The Rationality of Holding Beliefs and the Propositional Content of the Curriculum

Author(s):  
Jane Gatley
2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Brigitte Hilmer

Kunst kann dann als reflexiv interpretiert werden, wenn Reflexivität nicht auf propositionalen Gehalt oder sogar sprachliche Artikulation angewiesen ist. Reflexion tritt auf in den Modi der Selbstbeziehung des Lebendigen, des Überlegens und der Selbstreferenz im Symbolischen. Kunst ist ein Reflexionsmedium, das diese Modi beansprucht und miteinander verflicht. Eine spezifisch ästhetische Reflexivität ist von und nach Kant nach dem Vorbild der transzendentalen Reflexion und in Konkurrenz zu ihr etabliert worden. Sie läßt sich als Reflexivität des ästhetischen Urteils, als emphatisches Gemachtsein, als Rückwendung auf Wahrnehmungsvollzüge oder als Begriffsreflexion verstehen. Dabei wird die Unterscheidung von Anschauung und Verstand in deren Zusammenspiel oder Abspaltung vorausgesetzt. Von der Analogie zur transzendentalen Reflexion löst sich aber erst ein Verständnis von ästhetischer Reflexivität, das von den drei Modi und ihrer Verflechtung ausgeht.<br><br>Reflexivity does not presuppose linguistic articulation or even propositional content. If it did, art could not be called reflexive. Reflexivity can be found in the self-contact of the living, in mental reflection or in symbolic self-reference. Art is a medium which claims these different modes of reflexivity and intertwines them. Aesthetic reflexivity as such has been established by Kant and his epigones, following the model of transcendetal reflection. Thus it could be specified as the reflexive structure of aesthetic judgement, or as an emphasis on a work’s being created, or as a reference to perception itself in the process of perceiving, or as a way of reflecting concepts. Aesthetic reflexivity can only be detached from the model of transcendental reflection, if it is seen as oriented towards the interaction among the three modes of reflection mentioned above, leaving aside the difference, interplay or competition between perception and conceptual capacities.


Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

This chapter completes the account of the explicit criteria for epistemically proper belief. Given a belief formed through a process or processes on which the subject enjoyed a default permission to rely, the belief is epistemically proper just in case it satisfies a version of Process Reliabilism which the author calls Coherence-Infused Reliabilism (CIR). CIR requires that (i) beliefs be formed and sustained through processes that were reliable (or conditionally reliable), and (ii) the propositional content of the belief, as well as the hypothesis asserting the reliability of the processes as used on this occasion, cohere with the subject’s background beliefs. After arguing that such a view is well motivated, the author suggests that condition (ii) amounts to the exemplification of a minimal kind of epistemic responsibility, and goes on to generalize the account to cover all beliefs (not just basic ones).


Author(s):  
Sarah E. Murray

This book gives a compositional, truth‐conditional, crosslinguistic semantics for evidentials set in a theory of the semantics for sentential mood. Central to this semantics is a proposal about a distinction between what propositional content is at‐issue, roughly primary or proffered, and what content is not‐at‐issue. Evidentials contribute not‐at‐issue content, more specifically what I will call a not‐at‐issue restriction. In addition, evidentials can affect the level of commitment a sentence makes to the main proposition, contributed by sentential mood. Building on recent work in the formal semantics of evidentials and related phenomena, the proposed semantics does not appeal to separate dimensions of illocutionary meaning. Instead, I argue that all sentences make three contributions: at‐issue content, not‐at‐issue content, and an illocutionary relation. At‐issue content is presented, made available for subsequent anaphora, but is not directly added to the common ground. Not‐at‐issue content directly updates the common ground. The illocutionary relation uses the at‐issue content to impose structure on the common ground, which, depending on the clause type (e.g., declarative, interrogative), can trigger further updates. Empirical support for this proposal comes from Cheyenne (Algonquian, primary data from the author’s fieldwork), English, and a wide variety of languages that have been discussed in the literature on evidentials.


HUMANIS ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 1063
Author(s):  
Palella Tias Rahmadanni ◽  
I Gusti Ngurah Parthama ◽  
Wayan Suardhana

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan tipe-tipe tindakan bahasa illokusi yang direktif dan menganalisa kekuatan tindakan bahasa yang direktif yang diucapkan oleh para karakter. Data diambil dari sebuah film yang berjudul The Boss Baby yang menggunakan metode penelitian perpustakaan dan teknik dokumentasi, lalu dianalisa dengan metode kualitatif deskriptif. Ada dua teori yang digunakan untuk menjawab rumusan masalah. Pertama, teori directive illocutionary acts dari Searle dan Vanderveken (1985) untuk menganalisa rumusan masalah yang pertama. Kedua, teori directive illocutionary force dari Vanderveken (1990) yang digunakan untuk menjawab rumusan masalah yang kedua. Hasil analisis menunjukan bahwa ada enam tipe tindakan bahasa illokusi yang direktif, yaitu requesting, ordering, suggesting, warning, adjuring, and forbidding. Sedangkan kekuatan tindakan bahasa yang direktif mempunyai beberapa komponen yaitu the directive point, the mode of achievement, the propositional content, the preparatory condition, the sincerity condition, and the degree of strength of utterance.Kekuatan tindakan bahasa dikategorikan berhasil jika dapat memenuhi semua komponen tersebut.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 310-335
Author(s):  
Selmer Bringsjord ◽  
Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu ◽  
Michael Giancola

