Customs Unions among Producing Countries with Different Costs

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-63
Author(s):  
Jose Mendez-Naya ◽  
Tomas Gomez-Arias
Keyword(s):  
Production Cost ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Customs Union ◽  
Customs Unions ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Consumer Country ◽  
Homogeneous Product ◽  
The One ◽  
Homogeneous Good

The effects of production cost asymmetries on the sustainability of customs unions among producing countries are investigated using a homogeneous-product Cournot oligopoly model, in which three producing countries subsidize exports of an homogeneous good to a consumer country that imposes a tariff on imports. It is found that the only sustainable customs union is the one formed by the three-member customs union. However, although the said customs union will be in equilibrium if utility transferences among member countries are allowed, it could not be in equilibrium if such transferences are not allowed.

Contextual History, Practitioner History, and Classic Status: Reading Jacob Viner’s The Customs Union Issue

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 491-515
Author(s):  
Paul Oslington
Keyword(s):  
Customs Union ◽  
Customs Unions ◽  
Preferential Trading ◽  
Preferential Trading Arrangements ◽  
The One

Jacob Viner’s The Customs Union Issue, published in 1950, is the one undeniable classic in its field. The first part of this paper traces the development of Viner’s thinking on preferential trading arrangements, places his work in context, and clarifies his position on disputed issues. The second part considers the reception of his work, from the enthusiastic early reviewers to the international economists who further developed the theory of customs unions, to contemporary practitioners. While practitioners consistently misread Viner, these misreadings were scientifically fruitful, and there are reasons why fruitful science might flow from poor contextual history. Among contemporary international economists, the book has become a classic, marking off and justifying a field of enquiry.

scholarly journals An evolutionary Cournot oligopoly model with imitators and perfect foresight best responders

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 458-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Cerboni Baiardi ◽  
Ahmad K. Naimzada
Keyword(s):  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Perfect Foresight ◽  
Oligopoly Model

UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EXTENDED COURNOT OLIGOPOLY MODEL

1989 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 490-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLAUDE d'ASPREMONT ◽  
RODOLPHE DOS SANTOS FERREIRA ◽  
LOUIS-ANDRÉ GÉRARD-VARET
Keyword(s):  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Oligopoly Model

International Trade Organization (Interim Commission)

1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 542-543
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
South African ◽  
Textile Industry ◽  
Customs Union ◽  
Trade Restrictions ◽  
Excise Tax ◽  
Customs Unions ◽  
Import Restrictions ◽  
International Trade Organization ◽  
Emergency Measures

On April 8, 1949, more than 500 delegates and assistants from thirty-four countries met in Annecy, France, for trade meetings convened to discuss tariff barriers and other problems of international trade. Twenty-three nations already adhered to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and eleven others wished to join it. The first of such meetings had been held in Geneva in 1947. The first meeting of the series held in Annecy concluded on April 22 after adopting a declaration defining the position of Palestine in relation to the agreement and adopting a decision to seek emergency measures to resolve the crisis of the Cuban textile industry. The meeting also studied charges of trade restrictions, plans for customs unions, problems of new tariff negotiations, African import restrictions that had introduced discriminations against imports from dollar and other hard currency areas, the dispute between India and Pakistan over rebate of the excise tax on exports to Pakistan from India, the South African–Southern Rhodesian customs union and modifications of various countries' tariff schedules introduced since 1947.

scholarly journals Differences in fishery and aquaculture products, their production and sale technical regulations in Eurasian Economic Union and legislation and practice of the European Union

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mihails Silovs ◽  
◽  
Olga Dmitrijeva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Customs Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Customs Unions ◽  
Product Categories ◽  
Eurasian Economic Union ◽  
Aquaculture Products ◽  
Economic Union ◽  
Food Legislation ◽  
Technical Regulations

