scholarly journals Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Truths

AbstractAccording to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one’s belief could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should only examine the target belief when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it is argued that, if we should only examine the target belief, then the account fails to account for ignorance of necessary truths. But, if we should also examine beliefs in other relevant propositions, then the account fails to account for knowledge from falsehood. Therefore, the safety account of knowledge is undermined by knowledge from falsehood and ignorance of necessary truths.

Brute Necessity and the Mind–Body Problem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Van Cleve
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

In a growing number of papers one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. For short, they imply that there are brute necessities. Therefore, the arguments conclude, the views in question should be rejected in favor of rival views under which the necessities would be explained. This style of argument raises a number of questions. Do necessary truths really require explanation? Are they not paradigms of truths that either need no explanation or automatically have one, being in some sense self-explanatory? If necessary truths do admit of explanation or even require it, what types of explanation are available? Are there any necessary truths that are truly brute? This chapter surveys various answers to these questions, noting their bearing on arguments from brute necessity and arguments concerning the mind–body problem.

On the Nature of Necessary Truths in Jurisprudence: Putting Wittgensteinian Hinges to Use

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-237
Author(s):  
Yi Tong
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Nature ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
The Law

Inquiring into the fundamental nature of law has been traditionally formulated as an attempt to answer the question, “What is Law?” Such an inquiry typically proceeds by identifying the necessary features of law. Joseph Raz, for example, writes: A theory consists of necessary truths, for only necessary truths about the law reveal the nature of the law. We talk of ‘the nature of law’, or the nature of anything else, to refer to those of the law’s characteristics which are of the essence of law, which make law into what it is. That is those properties without which the law would not be law.1

scholarly journals Leibniz on Necessary and Contingent Truths

2012 ◽  
pp. 117-135
Author(s):  
Md Abdul Muhit
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Detailed Account ◽  
General Notion ◽  
Philosophy Of Logic ◽  
The Arts ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Philosophical Writings

The distinction between necessary and contingent truths has so much important role in the explication of Leibniz’s philosophy of logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of science that the distinction spreads throughout most of his philosophical writings. My aim in this paper is to try to provide a clear and detailed account of some of the aspects of Leibniz’s distinction between necessary and contingent truths. This paper is divided into four parts. In the first part, an analysis of Leibniz’s general notion of “truth” (“the Principle of the Predicate-in-Notion”) is given. This will be followed by his distinction between necessary truths and contingent truths, which he also terms as “truths of reason” and “truths of fact” respectively. Thirdly, the implication of this distinction in Leibniz’s theory of human freedom will be addressed. I will end my discussion with an answer to the following questions: The distinction goes traditionally under Leibniz' name; but is it his own invention, or has he merely picked it up from one of his predecessors? And secondly, how far this distinction has an impact (if any) on the philosophies of his contemporaries, especially on Wolff, Hume and Kant? DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/afj.v4i0.12936 The Arts Faculty Journal Vol.4 July 2010-June 2011 pp.117-135

scholarly journals El discurso sobre el poder en la intervención profesional: otro caso de la colonización del trabajo social por el régimen de verdad de las ciencias sociales

2011 ◽  
pp. 111
Author(s):  
Rubens Ramón Méndez
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Work ◽  
Professional Practice ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Social ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Trabajo Social ◽  
Use Of Knowledge

Cuando el Trabajo Social comenzó a sistematizarse y a organizarse a partir de Mary Richmond, se proponía como un programa de investigación distinto dentro de las Ciencias Sociales (Lakatos, 1999). Distinto porque toma los planteos teóricos dados en las Ciencias Sociales desde �las circunstancias históricamente determinadas y existencialmente posicionadas; creando nuevas perspectivas sobre esos planteos teóricos� (Méndez, 2006) y porque con su práctica profesional, evalúa y muestra el problema de las consecuencias efectivas y potenciales de la utilización de los conocimientos (Dewey, 1967) en la construcción de las prácticas sociales (discursivas o no discursivas).Presentar la emergencia de un discurso propio de las personas y documentar lo real de las prácticas sociales, mostrar cómo es que a algunos enunciados que no son en sí mismos ni verdaderos ni falsos, se les otorgan el �estatuto de verdad�; es lo que hace que el Trabajo Social deba ser vigilado y desarmado en sus efectos.Si el discurso no es el medio por lo que se establecen las luchas en esta sociedad de discursos; sino que es por el discurso, por lo que se lucha. Si el discurso es �aquel poder del que quiere uno adueñarse� (Foucault, 1983), las Ciencias Sociales no podían dejar al azar el discurso del Trabajo Social.When Social Work became systematized and organized after Mary Richmond, it was described as a different research program within the social sciences (Lakatos, 1999). It was different because it considered the theoretical propositions in the social sciences from �historically determined and existentially positioned circumstances, thereby creating new perspectives on those theoretical propositions� (Méndez, 2006) and because through professional practice Social Work assesses and highlights the problem of the real and potential consequences of the use of knowledge in the construction of social practices (Dewey, 1967), whether discursive or non-discursive.As Social Work presents the emergence of people�s own discourse and documents the reality of social practices while it also presents statements which are neither true nor false as necessary truths, Social Work should be watched and disarmed in its consequences.Discourse is not the means through which fights are established in our discourse society; it is discourse that is fought about. If discourse is �that power we wish to get hold of� (Foucault, 1983), then the social sciences should not ignore the discourse of Social Work.

