scholarly journals Values of love: two forms of infinity characteristic of human persons

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-450
Author(s):  
Sara Heinämaa

AbstractIn his late reflections on values and forms of life from the 1920s and 1930s, Husserl develops the concept of personal value and argues that these values open two kinds of infinities in our lives. On the one hand personal values disclose infinite emotive depths in human individuals while on the other hand they connect human individuals in continuous and progressive chains of care. In order to get at the core of the concept, I will explicate Husserl’s discussion of personal values of love by distinguishing between five related features. I demonstrate that values of love (1) are rooted in egoic depts and define who we are as persons, (2) differ from objective values in being absolute and non-comparative, (3) ground vocational lives as organizing principles, (4) are endlessly self-disclosing and self-intensifying, and (5) establish transitive relations of care between human beings. On the basis of my five-partite distinction, I argue that Husserl’s concepts of love and value of love reveal the dynamic character of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

Dialogue ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray Miles

InLeibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, Robert McRae alleges a flat “contradiction” (McRae 1976, p. 30) at the heart of Leibniz's doctrine of three grades of monads: bare entelechies characterized by perception; animal souls capable both of perception and of sensation; and rational souls, minds or spirits endowed not only with capacities for perception and sensation but also with consciousness of self or what Leibniz calls (introducing a new term of art into the vocabulary of philosophy) “apperception.” Apperception is a necessary condition of those distinctively human mental processes associated with understanding and with reason. Insofar as it is also a sufficient condition of rationality, it is not ascribable to animals. But apperception is a necessary condition of sensation or feeling as well; and animals are capable of sensation, according to Leibniz, who decisively rejected the Cartesian doctrine that beasts are nothing but material automata. “On the one hand,” writes McRae, “what distinguishes animals from lower forms of life is sensation or feeling, but on the other hand apperception is a necessary condition of sensation, and apperception distinguishes human beings from animals” (McRae 1976, p. 30). “We are thus left with an unresolved inconsistency in Leibniz's account of sensation, so far as sensation is attributable both to men and animals” (ibid., p. 34).


2003 ◽  
pp. 15-26
Author(s):  
P. Wynarczyk
Keyword(s):  
The Core ◽  

Two aspects of Schumpeter' legacy are analyzed in the article. On the one hand, he can be viewed as the custodian of the neoclassical harvest supplementing to its stock of inherited knowledge. On the other hand, the innovative character of his works is emphasized that allows to consider him a proponent of hetherodoxy. It is stressed that Schumpeter's revolutionary challenge can lead to radical changes in modern economics.


Imbizo ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-54
Author(s):  
Oyeh O. Otu

This article examines how female conditioning and sexual repression affect the woman’s sense of self, womanhood, identity and her place in society. It argues that the woman’s body is at the core of the many sites of gender struggles/ politics. Accordingly, the woman’s body must be decolonised for her to attain true emancipation. On the one hand, this study identifies the grave consequences of sexual repression, how it robs women of their freedom to choose whom to love or marry, the freedom to seek legal redress against sexual abuse and terror, and how it hinders their quest for self-determination. On the other hand, it underscores the need to give women sexual freedom that must be respected and enforced by law for the overall good of society.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg W. Bertram

AbstractThe concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Riikka Nissi ◽  
Melisa Stevanovic

Abstract The article examines how the aspects of the social world are enacted in a theater play. The data come from a videotaped performance of a professional theater, portraying a story about a workplace organization going through a personnel training program. The aim of the study is to show how the core theme of the play – the teaming up of the personnel – is constructed in the live performance through a range of interactional means. By focusing on four core episodes of the play, the study on the one hand points out to the multiple changes taking place both within and between the different episodes of the play. On the other hand, the episodes of collective action involving the semiotic resources of singing and dancing are shown to represent the ideals of teamwork in distinct ways. The study contributes to the understanding of socially and politically oriented theater as a distinct, pre-rehearsed social setting and the means and practices that it deploys when enacting the aspects of the contemporary societal issues.


2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 264-305
Author(s):  
Beverly Stein

