Dialogues on development: The individual, society, and political order

1987 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-298
2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Bohdan S. Kordan

<p class="EW-abstract"><strong>Abstract:</strong> Responding to a regime that failed to meet the needs of society, the Maidan materialized as a genuine expression of civic resistance and democratic renewal. Placing the individual at the centre of political life not only marks the revitalization of Ukrainian civil society but also serves as a legitimate basis for the transformation of the political order. The Maidan—its values, principles and ethos— offers a framework by which Kyiv might meet the twin challenges of reform and war.</p><p class="EW-Keyword"><strong>Keywords:</strong> Euromaidan, European Union, Geopolitics, Russia, Ukraine</p>


1977 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 378-382
Author(s):  
Rollin W. Workman ◽  

1980 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Kramer

Although the founder of the Catholic church said that “My Kingdom is not of this world,” one commentator correctly has observed of the church that “few contemporary institutions have been more intimately — and none more continuously — involved in the political order.” Never was the church's temporal dimension more graphically illustrated than in the June 1979 visit to his homeland of Pope John Paul II, the former Karol Cardinal Wojtyla, Archbishop of Cracow, Poland. Millions of people, many of them from other Communist countries, heard the first pontiff ever elected from a Soviet bloc nation repeatedly call for respect for human rights, for provision of religious liberties, and for the primacy of the individual over the state — demands that many regimes, including Communist ones, have been notably reluctant to grant. The pontiff also publicly raised the delicate issue of Polish-Soviet relations, asserting that alliances must be based on mutual respect and equality and that “there can be no just Europe without the independence of Poland marked on its map.”


The Forum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-76
Author(s):  
Adam M. Enders ◽  
Joseph E. Uscinski

Abstract Growing levels of polarization and out-group hostility have become fashionable explanations for the caustic politics of the Trump presidency. However, partisan and ideological identities cannot explain popular attraction to Trump’s anti-elite and populist rhetoric, nor can polarization and sorting account for rising levels of mass identification as political independents. In light of these discrepancies, we offer an explanation for the Trump era unrelated to traditional left-right identities and ideologies: anti-establishment orientations. We argue that much of what is interpreted as an expression of partisan and ideological extremism or polarization is actually the product of a deep-seated antagonism toward the broader political establishment. We first exhibit the individual-level correlates of anti-establishment orientations, finding that people holding strong anti-establishment views exhibit relatively high levels of anti-social personality traits and distrust of others. We then show that anti-establishment orientations are more predictive than left-right orientations of beliefs in conspiracy theories regarding COVID-19, QAnon, and voter fraud. Most importantly, we demonstrate that, while anti-establishment orientations are positively related to support for Donald Trump, they are negatively related to support for Joe Biden and both major parties. In short, the toxicity emblematic of the Trump era—support for outsider candidates, belief in conspiracy theories, corrosive rhetoric, and violence—are derivative of antipathy towards the established political order, rather than a strict adherence to partisan and ideological dogma. We conclude that Trump’s most powerful and unique impact on American electoral politics is his activation, inflammation, and manipulation of preexisting anti-establishment orientations for partisan ends.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 253-267
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Stawrowski ◽  
Clarinda Calma

How can liberty be implemented through state institutions? And what kind of liberty are we thinking about in the contemporary world, since this concept is generally acknowledged as ambiguous? In order to understand the modern state as a rule of liberty, one must investigate the essence of liberty itself. It is widely known that liberty can be viewed in many ways, but what kind of liberty can govern the contemporary political order? Among the philosophers who have examined authority from the point of view of liberty is Benjamin Constant, who has distinguished liberty understood as personal security from liberty recognized as participation in political life, and who has likewise stressed that these two understandings of liberty are complementary. Another widely known vision of freedom is the division of liberty into negative and positive; the latter, in Berlin’s original understanding of the term, remains unclear. Such doubts however do not apply to the negative concept of liberty, as Berlin called it, or its equivalent in Constant’s understanding of liberty understood as personal security. Both authors concur that this understanding of liberty is fundamental, and should above all find its expression in contemporary state institutions. In order to reveal the logic of liberty thus understood, we must turn to its very roots; that is, to Thomas Hobbes’s concept of liberty. For it is Hobbes who first precisely defined that understanding of liberty, and who first consciously engaged in designing a state based from start to finish on the liberty of the individual.


