scholarly journals Nash game model for optimizing market strategies, configuration of platform products in a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) supply chain for a product family

2010 ◽  
Vol 206 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yugang Yu ◽  
George Q. Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Family ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Vendor Managed Inventory ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Market Strategies

scholarly journals Horizontal Coalition Stability Analysis of Supply Chain Entities Based on Sequential Game

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shizhao Wang ◽  
Yong Luo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Sequential Game ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Coalition Stability ◽  
Reasonable Range

Aiming to find the effect of the same status entities’ horizontal coordination on supply chain, this paper studied the coalition stability of dealers in a two-stage supply chain with one supplier and multiple dealers. First, a vertical sequential game model is built, where the supplier is leader and the multiple dealers are followers. In the second stage of the game, multiple dealers face two selections: playing Nash game with each other or developing a coalition. Then, according to the results acquired by comparing the dealers’ profits which depend on their coalition situations, the criterion of coalition stability is developed. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the validity of the model, and some insights are obtained. For example, if the sensitivity coefficientTof the market price is fixed, dealers’ coalition tends to be stable with the increasing of the substitution ratekin a reasonable range; the supplier’s optimal wholesale price is constant with and without dealer’s coalition, but dealers’ coalition causes demand to decrease, which leads to the decrease of the supplier’s profit too. The result of this paper provides an important reference for the formation of dealers’ coalition in IT or automobile supply chain.

scholarly journals Complexity and Entropy Analysis of a Multi-Channel Supply Chain Considering Channel Cooperation and Service

Entropy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (12) ◽  
pp. 970 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Xingli Chen ◽  
Yimin Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Stability Domain ◽  
Largest Lyapunov Exponent ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Stability

In this paper, based on the background of channel cooperation and service of the supply chain, this paper constructs a Nash game model and a Stackeberg game model in the multi-channel supply chain considering an online-to-store channel (OSC). Based on maximizing the profits and the bounded rationality expectation rule (BRE), this paper builds a dynamic game model, respectively, and analyzes the stability of the equilibrium points by mathematical analysis and explores the influences of parameters on stability domain and entropy of the system by using bifurcation diagram, the entropy diagram, the largest Lyapunov exponent and the chaotic attractor etc. Besides, the influences of service level and profit distribution rate on system’s profit are discussed. The theoretical results show that the greater the service level and profit distribution rate are, the smaller the stability domain of the system is; the system will go into chaotic state and the system’s entropy will increase when operators adjust her/his price decision quickly; when the manufacturer or the retailer keeps service level in the appropriate value which is conducive to maximizing her/his profit; the manufacturer should carefully set the service level of OSC to ensure the system’s profit; in Nash game model, the stability of the system weakens than that in Stackelberg game model. Furthermore, this paper puts forward some suggestions to help the manufacturer and retailer in multi-channel supply chain to do the better decision.

Implementation of Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) in Managing Intra Ocular Lenses (IOL) in Eye Care Organization

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (9) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Operational Efficiency ◽  
Care Organization ◽  
Healthcare Industry ◽  
Vendor Managed Inventory ◽  
Eye Care ◽  
Inventory Cost ◽  
Innovative Strategies ◽  
Industry Hospital

Nowadays healthcare has a completely changed scenario as compared with the early 90’s. As more and more profit generating hospitals are coming in the industry, hospital and healthcare is no longer remains a charitable or philanthropically act. So to be remain in the market and compete within hospitals need to now focus on the different and innovative strategies in every aspect. Supply chain and operations is one of the important key of any organization which directly impact on business and revenue. Vendor Managed inventory is not a new concept but it is not efficiently utilized in service and healthcare industry as of now. Some retail and automobile industries has utilized the concept and also able to reduce the inventory cost with manageable position of stock out and over stocking position. As hospital’s key functioning is to deal with life of patients on day to day so position of material need to be necessarily on right time and right place. This paper is based on the insight of the application of vendor managed inventory in the management of inventory for the IOL (Intra ocular lenses) that is used for the surgeries in the eye hospital. We will also study the questionnaire on the acceptability of the concept of vendor managed inventory in the hospital that will help to assess the acceptability of VMI in hospital and healthcare industry. Also a framework matrix is designed to understand the relation of VMI with the revenue earning and smoothening of operational efficiency.

scholarly journals Single-Manufacturer Multi-Retailer Supply Chain Models with Discrete Stochastic Demand

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (15) ◽  
pp. 8271
Author(s):  
Yaqing Xu ◽  
Jiang Zhang ◽  
Zihao Chen ◽  
Yihua Wei
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Dynamic Programming Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Stochastic Demands ◽  
Demand Models

Although there are highly discrete stochastic demands in practical supply chain problems, they are seldom considered in the research on supply chain systems, especially the single-manufacturer multi-retailer supply chain systems. There are no significant differences between continuous and discrete demand supply chain models, but the solutions for discrete random demand models are more challenging and difficult. This paper studies a supply chain system of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers with discrete stochastic demands. Each retailer faces a random discrete demand, and the manufacturer utilizes different wholesale prices to influence each retailer’s ordering decision. Both Make-To-Order and Make-To-Stock scenarios are considered. For each scenario, the corresponding Stackelberg game model is constructed respectively. By proving a series of theorems, we transfer the solution of the game model into non-linear integer programming model, which can be easily solved by a dynamic programming method. However, with the increase in the number of retailers and the production capacity of manufacturers, the computational complexity of dynamic programming drastically increases due to the Dimension Barrier. Therefore, the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) approach is introduced, which significantly reduces the computational complexity of solving the supply chain model.

scholarly journals Pricing Policies in a Retailer Stackelberg O2O Green Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 3236
Author(s):  
Gan Wan ◽  
Gang Kou ◽  
Tie Li ◽  
Feng Xiao ◽  
Yang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Good Combination ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Mathematical Function ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Offline Channels

Due to the popularization of the concept of “new retailing”, we study a new commercial model named O2O (online-to-offline), which is a good combination model of a direct channel and a traditional retail channel. We analyze an O2O supply chain in which manufacturers are responsible for making green products and selling them through both online and offline channels. The retailer is responsible for all online and offline channels’ orders, and the manufacturer gives the retailer a fixed fee. We construct a mathematical function model and analyze the greenness and pricing strategies of centralized and decentralized settings through the retailer Stackelberg game model. Due to the effects of the double marginalization of supply chain members, we adopt a simple contract to coordinate the green supply chain. The paper’s contributions are that we obtain pricing and greening strategies by taking the cooperation of offline channels and online channels into consideration under the O2O green supply chain environment.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

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