. The decisions of those industries are characterised by interactivity. The risk arising from the domination of the power of oligopoly is the previous stage of manipulation of the market. This situation is against the concept of competitiveness and causes an entirely new situation to the customer's disadvantage. Mobile industry which is a typical oligopolistic market in Europe leads us to examine this specific market in Greece. Therefore, the present study examines the factors that influence the relationship marketing strategy of the industry. The research was conducted using a sample of 806 users of mobile phones. The method used for the quantitative analysis is chi-square test, discriminant analysis, which is based on Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA). The study has indicated that intense competition between mobile phone firms in Greece leads to the manipulation of consumers' behaviour. Also, findings of the current research demonstrate that firms create a unified policy in order to restrain their customers' consuming behaviour to a state of inertia, the customer passively re-buys the same service provider without much thought.


Author(s):  
Haiying Qiao ◽  
Hui Jie ◽  
Dong-Qing Yao

In this chapter we present a generic electronic market platform that is designed to run different kinds of auctions and exchanges. Researchers can use the platform to implement different electronic market mechanisms, simulate the market behavior of their interests, and experiment with it. A generic OR/XOR bidding language that can express different OR/XOR combinations is implemented for Web interfaces. Different auctions including combinatorial auctions, multiple-round reverse auctions and multiple homogeneous good auctions have been built and run successfully on the platform.


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