scholarly journals Compulsory Voting Rules, Reluctant Voters and Ideological Proximity Voting

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Dassonneville ◽  
Fernando Feitosa ◽  
Marc Hooghe ◽  
Richard R. Lau ◽  
Dieter Stiers
Res Publica ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 37 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 352-388
Author(s):  
Johan Ackaert

The institutional setting of the 1994 local elections was characterized by a by law introduced limitation of campaign expenditures and the increased share (at least 25%) of female candidates.  In spite of compulsory voting rules, the turnout decreased with 1,2%. The proportion of blanc or invalid votes increased slightly with 0,3%.  The results of the local elections followed the trends drawn by the 1991 general election. This means general losses for the traditional parties and large progress for the extreme right-wing parties. In the Flemish region, the winners were the extreme right-wing Vlaams Blok, the ecologist AGALEV and the VLD liberals.  The others parties lost votes. This was particularly the case for the Flemish-nationalist VU, followed by the socialists (SP) and the christian-democrats (CVP).In the Walloons region, all the traditional parties were set back or stagnated.  The socialists (PS) suffered the largest decline, but the liberals (PRL) and christian-democrats (PSC) lost voters too. The ecologist ECOLO only kept a modest status quo position. On the other hand, the extreme right-wing parties Front National and Agir realised a breakthrough. In Brussels, we notice the same tendencies, set-backs for the traditional parties and progress for the extreme rightwing parties (of both languages). The ecologists belonged there also to the winning side. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the local political system should not be dramatized.In general terms, parties supporting the leaving political majorities in the municipalities were no langer electorally favoured. On the contrary, the liberals realized better results in these municipalities where they belonged to the opposition.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (12) ◽  
pp. 1451-1482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Carreras

One of the most significant developments in Latin American democracies since the beginning of the third wave of democratization is the rise to political prominence of outsider candidates in presidential elections. I use an original database of political outsiders in Latin America to examine the institutional factors that contribute to the emergence of political outsiders. Using a fixed effects variance decomposition (FEVD) model, I find that, in addition to the favorable conditions already identified in the literature—legitimacy crisis of traditional political parties and negative socioeconomic conditions—the rise of political outsiders is determined by institutional factors, such as nonconcurrent elections, compulsory voting rules, and reelection provisions.


Nature ◽  
2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Ball
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
K. Sonin ◽  
I. Khovanskaya

Hiring decisions are typically made by committees members of which have different capacity to estimate the quality of candidates. Organizational structure and voting rules in the committees determine the incentives and strategies of applicants; thus, construction of a modern university requires a political structure that provides committee members and applicants with optimal incentives. The existing political-economic model of informative voting typically lacks any degree of variance in the organizational structure, while political-economic models of organization typically assume a parsimonious information structure. In this paper, we propose a simple framework to analyze trade-offs in optimal subdivision of universities into departments and subdepartments, and allocation of political power.


Author(s):  
Ian Ayres ◽  
Colin Rowat ◽  
Nasser Zakariya

Author(s):  
Mark Bovens ◽  
Anchrit Wille

How can we remedy some of the negative effects of diploma democracy? First, we discuss the rise of nationalist parties. They have forced the mainstream political parties to pay more attention to the negative effects of immigration, globalization, and European unification. Next we discuss strategies to mitigate the dominance of the well-educated in politics. We start with remedies that address differences in political skills and knowledge. Then we discuss the deliberative arenas. Many democratic reforms contain an implicit bias towards the well-educated. A more realistic citizenship model is required. This can be achieved by bringing the ballot back in, for example, by merging deliberative and more direct forms of democracy through deliberative polling, corrective referendums, and more compulsory voting. The chapter ends with a discussion of ways to make the political elites more inclusive and responsive, such as descriptive representation, sortition, and plebiscitary elements.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 221-236
Author(s):  
Alice Guerra ◽  
Barbara Luppi ◽  
Francesco Parisi
Keyword(s):  

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilat Levy

In this paper I analyze the effect of transparency on decision making in committees. I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. The main result is that when the decision-making process is secretive (when individual votes are not revealed to the public), committee members comply with preexisting biases. For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms. Transparent committees are therefore more likely to accept reforms. I also find that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one. (JEL D71, D72)


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