The question of 17th-century tonality has intrigued scholars for years: how to make sense of a repertoire in which modal concepts appear to coexist with elements of common-practice tonality. Although the system of modes and that of modern tonality are different constructions, the aspect of functional tonality that allows for the presence of major and minor keys at all 12 levels of transposition developed in part from an extension of a technique carried over from modal practice, that of transposition of mode. Nowhere is this process of tonal expansion based on the concept of transposition of mode as clear or as well structured as in the music of Giacomo Carissimi (1605-1674), the Roman composer of oratorios, cantatas, and motets whose output spans the central 40 years of the 17th century. A close examination of Carissimi's music provides us with a snapshot of the expansion of tonality via transposition and, in addition, offers important suggestions for understanding the tonal practices of contemporaries such as Monteverdi and Cavalli. In Carissimi's music, four basic tonalities are still clearly distinguishable, recognizable through unique and predictable cadence patterns. They appear at transposition levels ranging from the three-flat to the three-sharp systems, with the one-flat system conspicuous in its absence. As shown, the core of eight central keys demonstrates key pairing in a way that models the traditional authentic-plagal relationship of modes. An overview of Carissimi's tonal system demonstrates how the ap- parent coexistence of functional tonality and much older concepts of mode and hexachord can be understood to be part of a rational and organized system. This study explores Carissimi's tonal scheme through an examination of his cantatas, the repertoire displaying the widest tonal range. Based on characteristic cadence frequencies, opening transpositions, and previously unrecognized standard cadence patterns, it is possible to determine the nature of the four primary tonalities and their relationships to one another. These cadence patterns also appear as organizing principles in works of several other 17th-century composers and suggest future avenues of research. The final section summarizes the conservative and progressive features of Carissimi's tonal system, relates his practice to discussion of transposition in two popular treatises of the time, Giovanni Maria Bononcini's Musica prattico and Lorenzo Penna's Li primi albori musicali, and compares Carissimi's practice to the system of church keys (based on common transpositions of the psalm tones) prevalent in the 17th century. A study of Carissimi's cantatas thus reveals the existence of a truly distinct 17th-century tonal practice which functions on its own terms at the same time as it exhibits concepts derived from traditional modal and hexachordal theory, as well as contemporary practices of psalmody and small-scale functional tonality.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Dalsgaard

This article refers to carbon valuation as the practice of ascribing value to, and assessing the value of, actions and objects in terms of carbon emissions. Due to the pervasiveness of carbon emissions in the actions and objects of everyday lives of human beings, the making of carbon offsets and credits offers almost unlimited repertoires of alternatives to be included in contemporary carbon valuation schemes. Consequently, the article unpacks how discussions of carbon valuation are interpreted through different registers of alternatives - as the commensuration and substitution of variants on the one hand, and the confrontational comparison of radical difference on the other. Through the reading of a wide selection of the social science literature on carbon markets and trading, the article argues that the value of carbon emissions itself depends on the construction of alternative, hypothetical scenarios, and that emissions have become both a moral and a virtual measure pitting diverse forms of actualised actions or objects against each other or against corresponding nonactions and non-objects as alternatives.


2013 ◽  
pp. 115-135
Author(s):  
I.M. Boguslavskij

We consider Russian coordinative constructions with paired conjunctions, such as i?i ?both?and?, ili?ili ?either?or?, ni?ni ?neither?nor?, ne tol'ko?no i ?not only?but also?, ne?a ?not?but?, etc. The paper presents a class of syntactic constructions, so-called asymmetric constructions, which are interesting in several respects. They are closely related to coordinative constructions, although they do not share their principal property - the identity of syntactic functions of coordinated elements. They take up an intermediate position between standard syntax and ungrammaticality. On the one hand, the sentence is within the grammatical norm. On the other hand, its structure underwent a deformation that left a trace. We propose a description that accounts for their closeness to and difference from standard - symmetric - constructions. Symmetric constructions with paired conjunctions are convenient to describe as a result of two transformations occurring in the semantic structure: Deletion and Transfer. Asymmetric constructions are obtained when only one of these transformations is applied. Accordingly, two subclasses of asymmetric constructions can be distinguished - ?Deletion-Without-Transfer? constructions and ?Transfer-Without-Deletion? constructions. The latter class has a strong pragmatic marking. The core of this class are ?failed? symmetric constructions. The speaker begins to build a symmetric construction but faces an obstacle of syntactic nature, which prevents him from completing this plan. ?Transfer-Without-Deletion? constructions constitute a legalized way of overcoming syntactic conflicts.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Brendan Vize

<p>Consider Lt. Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the droid C3PO from Star Wars, or the Replicants that appear in Bladerunner: They can use language (or many languages), they are rational, they form relationships, they use language that suggests that they have a concept of self, and even language that suggests that they have “feelings” or emotional experience. In the films and TV shows that they appear, they are depicted as having frequent social interaction with human beings; but would we have any moral obligations to such a being if they really existed? What would we be permitted to do or not to do to them? On the one hand, a robot like Data has many of the attributes that we currently associate with a person. On the other hand, he has many of the attributes of the machines that we currently use as tools. He (and other science-fiction machines like him) closely resembles one of the things we value the most (a person), and at the same time, one of the things we value the least (an artefact), leading to an apparent ethical paradox. What is its solution?</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Brendan Vize

<p>Consider Lt. Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the droid C3PO from Star Wars, or the Replicants that appear in Bladerunner: They can use language (or many languages), they are rational, they form relationships, they use language that suggests that they have a concept of self, and even language that suggests that they have “feelings” or emotional experience. In the films and TV shows that they appear, they are depicted as having frequent social interaction with human beings; but would we have any moral obligations to such a being if they really existed? What would we be permitted to do or not to do to them? On the one hand, a robot like Data has many of the attributes that we currently associate with a person. On the other hand, he has many of the attributes of the machines that we currently use as tools. He (and other science-fiction machines like him) closely resembles one of the things we value the most (a person), and at the same time, one of the things we value the least (an artefact), leading to an apparent ethical paradox. What is its solution?</p>


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