The role of the preferred neighbor with the expected payoff on cooperation in spatial public goods game under optimal strategy selection mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 584 ◽  
pp. 126363
Author(s):  
Yunsheng Deng ◽  
Jihui Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Strategy Selection ◽  
Selection Mechanism ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Expected Payoff

The role of memory in human strategy updating in optional public goods game

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 043128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhaojin Xu ◽  
Ruyu Li ◽  
Lianzhong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game

scholarly journals Heterogeneous groups cooperate in public good problems despite normative disagreements about individual contribution levels

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Otten ◽  
Vincent Buskens ◽  
Wojtek Przepiorka ◽  
Naomi Ellemers
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Individual Contribution ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Homogeneous Groups ◽  
The Public ◽  
Heterogeneous Groups ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Good Individual

Abstract Norms can promote human cooperation to provide public goods. Yet, the potential of norms to promote cooperation may be limited to homogeneous groups in which all members benefit equally from the public good. Individual heterogeneity in the benefits of public good provision is commonly conjectured to bring about normative disagreements that harm cooperation. However, the role of these normative disagreements remains unclear because they are rarely directly measured or manipulated. In a laboratory experiment, we first measure participants’ views on the appropriate way to contribute to a public good with heterogeneous returns. We then use this information to sort people into groups that either agree or disagree on these views, thereby manipulating group-level disagreement on normative views. Participants subsequently make several incentivized contribution decisions in a public goods game with peer punishment. We find that although there are considerable disagreements about individual contribution levels in heterogeneous groups, these disagreements do not impede cooperation. While cooperation is maintained because low contributors are punished, participants do not use punishment to impose their normative views on others. The contribution levels at which groups cooperate strongly relate to the average normative views of these groups.

scholarly journals Role of Investment Heterogeneity in the Cooperation on Spatial Public Goods Game

PLoS ONE ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. e91012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wu-Jie Yuan ◽  
Cheng-Yi Xia
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game

scholarly journals The study on the role of dedicators on promoting cooperation in public goods game

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. e0257475
Author(s):  
Zhenghong Wu ◽  
Huan Huang ◽  
Qinghu Liao
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Care Group ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Emotional Effect ◽  
Spring Festival ◽  
Willingness To Donate ◽  
Negative Effect

In daily life, some people are always seen dedicating available resources to support collective activities. In this paper, we call these people who care group goals more than individual goals dedicators. Inspired by this phenomenon, we studied the role of dedicators on the evolution of cooperation in public goods game (PGG) based on a Chinese Folk Spring Festival Gala. Three types of agents were introduced into our PGG model including cooperators, defectors and dedicators. Dedicators tried to donate when the Gala was short of funds. Cooperators and defectors imitated the strategy of the highest-payoff neighbor based on the rational mechanism. And their imitating probability was modified on account of the emotional mechanism for positive effect of the dedicator’s donating behavior and negative effect of continuous poor performance. Through numerical simulations, we found that the existence of dedicators can indeed promote cooperation in PGG. It should be noted that dedicators’ willingness to donate was more important than their donation quantity in facilitating cooperation. And the stronger the emotional effect intensity of dedicators’ donating behavior was, the better. So, the selfless dedication of participants should be praised to promote cooperation by improving their emotional effect intensity. Last but not least, a reasonable activity budget was needed to sustain the highest level of cooperation.

Sharing Money With Humans Versus Computers: On the Role of Honesty-Humility and (Non-)Social Preferences

2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062110556
Author(s):  
Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Stefan Pfattheicher
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Game Studies ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Game ◽  
The Social ◽  
As If

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (a) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (b) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (b) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.

scholarly journals Classroom Games: Voluntary Provision of a Public Good

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 209-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles A Holt ◽  
Susan K Laury
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Fund Raising ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
The Public ◽  
Voluntary Provision ◽  
Good Problem

This paper describes a simple public goods game, implemented with playing cards in a classroom setup. Students choose whether to contribute to the provision of a public good in a situation where it is privately optimal not to contribute, but socially optimal to contribute fully. This exercise motivates discussion of altruism, strategies for private fund-raising, and the role of government in resolving the public good problem.

scholarly journals Selfish or selfless? The role of empathy in economics

2010 ◽  
Vol 365 (1538) ◽  
pp. 303-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Kirman ◽  
Miriam Teschl
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Prosocial Behaviour ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Usual Assumption

Empathy is a longstanding issue in economics, especially for welfare economics, but one which has faded from the scene in recent years. However, with the rise of neuroeconomics, there is now a renewed interest in this subject. Some economists have even gone so far as to suggest that neuroscientific experiments reveal heterogeneous empathy levels across individuals. If this were the case, this would be in line with economists' usual assumption of stable and given preferences and would greatly facilitate the study of prosocial behaviour with which empathy is often associated. After reviewing some neuroscientific psychological and neuroeconomic evidence on empathy, we will, however, criticize the notion of a given empathy distribution in the population by referring to recent experiments on a public goods game that suggest that, on the contrary, the degree of empathy that individuals exhibit is very much dependent on context and social interaction.

scholarly journals To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game

2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 84-106
Author(s):  
Ananish Chaudhuri ◽  
DeeDee Chen ◽  
Sara Graziano ◽  
Frances McIntire ◽  
Dawn Winkler
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Ride

scholarly journals The role of noise in the spatial public goods game

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (7) ◽  
pp. 073404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Alberto Javarone ◽  
Federico Battiston
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game

Social Emotions

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Social Behavior ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Social Emotions ◽  
Distant Future ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Shame And Guilt ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Future Consequences

This chapter examines the role of social emotions such as guilt and shame in supporting human cooperation, and how these could have evolved. It first models the process by which an emotion such as shame may affect social behavior in a simple public goods game before discussing how shame and guilt along with internalized ethical norms foster cooperation to be sustained with minimal levels of costly punishment, resulting in mutually beneficial interactions at limited cost. It also explains how the internalization of norms and the expression of these norms in a social emotion such as guilt and shame induce the individual to place a contemporaneous value on the future consequences of present behavior, rather than relying upon an appropriately discounted accounting of its probable payoffs in the distant future. The chapter suggests that shame, guilt, and other social emotions may function like pain by providing personally beneficial guides for action that bypass the explicit cognitive optimizing process.

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