Abstract Suppose an artificial agent a adj {a}_{\text{adj}} , as time unfolds, (i) receives from multiple artificial agents (which may, in turn, themselves have received from yet other such agents…) propositional content, and (ii) must solve an ethical problem on the basis of what it has received. How should a adj {a}_{\text{adj}} adjudicate what it has received in order to produce such a solution? We consider an environment infused with logicist artificial agents a 1 , a 2 , … , a n {a}_{1},{a}_{2},\ldots ,{a}_{n} that sense and report their findings to “adjudicator” agents who must solve ethical problems. (Many if not most of these agents may be robots.) In such an environment, inconsistency is a virtual guarantee: a adj {a}_{\text{adj}} may, for instance, receive a report from a 1 {a}_{1} that proposition ϕ \phi holds, then from a 2 {a}_{2} that ¬ ϕ \neg \phi holds, and then from a 3 {a}_{3} that neither ϕ \phi nor ¬ ϕ \neg \phi should be believed, but rather ψ \psi instead, at some level of likelihood. We further assume that agents receiving such incompatible reports will nonetheless sometimes simply need, before long, to make decisions on the basis of these reports, in order to try to solve ethical problems. We provide a solution to such a quandary: AI capable of adjudicating competing reports from subsidiary agents through time, and delivering to humans a rational, ethically correct (relative to underlying ethical principles) recommendation based upon such adjudication. To illuminate our solution, we anchor it to a particular scenario.


2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-102
Author(s):  
Dejan Aždajić

While the importance of an embodied theology has been recognized, in light of recent literature that sees a growing modern-day shift from emancipated individuality to ideological individualism, the aim of this article is to deepen the theological reflection on the urgent need for a more intentional embodied emphasis. This strategic approach is particularly significant, since in spite of the current challenge there remains a tendency toward a disembodied, anti-liturgical orientation that prioritizes words and cognition, locating theological truth on the inside of the autonomous individual thinking subject, who remains free to either accept or reject its propositional content. Drawing from relevant literature that provides a conceptual framework, this article argues that especially in today’s context, an overt emphasis on the externalization of faith and the embodiment of theological normatives performed together in community offers more promising pedagogical effectiveness. A bodily focus is principally important since it provides an experiential platform for the communal enactment and consequent appropriation of religious knowledge, thus potentially circumventing the present challenge of increasingly rigid individualism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Ibukun Filani

Abstract The general perspective in pragmatics research on stand-up comedy is that the comedian co-produces humor with the audience. In this paper, I argue that the stand-up comedian’s communicative behavior is also partly rooted in egocentrism. To achieve this, I adopted a sociocognitive approach to intention and egocentrism in analyzing a routine that was performed in Chicago by Okey Bakassi, a Nigerian stand-up comedian. I operationalize egocentrism as one of the humor strategies of the comedian. While focusing on the propositional content of the comedian’s utterances, the analysis revealed strategies like privatization, ad hoc concept formation and ad hoc coherence, which the comedian used in individualizing the prior common ground to generate the needed incongruity for humor in the performance sphere.


Pragmatics ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudy Loock

The aim of this article is to complement and refine Ellen Prince’s well-known taxonomy of given/new information (Prince 1981, 1992), which distinguishes between discourse-related and assumed familiarity-related newness/givenness. What we suggest is that a new category should be added to the existing hearer new, hearer old, and inferrable information categories, so as to include cases where the informational status of an entity or a propositional content cannot be determined with certainty. We call this new category ‘the (hearer) indeterminables’, and we justify its existence through a case study on nonrestrictive, relevance-oriented constructions (appositive relative clauses, non-restrictive pre-modifiers, apposition). We also argue that it is possible for speakers/writers to simulate informational statuses for politeness considerations, and that such simulation should be included in the definition of assumed familiarity.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Carretero

The English degree adverb absolutely and its Spanish equivalent absolutamente may function as modifiers of words of different kinds, as Adjuncts and as (parts of) minor clauses. This article sets forth a quantitative analysis, based on naturally-occurring linguistic data, of the distribution of these functions for both adverbs. Apart from distributional differences between the two adverbs and between their occurrences in spoken and written language, the results show that when they are modifiers of words or Verbal Group-oriented Adjuncts, their main function is to qualify (part of) the propositional content of the utterance; however, when they are clausal Adjuncts or (parts of) minor clauses, they are often geared to the performance of discourse functions such as contrast, concession or agreement. These functions are shared with some adverbs of certainty such as ‘certainly’ or ‘definitely’, which suggests that the semantic difference between degree and certainty tends to be blurred when adverbs of maximal strength of both types are used for performing discourse functions that enhance assertiveness.


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-207
Author(s):  
Mariela Aguilera

In “Steps toward Origins of Propositional Thought”, Burge claims that animals of different species are capable of making deductive inferences. According to Burge, that is why propositional thought is extended beyond the human mind to the minds of other kinds of creatures. But, as I argue here, the inferential capacities of animals do not guarantee a propositional structure. According to my argument, propositional content has predicates that might involve a quantificational structure. And the absence of this structure in animal thought might explain some of the differences with the propositional content of human thought.


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