Social Emotions

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Social Behavior ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Social Emotions ◽  
Distant Future ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Shame And Guilt ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Future Consequences

This chapter examines the role of social emotions such as guilt and shame in supporting human cooperation, and how these could have evolved. It first models the process by which an emotion such as shame may affect social behavior in a simple public goods game before discussing how shame and guilt along with internalized ethical norms foster cooperation to be sustained with minimal levels of costly punishment, resulting in mutually beneficial interactions at limited cost. It also explains how the internalization of norms and the expression of these norms in a social emotion such as guilt and shame induce the individual to place a contemporaneous value on the future consequences of present behavior, rather than relying upon an appropriately discounted accounting of its probable payoffs in the distant future. The chapter suggests that shame, guilt, and other social emotions may function like pain by providing personally beneficial guides for action that bypass the explicit cognitive optimizing process.

scholarly journals The Role of Faith Systems and Religions in the Future of Sustainable Development: An Islamic Outlook

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Mamdouh M. A. Sobaihi
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Belief Systems ◽  
Distant Future ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Religious Networks ◽  
Development Plans ◽  
Development Goals ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Shed Light

Reference material concerning sustainable development has increased dramatically over the last decades, with more and more countries, agencies and businesses following the sustainable development ideals and principles. However, one of the most basic of human institutions has not contributed, and perhaps not allowed to contribute, to the debate. Religion and faith systems have a great potential in influencing not only the definitions of sustainable development but also concepts of human sustainable practices to achieve sustainable development goals. The main obstacle to the fulfillment of this potential appears to be the lack of outreach and acceptance of the scientific community to the religious and faith system institutions and individuals. In this paper, a review of the literature is carried out to shed light on the root of this schism between science and belief systems. In addition, the paper will highlight how the majority of the literature deals with process rather than the individual human being and how to make him/her a better practitioner of sustainability. It is also aimed that the paper shed some light on how religious and faith system ideals can be incorporated into sustainable development plans and systems. The main focus of the paper is to cast light on the religion of Islam and some of the Islamic teachings and Ideals and how they can be incorporated in delivering the message of sustainable development since the religion of Islam is forecast to be the largest faith on the planet in the not too distant future. In conclusion, a discussion on how the various religious networks can deliver the message of sustainability will be discussed.

scholarly journals The role of the emotions of guilt and shame in methodology of research on social emotions

2021 ◽  
pp. 11-25
Author(s):  
Alexandra Shiller
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Psychology ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Social Emotions ◽  
History Of Research ◽  
Current State ◽  
History Of ◽  
Methodological Problems ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Methodology Of Science

This article is dedicated to examination of the role of guilt and shame, namely to prevalence one of these emotions in a particular culture as the leading mechanism of social control. The prevalence of guilt or shame as a cultural “dimension” has become one of the first criteria for the division of cultures into Western and Eastern, and was used by the researchers as a basic postulate for cross-cultural r. Over time, the perception of emotions as the criterion for the division of cultures has been revised. The article traces the history of research on emotions in general, namely the emotions of guilt and shame as social emotions, as well as describes guilt and shame as collective and individual experiences. Analysis is conducted on the role of guilt and shame in methodology of research on social emotions, cross-cultural studies. The author outlines certain methodological problems and contradictions, and assesses the current state of scientific research dedicated to social emotions. The conclusion is made that the research on collective sense of guilt and shame is more advanced from the perspective of cross-cultural psychology and philosophy, as well as the overall methodology of science; it allows shifting from the study of the role of individual emotions in interpersonal (conditioned by collective ties), intergroup and intragroup communication towards the integrated study of emotions associated with interaction of the individual and society, i.e. social experiences.