Swinburne on the Euthyphro Dilemma. Can Supervenience Save Him?

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-29
Author(s):  
Simin Rahimi
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Euthyphro Dilemma ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Necessary Truths

Modern philosophers normally either reject the „divine command theory” of ethics and argue that moral duties are independent of any commands, or make it dependent on God's commands but like Robert Adams modify their theory and identify moral duties in terms of the commands of a loving God. Adams regards this theory as metaphysically necessary. That is, if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds. But Swinburne's (1981) position is unprecedented insofar as he regards moral truths as analytically necessary. In this paper Swinburne's argument will be discussed and I will reveal some of the difficulties involved in categorising general moral principles (if there are such principles) as logical (analytical/necessary) truths.

Eternity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump ◽  
Norman Kretzmann
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Medieval Philosophy ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
History Of ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Temporal Location

The distinctive, philosophically interesting concept of eternity arose very early in the history of philosophy as the concept of a mode of existence that was not only beginningless and endless but also essentially different from time. It was introduced into early Greek philosophy as the mode of existence required for fundamental reality (being) contrasted with ordinary appearance (becoming). But the concept was given its classic formulation by Boethius, who thought of eternity as God’s mode of existence and defined God’s eternality as ‘the complete possession all at once of illimitable life’. As defined by Boethius the concept was important in medieval philosophy. The elements of the Boethian definition are life, illimitability (and hence duration), and absence of succession (or timelessness). Defined in this way, eternality is proper to an entity identifiable as a mind or a person (and in just that sense living) but existing beginninglessly, endlessly and timelessly. Such a concept raises obvious difficulties. Some philosophers think the difficulties can be resolved, but others think that in the light of such difficulties the concept must be modified or simply rejected as incoherent. The most obvious difficulty has to do with the combination of atemporality and duration. Special objections have arisen in connection with ascribing eternality to God. Some people have thought that an eternal being could not do anything at all, especially not in the temporal world. But the notion of an atemporal person’s acting is not incoherent. Such acts as knowing necessary truths or willing that a world exist for a certain length of time are acts that themselves take no time and require no temporal location. An eternal God could engage in acts of cognition and of volition and could even do things that might seem to require a temporal location, such as answering a prayer. The concept of God’s eternality is relevant to several issues in philosophy of religion, including the apparent irreconcilability of divine omniscience with divine immutability and with human freedom.

Molina, Luis de (1535–1600)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred J. Freddoso
Keyword(s):  
Free Choice ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
Causal Influence ◽  
Intrinsic Nature ◽  
Natural Knowledge ◽  
Divine Knowledge ◽  
History Of ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Political Philosopher

A leading figure in sixteenth-century Iberian scholasticism, Molina was one of the most controversial thinkers in the history of Catholic thought. In keeping with the strongly libertarian account of human free choice that marked the early Jesuit theologians, Molina held that God’s causal influence on free human acts does not by its intrinsic nature uniquely determine what those acts will be or whether they will be good or evil. Because of this, Molina asserted against his Dominican rivals that God’s comprehensive providential plan for the created world and infallible foreknowledge of future contingents do not derive just from the combination of his antecedent ‘natural’ knowledge of metaphysically necessary truths and his ‘free’ knowledge of the causal influence – both natural (general concurrence) and supernatural (grace) – by which he wills to cooperate with free human acts. Rather, in addition to God’s natural knowledge, Molina posited a distinct kind of antecedent divine knowledge, dubbed ‘middle knowledge’, by which God knows pre-volitionally, that is, prior to any free decree of his own will regarding contingent beings, how any possible rational creature would in fact freely choose to act in any possible circumstances in which it had the power to act freely. And on this basis Molina proceeded to forge his controversial reconciliation of free choice with the Catholic doctrines of grace, divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination. In addition to his work in dogmatic theology, Molina was also an accomplished moral and political philosopher who wrote extensive and empirically well-informed tracts on political authority, slavery, war and economics.

Nativism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Samet
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Young Age ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Linguistic Data ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Fruitful Research ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Native Tongue

Traditional empiricism claims that the mind is initially equipped only with the capacity for experience and the mechanisms that make it possible for us to learn from experience. Nativists have argued that this is not enough, and that our innate endowment must be far richer, including information, ideas, beliefs, perhaps even knowledge. Empiricism held the advantage until recently, partly because of a misidentification of nativism with rationalism. Rationalists such as Descartes and Leibniz thought nativism would explain how a priori knowledge of necessary truths is possible. However, the fact that something is innate does not establish that it is true, let alone that it is necessary or a priori. More recently, nativism has been reanimated by Chomsky’s claims that children must have innate language-specific information that mediates acquisition of their native tongue. He argues that, given standard empiricist learning procedures, the linguistic data available to a child underdetermines the grammar on which they converge at a very young age, with relatively little effort or instruction. The successes in linguistics have led to fruitful research on nativism in other domains of human knowledge: for example, arithmetic, the nature of physical objects, features of persons, and possession of concepts generally.

Necessary truths.

2011 ◽  
pp. 359-381
Author(s):  
George Henry Lewes
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Truths

Of demonstration, and necessary truths.

2011 ◽  
pp. 258-289
Author(s):  
John Stuart Mill
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Truths
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