Optimal decisions and Pareto improvement for green supply chain considering reciprocity and cost-sharing contract

Author(s):  
Man Yang ◽  
Xiao-min Gong
2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 1419-1450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ata Allah Taleizadeh ◽  
Mahsa Noori-Daryan ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana

Purpose This paper aims to deal with optimal pricing and production tactics for a bi-echelon green supply chain, including a producer and a vendor in presence of three various scenarios. Demand depends on a price, refund and quality where the producer controls quality and the vendor proposes a refund policy to purchasers to encourage them to order more. Design/methodology/approach In the first scenario, the members seek to optimize their optimum decision variables under a centralized decision-making method while in the second scenario, a decentralized system is assumed where the members make a decision about variables and profits under a non-cooperative game. In the third scenario, a cost-sharing agreement is concluded between the members to provide a high-quality item to the purchasers. Findings The performance of the proposed model is investigated by illustrating a numerical example. A sensitivity analysis of some key parameters has been done to study the effect of the changes on the optimal values of the decision variables and profits. From sensitivity analysis, the real features are observed and mentioned in this section. Originality/value This research examines the behavior of partners in a green supply chain facing with a group of purchasers whose demand is the function of a price, greenery degree and refund rate. This proposed mathematical model is developed and analyzed which has an implication in supply chain model.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhou Xideng ◽  
Xu Bing ◽  
Xie Fei ◽  
Li Yu

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.


Author(s):  
Guangdong Liu ◽  
Tianjian Yang ◽  
Yao Wei ◽  
Xuemei Zhang

In order to investigate supply chain coordination and decision under customer balking and stochastic demand, the article considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer with risk-neutral and one retailer with risk-neutral and develops two models in a centralized and a decentralized system and the three contracts are designed to coordinate supply chain and the optimal price and customer balking strategies are obtained. The results show that the revenue and cost-sharing contract can coordinate supply chain under customer balking and price-dependent demand and achieve the Pareto-improvement; the expected sales quantity and expected reduced sales quantity are influenced conversely by the threshold of inventory and probability of a sale under customer balking. In addition, numerical analysis is given to verify the effectiveness of revenue and cost-sharing contract and the paper gives some managerial insights and puts forward to the future work at last.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Manyi Tan ◽  
Manli Tu ◽  
Bin Wang ◽  
Tianyue Zou ◽  
Hong Cheng

Agricultural products are basic needs of human beings, and whether they are cultivated in a green (or organic) manner has direct impact on environment and public health. This research incorporates product freshness and greenness into a two-echelon agricultural product supply chain (APSC). Game theoretic analyses are carried out to examine pricing, freshness, and greenness decisions of the supply chain members with and without cost-sharing for greenness investment. Subsequently, we conduct comparative and sensitivity analyses for these optimal decisions and profits of the APSC members under different cases. Numerical experiment is employed to investigate the impact of key parameters on equilibrium decisions and profitability. Analytical and experimental results show that the cost-sharing contract of greenness investment for agricultural products helps to strengthen the supply chain members’ effort in improving the greenness and freshness levels of the agricultural product, thereby enhancing both individual and channel profitability of the APSC under certain conditions. This research also reveals a widened profit gap between the producer and the retailer under the cost-sharing contract.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Liyan Wang ◽  
Minghai Ye ◽  
Shanshan Ma ◽  
Yipeng Sha

This paper addresses the pricing and coordination strategy in a green supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a green product and sells it to a risk-averse retailer. The product’s demand is a random variable influenced by the green level and the retail price. The problem is modeled in three different structures, a centralized and two decentralized models, in which the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer act as the channel leader, respectively. This paper presents the optimal decisions for all supply chain members, analyzes the effects of green degree and risk-averse coefficient on the supply chain members’ decision-making and their profits, and performs the numerical analysis. The results show that the green degree and the whole supply chain’s expected profits are highest in the centralized scenario, followed by the retailer-led scenario, and lowest under the manufacturer-led scenario; the green degree and the manufacturer’s expected profit increase with the risk-averse coefficient, no matter who dominates the channel; however, the risk-averse coefficient’s effects on the retailer’s expected utility and the retail price depends on who dominates the channel and on the greening investment parameter.


2013 ◽  
Vol 804 ◽  
pp. 370-377
Author(s):  
Ding Yue Zhang

For a two-echelon supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and one supplier, the incentive mechanism is designed for the supplier to reduce the production cost of green intermediate products by the manufacturer. It is proposed under the situation of asymmetric information on the endeavor level of supplier to promote the initiative of suppliers technology R&D. The design process of the incentive mechanism in the face of moral hazard problems is discussed by the manufacturer. It indicates that the manufacturer can adopt linear incentive payment according to different periods of producing and marketing. The results manifest that the proposed incentive mechanism will promote the supplier's efforts on R&D as far as possible and make the profits of the members Pareto improvement distinctly. The paper affords great guidance on operating decisions for the green supply chain at initial stages of the green market.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Liu ◽  
Feng-jie Zhang

Abstract In the Big Data environment, when green manufacturers invest in the green production technology, to satisfy consumer demand timely and accurately, they may begin to gain consumer performance information (hereafter, CBDI) to design and produce product. However, these will go up their extra costs. Meanwhile, for a green manufacturer who sells the green product through the online channel and the offline channel, the expression of its market demand needs to rethink in the new environment. In these conditions, for a dual-channel green supply chain (hereafter, DGSC), chain members pay more attention on the pricing problems considering the inputs of CBDI and greening R&D. Hence, to resolve this question, a DGSC a green manufacturer selling by the online channel and with one retailer selling by the offline channel was chosen. Afterwards, the demand function of the DGSC was revised, and we analyzed the profits models and its pricing rules in the proposed four common cost-sharing models. Results indicate that whether the retailer bears the CBDI costs or the greening R&D costs, the retailer will not change its retail price. If the retailer can bear some CBDI costs, the alteration tendencies of the best wholesale price are related to the cost-sharing parameter.


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