Author(s):  
Benjamin Kelly

This chapter reconstructs the legal underpinnings of repressive responses to fundamental threats to the Roman political order: sedition, conspiracies, riots and provincial revolts. It outlines the legal and ethical limitations on state power that were invoked in relation to acts of repression. It argues that there was a tension in Roman civilization between ideas about the appropriate limitations on the exercise of state violence against the individual and the need to deal with fundamental political threats. With the growth of autocracy in the later Empire, the ethics of rulers’ responses to fundamental threats to the political order came to be emphasized rather than the legal rights of the rebellious. The chapter argues that attempts were made to downgrade legally or discursively the civic statuses of individuals accused of threatening the political order. Such attempts aimed to reduce concerns about repressive actions that would have been considered illegal or unethical.


Author(s):  
Raymond Plant

Political philosophy developed as a central aspect of philosophy generally in the world of ancient Greece, and the writings of Plato and Aristotle made a basic and still important contribution to the subject. Central to political philosophy has been a concern with the justification or criticism of general political arrangements such as democracy, oligarchy or kingship, and with the ways in which the sovereignty of the state is to be understood; with the relationship between the individual and the political order, and the nature of the individual’s obligation to that order; with the coherence and identity of the political order from the point of view of the nation and groups within the nation, and with the role of culture, language and race as aspects of this; with the basis of different general political ideologies and standpoints such as conservatism, socialism and liberalism; and with the nature of the basic concepts such as state, individual, rights, community and justice in terms of which we understand and argue about politics. Because it is concerned with the justification and criticism of existing and possible forms of political organization a good deal of political philosophy is normative; it seeks to provide grounds for one particular conception of the right and the good in politics. In consequence many current controversies in political philosophy are methodological; they have to do with how (if at all) normative judgments about politics can be justified.


2021 ◽  
pp. 113-134
Author(s):  
Kamila Dworniczak

The text discusses definitions of photography formulated in Poland in the 1940s. The author analyses Zbigniew Dłubak’s series of photographs inspired by the poetry of Pablo Neruda in reference to surrealism, Marxism, and, primarily, to Władysław Strzemiński’s theory of vision. Particular emphasis is placed on the concept of the image shared by Dłubak and Strzemiński, a concept that links the issue of realism with individual expression, allowing for a formal differentiation of representation (abstraction). In consequence, the analysed series by Dłubak is presented as sharing similarities with seemingly formally remote series of collages To My Friends the Jews by Strzemiński. Both demonstrate an ambition to express in the modern form both collective realism as well as individual memory, primarily of the war events. Proposed interpretation suggests that the use and understanding of photography as a medium closely tied to reality had a decisive meaning for the new formula of the image constructed right after 1945 – formula open to experimenting, yet also ideologically radical, addressing the existential problems of the individual involved with the new political order.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janis Grzybowski

AbstractThe literature on de facto states challenges the conventional identification of states by legal recognition, proposing to identify states based on their effectiveness instead. Yet, as I argue in this paper, rather than turning the tables on recognition, the de facto state challenge ultimately reveals all state identification in International Relations and international law to be essentially indeterminate. This lacuna, I suggest, is not an accidental omission, but an expression of the foundational paradox of modern political order that is rooted in the intertwined ontology of the state system and the individual states constituting it, with each presupposing the other. As a result, the opposition between empirical facts, political decisions, and legal norms invoked in attempts to identify states cannot but remain irresolvable. This should not be regarded as a problem to be overcome, however, but as a source of social order. Although states cannot be substantively identified, any effort to do so in practice naturalizes the state as the very form through which we articulate and shape political claims, conflicts, and settlements. In performatively enacting states precisely at the contested margins, state identification thus both invokes and (re-)produces the statist international as the central imaginary of modern political order.


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