The mandatory requirements for the fishery and aquaculture products, their production and sale in force in the territory of the Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Union (CU EAEU) arise from the regulatory and legal acts of the Eurasian Economic Union and its predecessor - the Customs Union - and apply in a package approach similar to the law of the European Union pertaining to the food safety area. The requirements of the EAEU technical regulations have been analysed taking into account that European exporting enterprises are first of all obliged to comply with the requirements of the listed EU regulatory and legal acts applicable to their production process and products. The aim of this paper was to run a comparative analysis on the mandatory requirements of the food legislation of the European and Customs Unions regarding fishery and aquaculture products, their production and sale. The issues of certification of certain product categories are analysed separately, the requirements for canned fish being highlighted. The analysis is relevant for all fish processing companies which may consider the possibility of starting export to the countries of the CU EAEU and are intended to reduce costs associated with products’ entry into these markets.

scholarly journals The Implications of A South-South Customs Union On Tariffs, Welfare, and The Prospect of Global Free Trade

1970 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-91
Author(s):  
Hiranya Nath ◽  
Halis Yildiz
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Trade Negotiations ◽  
Customs Union ◽  
Doha Round ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
The North

Following the failure of multilateral trade negotiations at the Cancun meetingand the Doha Round, developing countries have pursued an alternative in so called"south-south" trade agreements. Since these agreements lead to trade diversionfrom efficient north (developed) countries to less efficient south (developing)partners, there have been widespread concerns regarding their welfare implications.Using a three country oligopoly model of trade, we first examine staticallythe implications of a south-south customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs andwelfare. We find that south countries always have incentives to form a CU that reducesthe welfare of the north country. Moreover, when south firms are sufficientlyinefficient relative to north firms, a south-south CU leads to a large trade diversioneffect and reduces world welfare. We further show that, in a repeated interactionmodel, free trade is less likely to be sustainable under the south-south CU relativeto no agreement.

Welfare Effect of Free Trade Agreements: A Theoretical Note

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avijit Mandal
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
International Economics ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Diversion ◽  
Welfare Gain ◽  
Jel Codes ◽  
Customs Unions ◽  
Compensation Principle ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The One

Kemp and Wan (1976, Journal of International Economics, 6(1), 95–97) show that customs unions can be welfare enhancing if the imports from the rest of the world (ROW) by the union members are fixed both before and after the formation of the union. This note extends their argument to the case of (a) two small open economies (SOEs) joining a free trade agreement (FTA) and (b) a single SOE joining a pre-existing FTA among similar economies. The particular compensation principle considered is the one suggested by Grinols (1981, Journal of International Economics, 11(2), 259–266). According to this argument, welfare gain is ensured if tariff revenue rises in the post-FTA situation. For our case, this compensation principle translates to the following: welfare gain can be ensured only when import from ROW (with whom the FTA was not signed) rises. Since this will amount to a (meaningless) negative trade diversion effect in the context of the FTA, the source of any such revenue rise has to be external. The general conclusion of the article is therefore that it may be impossible for an FTA per se to ensure increased welfare for SOEs. JEL Codes: F13, F15

scholarly journals Critical bifurcation surfaces of 3D discrete dynamics

2000 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 333-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Sonis
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Point ◽  
Asymptotic Stability ◽  
Bifurcation Analysis ◽  
Analytical Representation ◽  
General Algorithm ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Adjustment Process ◽  
Discrete Dynamics ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Analytical Construction

This paper deals with the analytical representation of bifurcations of each 3D discrete dynamics depending on the set of bifurcation parameters. The procedure of bifurcation analysis proposed in this paper represents the 3D elaboration and specification of the general algorithm of then-dimensional linear bifurcation analysis proposed by the author earlier. It is proven that 3D domain of asymptotic stability (attraction) of the fixed point for a given 3D discrete dynamics is bounded by three critical bifurcation surfaces: the divergence, flip and flutter surfaces. The analytical construction of these surfaces is achieved with the help of classical Routh–Hurvitz conditions of asymptotic stability. As an application the adjustment process proposed by T. Puu for the Cournot oligopoly model is considered in detail.

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