The role of memory in human strategy updating in optional public goods game

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 043128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhaojin Xu ◽  
Ruyu Li ◽  
Lianzhong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game

scholarly journals Heterogeneous groups cooperate in public good problems despite normative disagreements about individual contribution levels

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Otten ◽  
Vincent Buskens ◽  
Wojtek Przepiorka ◽  
Naomi Ellemers
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Individual Contribution ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Homogeneous Groups ◽  
The Public ◽  
Heterogeneous Groups ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Good Individual

Abstract Norms can promote human cooperation to provide public goods. Yet, the potential of norms to promote cooperation may be limited to homogeneous groups in which all members benefit equally from the public good. Individual heterogeneity in the benefits of public good provision is commonly conjectured to bring about normative disagreements that harm cooperation. However, the role of these normative disagreements remains unclear because they are rarely directly measured or manipulated. In a laboratory experiment, we first measure participants’ views on the appropriate way to contribute to a public good with heterogeneous returns. We then use this information to sort people into groups that either agree or disagree on these views, thereby manipulating group-level disagreement on normative views. Participants subsequently make several incentivized contribution decisions in a public goods game with peer punishment. We find that although there are considerable disagreements about individual contribution levels in heterogeneous groups, these disagreements do not impede cooperation. While cooperation is maintained because low contributors are punished, participants do not use punishment to impose their normative views on others. The contribution levels at which groups cooperate strongly relate to the average normative views of these groups.

scholarly journals Role of Investment Heterogeneity in the Cooperation on Spatial Public Goods Game

PLoS ONE ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. e91012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wu-Jie Yuan ◽  
Cheng-Yi Xia
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game

scholarly journals The study on the role of dedicators on promoting cooperation in public goods game

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. e0257475
Author(s):  
Zhenghong Wu ◽  
Huan Huang ◽  
Qinghu Liao
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Care Group ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Emotional Effect ◽  
Spring Festival ◽  
Willingness To Donate ◽  
Negative Effect

In daily life, some people are always seen dedicating available resources to support collective activities. In this paper, we call these people who care group goals more than individual goals dedicators. Inspired by this phenomenon, we studied the role of dedicators on the evolution of cooperation in public goods game (PGG) based on a Chinese Folk Spring Festival Gala. Three types of agents were introduced into our PGG model including cooperators, defectors and dedicators. Dedicators tried to donate when the Gala was short of funds. Cooperators and defectors imitated the strategy of the highest-payoff neighbor based on the rational mechanism. And their imitating probability was modified on account of the emotional mechanism for positive effect of the dedicator’s donating behavior and negative effect of continuous poor performance. Through numerical simulations, we found that the existence of dedicators can indeed promote cooperation in PGG. It should be noted that dedicators’ willingness to donate was more important than their donation quantity in facilitating cooperation. And the stronger the emotional effect intensity of dedicators’ donating behavior was, the better. So, the selfless dedication of participants should be praised to promote cooperation by improving their emotional effect intensity. Last but not least, a reasonable activity budget was needed to sustain the highest level of cooperation.

Sharing Money With Humans Versus Computers: On the Role of Honesty-Humility and (Non-)Social Preferences

2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062110556
Author(s):  
Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Stefan Pfattheicher
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Game Studies ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Game ◽  
The Social ◽  
As If

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (a) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (b) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (b) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.

scholarly journals Classroom Games: Voluntary Provision of a Public Good

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 209-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles A Holt ◽  
Susan K Laury
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Fund Raising ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
The Public ◽  
Voluntary Provision ◽  
Good Problem

This paper describes a simple public goods game, implemented with playing cards in a classroom setup. Students choose whether to contribute to the provision of a public good in a situation where it is privately optimal not to contribute, but socially optimal to contribute fully. This exercise motivates discussion of altruism, strategies for private fund-raising, and the role of government in resolving the public good problem.

Reciprocity and Social Norms: Short- and Long-Run Crowding Out Effects of Financial Incentives

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-213
Author(s):  
Jinhua Zhao ◽  
◽  
John M. Kerr ◽  
Maria Knight Lapinski ◽  
Robert Shupp ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Using Data

We link the reciprocity model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) with the theory of normative social behavior to study how financial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation in both the short and long runs. Using data from a lab-based repeated public goods game, we find strong evidence in support of the reciprocity model and crowding out effects both when the payment is in place and after it stops. When the payment program is in place, subjects become less sensitive to reciprocity, perceive less kindness in others’ contributions, and care less about others’ welfare. The overall decrease in motivation to reciprocate reduces the effectiveness of the payment program by almost 50%. About 20% of the crowding out effect persists after the payment stops, and the reciprocity mechanism explains over three quarters of the long-run crowding out effect.

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