On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games

2011 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 683-688 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daisuke Oyama ◽  
Satoru Takahashi
2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darin Christensen

AbstractForeign investment in Africa's mineral resources has increased dramatically. This paper addresses three questions raised by this trend: do commercial mining investments increase the likelihood of social or armed conflict? If so, when are these disputes most prevalent? And, finally, what mechanisms help explain these conflicts? I show, first, that mining has contrasting effects on social and armed conflict: while the probability of protests or riots increases (roughly doubling) after mining starts, there is no increase in rebel activity. Second, I show that the probability of social conflict rises with plausibly exogenous increases in world commodity prices. Finally, I compile additional geo-spatial and survey data to explore potential mechanisms, including reporting bias, environmental harm, in-migration, inequality, and governance. Finding little evidence consistent with these accounts, I develop an explanation related to incomplete information—a common cause of conflict in industrial and international relations. This mechanism rationalizes why mining induces protest, why these conflicts are exacerbated by rising prices, and why transparency dampens the relationship between prices and protest.


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Cristina Molinari

Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games.


2010 ◽  
Vol 163-167 ◽  
pp. 3193-3199
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Ya Fei Ma ◽  
Jian Ren Zhang

The influencing information of structural resistance cannot be exactly inspected due to limitation of the experimental means, time and space. The study must be conducted by incomplete information and the uncertainty is enhanced. The uncertainty consists of fuzziness, randomness, and faultiness of knowledge. The faultiness of knowledge is the weak uncertainty, and can be incorporated into fuzziness and randomness. A novel probabilistic analysis method of corrosion-induced resistance degradation subject to fuzziness and randomness is developed in this paper. The reinforcing bar corrosion is induced by chloride ion attack in reinforced concrete (RC) bridge. The relationship between steel area corrosion rate and yield strength is presented based on the experimental investigation on mechanical property of corroded reinforcement. The fuzzy time-variant probabilistic analysis of resistance degradation is illustrated by an example problem of RC bridge beam. The result can be used to time-variant reliability-based evaluation for reinforced concrete.


2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 437-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Vives

The theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games is presented as the appropriate tool to model complementarities. The approach, which has not yet been fully incorporated into the standard toolbox of researchers, makes the analysis intuitive and simple, helps in deriving new results and in casting new light on old ones. The paper takes stock of recent contributions and develops applications to industrial organization (oligopoly, R&D, and dynamics), finance (currency and banking crisis) and macroeconomics (adjustment and menu costs). Particular attention is devoted to Markov games and to games of incomplete information (including global games).


10.29007/shrz ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Csaba Imre Hencz ◽  
Tamás Hartványi

In this research, we intend to present a novel mathematical approach to logistics which allows (financial) value to be associated with information as a central corporate resource. The inherent logistics processes (transport, production, sales) uncertainty requires continuous inventory monitoring and maintenance of safety stock levels. Literature and practice show that logistics responds to poor quality or incomplete information by increasing inventory.In our research, we are looking for a minimum of safety stock levels based on the processing of information available in space and time and I intend to give a formal description of the mathematical model and present an example of its application.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 370-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brenton Kenkel

Incomplete information exacerbates the problems inherent in collective action. Participants cannot efficiently coordinate their actions if they do not know each other’s preferences. I investigate when ordinary communication, or cheap talk, may resolve mutual uncertainty in collective action problems. I find that the efficacy of communication depends critically on the relationship between contributions and the value of the joint project. The incentive barriers to honesty are highest when every contribution increases the project’s value. Participants then have a strict incentive to say whatever would induce others to contribute the most, so cheap talk lacks credibility. By contrast, when contributions may be marginally worthless, such as when the project has no value unless contributions hit a certain threshold, communication may help participants avoid wasted effort. Using these findings, I identify which collective action problems in politics might benefit from communication and which require more expensive solutions to overcome uncertainty.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Luis E. Castro ◽  
Nazrul I. Shaikh

This article presents the relationship between a firm's advertisement spending and sales in a duopoly when information about the competitors' advertisement spending is unavailable. The competitive interaction between the firms has been modeled as imperfect information Cournot and Stackelberg games and the conditions for subgame perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium are presented. The results suggest that when the firms are similar in size and advertisement effectiveness, both firms are better off sharing their advertising plans with each other. On the other hand, when one of the firms is a market leader, the follower may profit from the leader's advertisement spending and so is better off keeping the leader guessing. A practical approach to estimate the optimum advertisement budget based on the expected values of the competitors' historic advertising spending is presented as well.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 461-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
TANGA MORAE MCDANIEL

We use experiments to study coordination in games with incomplete information. In the games, one player knows the payoffs, while the other player knows the probability of payoffs forming a prisoner's dilemma or a stag-hunt. When payoffs form a stag-hunt there are two Pareto ranked pure strategy equilibria. We ask whether cheap talk aids coordination on the socially optimal equilibrium and whether the informed player can use cheap talk to engineer her preferred outcome. Consistent with previous literature, the benefit of cheap talk depends on the relationship between payoffs and risks, and in the games we study; cheap talk benefits informed players only when the stag-hunt payoffs exhibit low risks.


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